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LANGUAGE SERVES THE PEOPLE, NOT THE OTHER WAY AROUND!

Ideologies of language in Lithuania, Norway, Serbia and the Baltic, Scandinavian and Ex-Yugoslav regions. A typological perspective on metalinguistic media discourses and language policies

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- SCLL (State Commission of the Lithuanian language)
- CSSL (Commission for the Standardization of Serbian Language)
- LP (Language planning)
- SLI (State Language Inspectorate)

Country / region codes:
- LT (Lithuania)
- LA (Latvia)
- EE (Estonia)
- SR (Serbia)
- HR (Croatia)
- BiH (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
- ME (Montenegro)
- SE (Sweden)
- NO (Norway)
- DK (Denmark)
- NORD (Nordic)

Primary sources:
- DOC- (LP document)
- Exp- (Article by a language expert)
- Int- (interview with a language expert)
- Com- (Comment section or forum threat in which the comment was found)
INTRODUCTION

In 2003, Richard Bauman and Charles Briggs made a claim that there are ‘metadiscursive regimes’ governing how we think and talk about language. The claim was that the contemporary understanding of language is a synthesis of two modernist ideas: languages are abstract, clearly separable entities and the idea that one people speaks one language. Their monograph “Voices of Modernity: Language Ideologies and the Politics of Inequality” (2003) sought to trace the origins of these two modernist ideas of language. The first was traced back to the work of the philosophers – such as John Locke and Francis Bacon – who insisted on the ideal condition of language, where, for example, one word had one meaning; a system of rules would be imposed in order to make language a precise tool of pure communication, free of elements that would be used for manipulative purposes or cause misunderstandings, such as rhetoric. The latter idea was traced back to Johann Gottfried von Herder’s and Wilhelm von Humboldt’s idea of language being a creation of the spirit of one people, which bears the worldview and the history of the people imprinted in the language and all products of those languages such as folk tales, songs and texts. These two ideas form an understanding of language as essentially unified across one whole society, in literature referred to as monolingualism or the “monoglot ideology” (Silverstein 1996, as quoted in Blommaert 2006). As they claim, this ideology is so strong and even ‘common-sense’ that it is embedded in the school system and national language politics. Numerous consequences have historically derived from such a way of thinking, a few of which being: linguistic purism, linguistic nationalism the idea that languages are separable from the speakers and, ultimately, linguistic inequality: all language use that does not match these ideologies is stigmatized. This way of thinking of language is said to be dominant in every European country, as well as in those parts of the world that were violently civilized by Europeans through colonization (cf. Makoni & Pennycook 2005).

Yet not every European country exhibits exactly the same ideology. In Norway, there is no spoken standard language (Papazian 2012a), it is considered normal that Norwegians should speak in their local dialect both privately and publicly; this has been called a pro-dialect ideology (Røyneland 2009). In Serbia, the recent change in the name of the language from Serbo-Croatian to Serbian, causes disagreements amongst linguists and politicians about what Serbian language actually is (cf. Greenberg 2004, Bugarski 2018). For some linguists, the Serbian language is understood to be the same language, linguistically, as Bosnian, Croatian and Montenegrin (the former Serbo-Croatian language), others consider it the language that is spoken by those who self-identify as Serbs. Can the ‘monoglot ideology’ described above be sustained in a country like Norway, where dialects are considered at least as important as the written standard language, or in Serbia, where there is not even a clear agreement about what
the Serbian language is? On the other hand, we can take a country like Lithuania, where there are no such serious “threats” to the metalinguistic regimes as in Norway and Serbia. In fact, Lithuania is an even more unique example of this ideology: Both Silverstein and Bauman and Briggs have described the ‘monoglot ideology’ as something that is so naturalised that it is usually seen as common-sense. In Lithuania, this ideology has a physical form, with two powerful language planning institutions that have the monopoly to decide on what is correct language from orthography to prosody, morphosyntax and word-choice (Vaicekauskienė & Šepetys 2018). Further, they have been granted the power to enforce their position through the usage of administrative fines – up to 400 euros – for use of non-Lithuanian languages in state institutions and in the media. What happens in a society where this way of thinking about language becomes officially institutionalised? Will there be more awareness of it, and thus more criticism towards it, or will it still be considered natural?

Another fact that challenges Bauman’s and Briggs’s thesis is increasingly postmodern conditions of the world today. As the ‘monoglot’ ideology was formed top-down, through processes of modernisation, they are very likely to be challenged in a contemporary multi-voiced world. The internet news outlets, discussion forums and the social media provide an opportunity for the voice from ‘below’ to be heard. Will the metadiscursive regime endure in such conditions, or will it be at least to a certain degree, deconstructed?

This dissertation offers a comparative research of ideologies of language in Lithuania, Norway and Serbia (alphabetical order), with a brief comparative overview of the language-ideological regional context of these three countries tendencies (the Baltic, Scandinavian and ex-Yugoslav regions). Ideologies of language is understood as more stable, systematic sets of notions and beliefs about language (following Rumsey 1990). The aim is to present a typology of the dominant and non-dominant ideologies of language in these countries.

Ideologies are compared on the macro-societal level. Studies of ideologies of language of this type usually look for dominant ideologies through an analysis of the mainstream media discourse, or in state legislation, in order to determine what type of discourse is considered legitimate. In this dissertation, I have decided to extend the scope of what is usually considered public sphere (news media), including the growing virtual sphere into the research, which includes both news articles and the comment sections under them. At the same time, I have limited the news media data section – instead of taking all the media articles on language, I will take only the most powerful voice – to the ‘language expert’.

I will, therefore, look for ideologies of language in language three different contexts – (1) the ‘official’ context – in state legislation and institutional practice, (2) ‘expert’ context – in the opinions of language experts in media and the (3) ‘vox populi’ context – in online discussions about language. The comparison of states’ legislation, practices, the experts’ and ‘vox populi’ views on language will provide more
insight into what beliefs about languages are dominant internalized in people’s consciousness and officially institutionalised, and which ones are alternative and could become dominant in the future. The data for the research will, therefor, consist of metalinguistic texts in which ideologies of language can be detected by means of discourse analysis. For each of the three countries, the data consists of: (1) state institutions’ legal documents that concern language regulation, documents from language planning (LP) institutions and (when possible) previous research on the same subject; (2) articles on online news portal, either written by a language expert or interviews / news pieces where the voice of a language expert is present; and (3) online discussion outlets, where lay language users can express their views on language (these include comments sections or forums of news portals). The data covers a period of the years 2008-2016, when internet commentating and online news portals became popular in all three countries.

The main research questions are: What types of ideologies of language are present in three different contexts (official, expert and vox populi) in the three countries (Lithuanian, Norwegian and Serbian)? Which ones are dominant, and which ones are secondary? Which ideologies of language are present in the state-sponsored LP efforts in the Baltic (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Scandinavian (Denmark, Norway, Sweden) and Ex-Yugoslav countries where the standard language used to be Serbo-Croatian (Bosnia, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia)?

I have chosen to compare three rather different European countries / regions. As noted above, their European history provides some common background in terms of a similar nation-building processes in the 19th century and similar ideologies of language standardization arising from the combination of the rationalist and national-romantic ideas.

What is different is:
(1) The type and level of language-planning institutionalisation
(2) The status of dialects vis-à-vis standard language
(3) The status of minority languages vis-à-vis official language

The differences also include non-language related differences, which might also play a role, such as:
(4) The history of statehood
(5) The history of dominance / domination
(6) Religion

The modern history of statehood is quite different: Lithuania has had a very short period of independence from larger state formations (The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Russian Empire the USSR): between two world wars and then after 1990), Norway has been fully independent for over a 100 years, with its own constitution for over 200 years (since 1814), when it split from the Danish kingdom, while Serbia was created when the Ottoman empire fell apart but was also a centre of power in
both the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918-1941) and Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1945-1989). The comparison of these three similar-yet-different countries hopes to provide insights into how old European language ideologies are reproduced and/or challenged in the era of the Internet. It will also shed some light on the universal and country-specific language ideologies, as well as ways in which those ideologies manifest themselves in discourse.

The innovative part of this dissertation is the research methodology. The usual way of approaching ideology through analysis of text is through a content analysis that seeks to identify of individual attitudes and beliefs about language and then construct an overreaching ideology. I have chosen an etic approach, as an emic one would most likely yield incomparable results, due to many specifics of attitudes and beliefs in these tree regions (reflecting both ideologies of language and societal ideologies expressed through beliefs about language. This dissertation’s research object is only the first kind of ideology). Therefore, a theoretical model will be developed that will be used to compare ideologies of language, consisting of three aspects of the ideology of language. These aspects are will be called representation, expertise and function. The first aspect is concerned with beliefs about what group of people (or individuals) are the represented by the language they speak (f. ex. an ethnic, social, civic group or an individual), the second aspect is about different beliefs about what defines ‘good language’ and a ‘good language speaker’ (and, consequently, ‘bad language’ and ‘bad speakers’), thus also defining who can be considered having high expertise in language (f. ex. ‘good language’ can be considered any language produced by those having mother-tongue competence, or, ‘good language’ can be considered only the standard language norm, as defined by linguistic authorities) and the third aspect is about the belief about what the main function of language is, what goals it serves (f. ex. communicative or symbolic functions).

The methods of the research are qualitative and quantitative discourse analysis. I combine content analysis (documenting explicit opinions, attitudes and beliefs about language) with discourse analysis (analysis of the direct and social context, analysis of discursive pre-suppositions, analysis of semiotic resources such as script, spelling, phrasing and the structure of discourse – intertextuality, interdiscursivity, metaphors, cultural and cognitive models) to detect, categorize and compare different beliefs about language (according to the theoretical model). Finally, if a set of (systematic) beliefs that often go hand in hand is found, it will be considered an individual notion of language\(^1\). All the identified notions will then be compared in between levels of dis-

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1 Alternatively, these could be understood as «ideologies» of language, but I will use the term notions as an analytic term, because ideology can have a multitude of meanings in sociolinguistic research, such as non-scientific («false») sets of beliefs about language or common-sense beliefs or historically bound discourses on language. The term notion is chosen as a neutral term, and these notions will be compared to other ideologies in the discussion chapter.
course and the three countries. The prevalence of different beliefs about language is also compared quantitatively to determine which ideologies are dominant.

The dissertation consists of five main chapters: (1) The theoretical chapter, (2) A comparison of language policy and language regulation in the Baltic, Scandinavian and former Yugoslav states, (3) The analysis of metalinguistic texts, (4) Discussion of the results and (5) Conclusions.

Publications related to the thesis:
1. THEORY & METHOD

In this section, the terms ‘language’ and ‘ideology’ are first discussed as separate (1.1.), and then the terms ‘language ideology’ and ‘ideology of language’ are discussed as research objects and fields of research (1.2.), then the previous research (1.3.) and the research methodology (1.4.) are presented.

1.1. WHAT IS LANGUAGE, WHAT IS IDEOLOGY?

**Language** does not have a single definition. In fact, it is safe to say we do not know what language is. Even introductory textbooks in linguistics define language using fundamentally different notions – for Edward Sapir, language is a product of culture, for Noam Chomsky, language is a biological-psychological fact, and for Henry Allan Gleason, language is a ‘structure’ (Lawson 2001). The definition of language will vary greatly according to the field of linguistics it originates from. We do know that language is both a psychological, social and cultural fact. The inability of a permanent and comprehensive definition of language makes it a subject of ideologization, both in academia and otherwise. This ideologization can be formed by different factors, such as the knowledge about language as a phenomenon, our understanding about the importance of language, to societal values and political interests connected to language. For example, for a French politician, the French language is a way of ensuring national unity, while for a refugee in France, language is a barrier that locks out opportunities of finding a job, getting education etc. Different social identities, knowledges and values, thus, shape the way language will be understood. In sociolinguistic research, the term which has been used to explain (relatively) stable, socially constructed understandings of language is language ideology or ideology of language.

**Ideology** is a very frequently used word in social research, sociolinguistics and discourse studies. In 1993, two legal scholars, Trevor Purvis and Alan Hunt, published an article with a humorous title “Discourse, ideology, discourse, ideology, discourse, ideology...”. Their goal was to show the extremely widespread use of the two terms, sometimes synonymous, and how problematic the use of the terms can be. In a review of definitions of ideology, John Gerring argues that ideology is not problematic as a theoretical concept, but it is the definitions that can be troublesome (Gerring 1997: 979). Agreeing with Gerring, I will avoid trying to define ideology, and use an operational definition suitable for the analysis of language ideologies. Regardless of the definition of ideology, most understandings of ideology have in their core ‘systematic beliefs’ or ‘entirety of beliefs’ about the nature of some phenomena or the world as a whole.
In sociolinguistic research, one major line is drawn between two theoretical views of ideology: a critical and a neutral (Woolard 1992). The critical understanding stems from Marx’ and Engels’ work “The German Ideology” (1846/1970), where ideology is seen as a false worldview, or a distortion of the truth, motivated by a certain group’s interest (the example used by Marx and Engels was the ideology of the working class in the 19th century that ‘mystifies’ the extremely uneven power relationships between the employer and the employee as natural). This group of definitions presupposes that the objective truth is reachable through critique of ideology, as the “veil of ideology” is lifted. The other group of definitions belongs to the postmodern kind, which rejects that ‘objective truth’ is directly accessible. Here, ideology is seen as a necessary simplification of the extremely complex world around us, an inevitable worldview, constructed by our experiences. Ideology is more on side of “collective conscience” (Geertz 1964/1973: 220), than a system that sustains power relations. Therefore, ideologies are present in any aspect of life, from the way we drive our cars or the way we write scientific articles. This dissertation takes the latter view of ideology. There is no ‘correct’ view of language, nor will I try to offer one: each ideology of language is formed by the experiences, identities, motives and interests of the certain person, group or institution, that I will describe in detail.

Studies of language and ideology have provided insights of great value for the field of humanities. Firstly, ideology forms what one is allowed and not allowed to say. This can tell a lot about, in Michael Foucault’s terms, societal épistémè or, in Antonio Gramsci’s terms, hegemonies. Ideologies form how one is allowed to talk and write about certain subjects. For example, racist attitudes are legitimate, as long as one opens with a disclaimer such as “I am not a racist”, followed by a conjunction “but” or “however” and then continues to express a racist attitude (cf. Wodak & Matouschek 1993). This can tell a lot about how we structure our language and speech. Therefore, studying language and ideology provides insight into both the social and the linguistic: ideologies are created as linguistic (discursive) responses to social phenomena; they also are a fundamental factor that shapes linguistic production. The most usual term for this field of study, introduced by Kathlyn Woolard, is language ideologies. In her words, language ideologies lie on the “intersection” of language and the social world. She thus defines them as: “representations, whether explicit or implicit, that construe the intersection of language and human beings in a social world are what we mean by language ideology.” (Woolard 1998: 3, italics by me).

1.2. LANGUAGE IDEOLOGY – THE FIELD, HISTORY, ISSUES

This section will review the study directions in the field of language ideology, with a special focus on the research of the language ideologies in the public sphere.
The term *linguistic ideology* has been employed by Michael Silverstein (1979) to bridge the questions of language use and language attitudes and thus help discuss an age-old question in linguistics: do attitudes towards language influence the structure of language? Language attitudes can be attached to certain *linguistic forms* or *varieties of language*: a dialect, an accent or a certain lexical item can be understood ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘funny’, ‘inappropriate’, ‘smart’ etc. Michael Silverstein defined systematic attitudes as *linguistic ideologies* in the following way “sets of beliefs about language articulated by users as a rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use” (1979: 193).

While historical and structural linguists normally ignore attitudes as a factor that can provoke essential changes in the grammatical system, Silverstein’s research showed the opposite. In his 1985 study on gender, he compared the loss of the *thou / thee* 2nd person pronoun in English to the changes in the generic masculine pronoun *he* in modern English. The fear of the speakers to use *thou / thee* forms, and the total rejection of the forms, arose in 18th century Britain because it was connected to the language ideology of a religious sect called the Quakers. They insisted that all men were equal before God, and therefore used only the informal *thou / thee* form, and never the formal *you* form. He observed the feminists of the 1980s who fought against the generis use of *he* might cause the same reaction, but not the desired one. As he put it: “Explicit views on acceptable language exert only one, generally indirect force on the process.” (Silverstein 1985: 221).

What Silverstein brought to studies of language change was the focus on the societal and ideological processes that guide language change, shift and death; linguistic attitudes, prestige, social and economic inequalities, gender ideologies and other social factors have been noted as crucial parts in the above-mentioned processes (see Silverstein 1998 for a review of relevant research). He defined this research object as the “total linguistic fact” that should include language structure, contextualized usage, and ideologies of language (Silverstein 1985: 220).

Picking up Silverstein’s *linguistic ideologies*, anthropologists became interested in what one can learn about human culture, by studying these “sets of beliefs about language”. A seminal publication in this sphere was “Language ideologies: Practice and theory”, that came out in 1998, edited by Bambi Schieffelin, Kathryn Woolard and Paul Kroskrity. The anthropological studies are important for the field of language ideologies, because they point out that ideology operates as a two-way street (or as the above-mentioned “intersection of language and humans in a social world”, Woolard 1998: 3). Namely, any detectable *language ideology* is both the product of language and can, in turn, influence the language (I use the term ‘language’ the broadest sense – both grammar, speech, its status, the legitimate discourse etc.). The anthropological studies have very successfully used the term *language ideology* to uncover social struc-
tures and social ideologies, such as gender (c.f. Kulik 1992) or social status (c.f. Hill 1998) by analysing linguistic behaviour and language attitudes (responses to that behaviour). The focus on small linguistic communities has allowed the anthropological linguists to explain a variety of social and linguistic aspects of community life using Silverstein’s term language ideology. As an example, Don Kulik (1992) has examined language ideologies in a Papua New Guinean village and found them to be very much connected to ideologies of gender and colonial discourses: he studied a small non-Western society in which men are perceived as the “emotional gender”. While in Western societies, it is the women who tend to adopt a more prestigious form of language, in the village studied by Kulik, it was the men tend to adopt the prestigious language, that is the lingua franca of the island – Tok Pisin. Women, on the other hand, use the local vernacular, Taiap. The result of this situation is a gradual language shift in the whole society from Taiap to Tok Pisin. The reason is purely ideological: society is stopping to use Taiap, because it is being associated with a big tabooed activity – angry women who have fights using extremely foul language in Taiap are believed by villagers to invite evil spirits and cause diseases. Studies as such these are valuable as a reflection over all ideologies present in a society, reflected in language and beliefs about language, as well as the consequences they can have for language change (or death). Although such comprehensive analysis would not be possible on a scale of a modern Western nation-state, they prompts reflection over non-salient ideologies of language in Western societies.

As this dissertation is focused on three European countries, I will outline another field of research that sprung from ideology studies and the discursive tradition in sociolinguistics that will be called (for the purpose of this dissertation) “problem-oriented and critical sociolinguistics”. They are quite similar to anthropological researches in terms of studying a society to uncover dominant, non-salient language ideologies. The difference is that they study modern Western societies (usually the researcher him/herself belongs to that society) and is guided by a critical need to point out faulty and harmful ideologies. Here, I would stress the definition of language ideology that will be used in this dissertation, Alan Rumsey’s, a professor of the Australian National University, definition that defines language ideology as a “shared bodies of commonsense notions about the nature of language in the world.” (1990: 346, my italics). Identifying such ‘commonsense’ beliefs can be a real methodological challenge. In this dissertation, this challenge is met by comparing three different societies.

1.2.2. PROBLEM-ORIENTED AND CRITICAL SOCIOLINGUISTICS

I will use the term “problem-oriented and critical sociolinguistics” for the purpose of this dissertation for a set of diverse research paradigms that address not only theoretical, but also social issues through research. It has been an ongoing theme in the
research throughout the period of the 1990s and 2000s, both in variationist sociolinguistics (c.f. Singh 1996) and discourse studies (c.f. van Dijk 2015a).

What defines a work of critical sociolinguistics is that there is a general need to go beyond the description of language or linguistic theory and turn their research into a tool for changing the world for the better. A good example of this is Deborah Cameron’s seminal publication “Verbal Hygiene”. Originally published in 1995, Cameron’s book was directed towards changing the attitude of British linguists who have dismissed the possibility of linguistic research to influence unfavourable societal ideologies (in this case, linguistic prescriptivism). Having identified prescriptivism as a problem, Deborah Cameron chose to make it a central point of her research to show the logical and ethical fallacies of prescriptivism and contribute to a more linguistically tolerant society. The ideal of a theoretically strong, yet engaged research can be found in the preface to the 2012 edition of the same book:

“One of my goals in making this argument was to prompt reflection among those professional linguists whose response to the concerns of verbal hygienists is to dismiss them as irrelevant, futile or misguided. Today there is more variety in the way linguists communicate with ordinary language users (...). But the finger-wagging ‘leave your language alone!’ tradition has not lost its vitality: rather it has been updated, in ways which are perhaps worth remarking on.” (Cameron 2012: vii-viii)

Cameron has also shown that seemingly naïve ideas about what ‘correct’ and what ‘incorrect’ language is, are not products of the language speakers’ lack of linguistic knowledge, but much more so a product of those who earn money from people’s “linguistic incompetence”, namely the language professionals (Cameron 2012: 42). In other words, ideologies of language can be sustained by (even financial) interests.

The same motivation could be found among those linguists researching dialects (c.f. Wolfram 2004) or languages with a low status among its own speakers, such as the Kven language in Norway (c.f. Lane 2011, 2016). Variationist sociolinguists have experienced the need to improve help the linguistic communities they work with, which, according to Walt Wolfram, comes from the very nature of sociolinguistic work:

“Sociolinguists, like many other social science researchers, often feel a sense of indebtedness and obligation to the subjects who provide data for their research and the communities where they carry out their fieldwork” (Wolfram 2004: 15)

Linguists working in this paradigm have translated their need to give back to their research subjects in the principle of “linguistic gratuity” (Wolfram, Reaser & Vaughn 2008), which tries to set principles for social engagement of sociolinguists engaged in work with linguistically low-status, or even oppressed, communities.

The reason speakers of non-standard varieties and minority language or unstandardized languages are discriminated against can be explained as a consequence of linguistic standardisation. Looking into the problematic aspects of the historical processes of standardisation, researchers have employed term standard language ideology
(Lippi-Green 1994) to explain the dominant way of thinking about ‘a language’. This term was coined by Rosina Lippi-Green in 1994, but gained popularity in 2001, when James Milroy (2001) gave this term a detailed theoretical treatment in the *Journal of Sociolinguistics*. This term has set much of the tone for research ever since. The key element of the standard language ideology is the belief that *language is not a property of the speakers*, but of anonymous linguistic authorities, which Milroy compares to high priests, gatekeepers of arcane linguistic knowledge (2001: 537). Standard language ideology also explains the common belief that the best variety of language is its unified, canonical form, while all others are seen as ‘below’ it.

As standardisation of languages in Europe is connected to the 19th century nationalist movement, studies of nationalism have also been increasingly important in critical sociolinguistics. Commenting on the fact of how nationalism created national standard languages, Michael Billig notices that “…language does not create nationalism, so much as nationalism creates language; or rather nationalism creates ‘our’ common-sense, unquestioned view that there are, ‘naturally’ and unproblematically, things called different ‘languages’, which we speak.” (1995: 30). He suggests that ‘standard, separate languages’ are a product of ideology (nationalism), while the real linguistic state is much more complex – there are regional, urban, age-based and many other group-based language varieties; the boarders between languages are impossible to draw on a map (there are dialectal continua, bilingual areas, diglossia etc.). Nationalism creates an understanding that there is actually just one – national (standard) – language variety. Thus, linguistic nationalism is unescapably intertwined with standard language ideology.

Going beyond criticism in linguistic scholarship, Joshua Fishman proposes the idea that linguists need to be involved in large-scale social processes, such as language planning (LP). In his seminal book “Do not leave your language alone!” (2006) his idea was to show that no LP is free of ideology, interests (including hidden ones) that are obvious to the trained sociolinguist, can be harmful to small languages, speakers of dialects and the freedom of expression. Even the ‘no LP’ can be harmful, as it leaves the strongest language dominating over smaller languages and smaller language varieties (Fishman 2006).

The following quote from Monica Heller’s “Paths to post-nationalism: A critical ethnography of language and identity” illustrates the above-mentioned points about the nature and agenda of critical sociolinguistics.

I argue for a sociolinguistics that is not a form of expert knowledge, but rather an informed and situated social practice, one which can account for what we see, but which also knows why we see what we do, and what it means to tell the story. In other words, I want to move away from a position that claims objective, neutral, unconstrained, disinterested knowledge production which can, if called upon to do so, guide social and political action, and toward one that understands knowledge production to be socially situated, but no less useful for that (Heller 2011: 6)
In other words, self-reflection, criticism and societal betterment should be considered the core parts of sociolinguistic epistemology. Hence, this dissertation will not only compare ideologies for the sake of comparison, but also look for causalities, evaluate and critically reflect on the ways in which ideologies in the public sphere are produced, sustained and challenged.

Another group of researchers that fit into the category of critical sociolinguistics, are those working in the paradigm of discourse studies called critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 1989). This type of research seeks to highlight the linguistic means that sustain oppressive societal ideologies (often called ‘hegemonies’, or ‘discursive regimes’). The most prominent researchers have focused on the language of racism (cf. Van Dijk 2015b), ethnic and gender-based discrimination (cf. Wodak 2005), the language of neoliberalism – used in a pejorative sense (cf. Scharff & Gill 2013, Fairclough 2007).

Sociolinguists would argue that I have gathered a diverse group of scholars into one category, especially in terms of research methods and theoretical views. My argument would be that all of the researchers mentioned above are guided by a similar research agenda: to point out socially problematic aspects of language and language use.

Public discourse has been the focus of much language ideological research, especially since the publication of Jan Blommaert’s seminal “Language Ideological Debates” (1999), as a sight for where ideologies are visible, discussed, challenged or reproduced. Public discourse is the focus of this dissertation too, so the next section (1.2.3) will describe the theoretical insights from this sub-field of study.

1.2.3. THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES

The public sphere is a discursive space in which something close to a public opinion can be formed (Habermas 1991). This space was the agora in Ancient Athens, where news circulated and were discussed orally. In Europe, since the end of the 17th century, this discursive space has been the press, which began bringing news in print form to the public (Habermas 1991: 16), and it has lived through many transformations since. Research of the public sphere is of great importance for studies of democracy, as it focuses on questions of who has, and who has not, the possibility to raise and discuss public issues. Traditional media such as TV and newspapers are made for one-way communication, there is only limited room for the reader to participate in discussions or raise questions (usually, reader participation is reserved for the “Letters to the Editor” section). Hence, the raise of the internet gave great hopes for a new “virtual sphere” (Papacharissi 2002) and mass participation. It would become like a traditional public sphere extend into the e-realm, accessible to everyone with a computer and an internet connection. Indeed, the rapidly evolving internet space (or spaces) comes with new possibilities, but also new limitations. Beer (2009), Goldberg
(2011) and Ellison & Hardey (2014) have pointed out that the virtual sphere is not a force for democratic change, citizen participation in political decision making, as it was hoped to be. Unexpectedly, the social media technology was used for revolutionary success in Egypt (cf. Gerbaudo 2018).

Still, language ideological research has shown that the public sphere is the locus where dominant language ideologies are discussed, sustained and challenged. That makes it a fertile area of inquiry and exploration of language ideologies. Most studies have focused on the traditional public sphere (newspapers and TV), but the virtual sphere has been attracting the attention of researchers on language ideology in the recent years as well.

The studies of traditional media outlets work in two paradigms: the critical and the cognitive.

The agenda for the critical research paradigm was set in the publication “Language ideological debates”, edited by Jan Blommaert (1999). Blommaert has contributed to the field of language ideologies by offering to conceptualize the research objects as language ideological debates. The researchers’ task is to identify a debate that stretches over long periods of time and in various spaces (newspapers, TV, political debates etc.) and detect how ‘language’ as a phenomenon plays a part the construction and negotiation of various ideologies. Research has shown that there always is a multitude of ideologies in one place. Ideologies of language are never ideologies about language alone, but about many other social phenomena. As an example, Blommaert, while studying an age-long debate about the French and Flemish languages in the Belgian public sphere, concluded that that “...language never occurred alone as a factor and argument in conflicts, but always operated as part, initially, of a larger democratization process and, later, as part of a power struggle due to momentous demographic and socio-economic transformations. Language was, in short, an emblematic argument that became shorthand for a larger set of issues.” (2011: 1). In other words, the social and political ideologies that anthropologists find through ethnography, can also be discussed by discourse analysts by studying the (public) discourse. Studies following Blommaert’s concept usually have to limit their research question to a single (usually problematic) aspect of language ideology and explore it in depth, for example linguistic nationalism (c.f. Meeuwis 1999, Homer 2005), ideology of gender (c.f. Milani 2007) or the linguistic creation of ‘otherness’ (c.f. Stroud 2004). Thus, studies in the critical paradigm are more focused on uncovering a harmful societal ideology, visible in a language ideological debate. Another important aspect of the critical studies is the study of the medium in which the debates take place. It should be kept in mind that media functions according to its own political, market-driven and ideological constrains, providing a place for many different voices to compete of whose knowledge of language and linguistic phenomena counts as legitimate.

Another branch of linguistics that studies public discourse is cognitive sociolinguistics. Unlike the research following the critical paradigm, cognitive sociolinguists
focus on the cognitive schemes and models that shape out understandings of the abstract concept ‘language’. These studies show more detailed mental mappings of the domain ‘language’ by employing tools from cognitive science: metaphors (Lakoff 1980/2008), idealized cognitive models (Lakoff 1987), mental schemata (Piaget 1923/1926). They provide a clear view of many various ways in which language is understood. While it can be assumed that some of these cognitive mappings are ideologies themselves, they are more likely to be products of ideology: for example, language is blood can seem like a product of a primordial-nationalist ideology and language is a tool can be understood as a pragmatic view of language. However, language can be a tool of achieving social success (by learning foreign languages) for a liberally-oriented voice in the public sphere, while for a nationalist, language is a tool that unites one monolingual country (Berthele 2008: 315). Thus, an analysis of cognitive mappings does not suffice to uncover ideologies and it should, therefore, always be combined with discourse analysis. Cognitive sociolinguists suggest investigating cognitive elements and how they are used in discourse to identify idealized cognitive models of language (also called cultural or folk models).

Some studies have borrowed from medialinguistics, a discipline popular in the German-language academia, that stresses the importance of the quantitative in research (cf. Spitzmüller 2007, Moschonas & Spitzmüller 2010). These studies use a great amount of data and employ quantitative methods in order to understand discourse. These will be further discussed in 1.3.1.

1.2.4. TERMINOLOGICAL NOTES AND SUMMARY

The term ideologies about language has been used interchangeably and often synonymously with the terms linguistic ideology and language ideology (Woolard and Schieffelin 1994: 58), as well as notions of language (used in Woolard and Schieffelin 1994: 60, 65). Ideally, the terms language ideologies and linguistic ideologies would be reserved for anthropological studies, focusing on an exploration of ideology in language use and change, formation of language attitudes, prestige etc., while ideologies about language or notions of language would address a more metalinguistic problem – how language users conceptualize language as a phenomenon. However, in the recent years, the term language ideologies has taken over, and is used to cover a broad field of research interests. A search in the Google Books digitalized library using the keyword “language ideology”, results in a graph of showing a low, but stable number of mentions in the years between 1975 and 1993, followed by a 700% increase in the period between 1993 and 2008. Therefore, of all the terms listed above, the “buzzword” in research is definitely language ideology. Nevertheless, I will use the term ideologies about language in this dissertation, in order to point out that the research object is a systemic conceptualizations / understanding of the nature of language in the world, rather than other
societal ideologies, in which language plays some part (such as for example ideology of nationalism or neo-racism), as is common in the tradition of ‘Language ideological debates’. While the driving factor behind research on ‘language ideological debates’ is usually driven by social issues and adopts a critical stance (making use of critical theories), such as discrimination, sexism, racism, nationalism etc., this dissertation seeks to explore a meta(socio)linguistic issue. The issue at hand is the status of ‘metadiscursive regimes’ in the period of late modernity or postmodernity\(^2\) in an online setting, as stated in the introduction.

Agreeing with Woolard’s point on intersectionality (see 1.2.1.), these understandings of language influence how language is used – what forms, words, phrases are preferable to others, what is legitimate and what is illegitimate discourse, therefore special attention should be paid on all levels of linguistic and discursive structure. A more general study of the influence of these ideologies of language on language (discourse) itself is beyond the scope of this study will be left for future studies to follow up on.

The operational definition will be “…shared bodies of commonsense notions about the nature of language in the world.” (Rumsey 1990). The first keyword here is “shared”, which means that ideologies cannot be unique to a single person, but rather repeated systemic beliefs about language, found repeatedly among different people. The second keyword here is “commonsense”, which signalizes that ideology is located in pragmatic and discursive presuppositions (de Saussure 2012) rather than clearly articulated statements (more on the way of identifying ideologies in the section on the research method, 1.4.). This definition was criticized by an anthropological linguist Paul Kroskity stating that “This definition properly highlights the informal nature of cultural models of language but (...) does not problematize language ideological variation (by age, gender, class, etc.)” (Kroskity 2004: 496). The criticism is, of course, valid, but as my research is not ethnographic, I have no information on the age and social class of the commentators. As I am looking for ideologies created in online media, I find the definition to be helpful in setting where the focus the commonsense and shared by many, therefore it is widespread or even dominant.

To summarize, language ideologies as a field takes up issues relevant to linguistics (language structure, use, change and shift), anthropology and sociology (ideologies about social phenomena such as gender, economy, national politics, found in both explicit debates about language and in specific culturally-bound discourses), and metalinguistics issues (how to describe and interpret language using language), the last ones being of most importance for this dissertation. Perhaps the most important contribution of the field to humanities is the discovery that all these issues are inter-related.

\(^2\) This dissertation partially engages in the debate on whether the condition of the world after World War II can be better described as ‘late modernity’ or ‘postmodernity’. The status of modernist ideas about language in the era of the Internet will can tell a lot on whether modernity is “over”, or whether it has transformed itself in form, but not so much in content. This will be discussed in chapter 4.
1.3. IDEOLOGIES OF LANGUAGE ERA  
OF THE INTERNET – RESEARCH OVERVIEW

In the introduction, I have postulated that the modernist, monoglot language ideology will be challenged in the virtual sphere, which provides a more multi-voiced platform for all who wish to participate and challenge the hegemonies.

This subject has so far mostly been approached qualitatively, somewhat quantitatively, and only a few researchers took a comparative perspective. All of this research will be described in the following sub-sections (1.3.1. through 1.3.3.).

Today, the public sphere extends beyond print media to the virtual sphere, with a format different from the traditional public sphere, with new possibilities and new limitations (Papacharissi 2002). As it is a place for general public debate, the first question to answer is: what makes ‘language’ a news-worthy issue? The media have to make their stories resonate with the audiences and be of some importance for them, which is why the language issues are not as often on the front pages of the newspapers as daily-political issues. However, with a clever framing of language-related news, language can sometimes become a prominent, or even a top issue. From the studies on public debates about language, I have identified a handful of topics (“language issues”) that have so far been the subject of research on language ideologies in the public sphere. Among them are (in no particular order):

1. Issues connected to a (official or non-official) minority language or multilingual language practices, (cf. Blommaert 2011, Milani 2008),
2. influence of a foreign (usually global or neighbouring) language on a smaller or a national language
4. a new / emerging linguistic variety with a growing number of users, usually multiethnic mixes, mixed speech (cf. Ims 2014, Svendsen 2015, Wiese 2012),
5. “internal” language threats such as incorrect language use, illiteracy (Milroy & Milroy 1999)

The issues in the categories 1-4 can be seen as caused by the phenomenon we usually refer to as linguistic nationalism, that in the broadest terms encompasses “Herdrian packages containing a common language, history, territory, people, race and religion” (Bauman & Briggs 2003: 289). Issues in the categories 5 and 6 can be seen as coming from the Standard language ideology (Milroy 2001). Language is seen as a system of strict grammatical rules and a pure lexicon; efforts are made to standardize and spread it in schools, therefore all deviation from the norm is penalized and stigmatized. This includes accents, use of non-standard speech, slang, dialect as well as the use of ‘foreign’ elements in language.
These ideologies, as mentioned in the introduction, often go hand in hand, forming a “monoglot ideology”, meaning “that a society is in effect monolingual...coupled with a denial of practices that point toward factual multilingualism and linguistic diversity” (Silverstein 1996, as cited in Blommaert 2006: 243–44).

The relevant studies discussing these issues will be presented according to the paradigm they belong to. In 1.3.1., I will present the sociocognitive paradigm, that relies on concepts from cognitive sciences, in 1.3.2., I will present the critical paradigm, that employs critical theory (relying primarily on the Frankfurt school) and focuses on sociological analysis, and in 1.3.3., other research relevant for the dissertation will be presented – mostly studies of public discourse from a language-planning perspective and studies of linguistic authority in the online space.

1.3.1. RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOCOGNITIVE PARADIGM

This research is based on a number of cognitive tools: the conceptual metaphor, the idealised cognitive model (also folk or cultural model) and the argumentation scheme. The conceptual metaphor is now often used as a concept in studies of human cognition. It is based on the idea that metaphors exist not only in language, but are part of the human cognitive system, as well as of human culture (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) – it is very likely that all thinking is metaphorical/metonymical, i.e. we think about phenomena in terms of other phenomena that are analogically linked to them. While some metaphors are universal, others are a part of culture (Lakoff and Johnson’s example time is a resource (1980: 67) is an example of a metaphor present only in, for example, industrialized societies). The metaphors, combined with image schemata and their framing, form idealised cognitive models, which function as cognitive organisers of our knowledge. They consist of other models but are called “idealized” because they have properties of “prototypes”, or ideal representations of concepts. For example, a stepmother, a biological mother, a donor mother and a surrogate mother can all be considered to be “mothers”, because the models of each type of mother overlap by their “virtue of their relation to the ideal case” (Lakoff 1987: 76). In the case of language, the frequent metaphors are language is a key, which means that language “unlocks” new possibilities, or language is a glue that unites people and holds them together (Berthele 2008).

Geeraerts (2003) offered two cultural models for the analysis of ideologies of linguistic standardization, which can be applied to an exploration of language too: they are based on the ideology of standard French and German language. The French model is called the ‘rationalist’ model and the German is called the ‘romantic’ model. The rationalist model offers an understanding of standard language as a means of emancipation, providing the citizens with the necessary tool to read laws and participate in public debate. The romantic model arises from a view of standard language
as means of uniting all people of the same ethnicity under a single language, which presents the ‘spirit of the nation’. These models also reflect different understandings of the primary function of language differently: language as a tool of communication in the rationalist, and a tool of expression in the romantic model. Although Geeraerts noted that these are models of linguistic standardization, rather than language itself, these two are often equated as a result of the standard language ideology (see Milroy 2001 in the introduction), and therefore relevant for the present dissertation. Dirk Geeraerts’ rationalist and romantic models mentioned before are inevitably connected to the understanding of the nation – civic and ethnic (2003: 25). In the French version, the “national” is equated with the French state, and a national of France is French, regardless of his origin, mother tongue, religion, etc. Thus, French language represents a civic group (all those who share a French citizenship). The German view of the nation is more ethnic – a group of people are bound by similar traditions, religion, customs and language. Language is seen as an expression of the ‘voice of the people’ (Bauman & Briggs 2003: 182) in the Humboldtian romanticist fashion. These models have been used in research of language policy, educational policies, etc. (c.f. Filipović, Vučo & Djurić 2008). These models transform themselves in through time; so, in the global times, the rationalist model is used to express the idea that the knowledge of global languages emancipate people economically, is a force for democratization, while the romantic model is used to criticize global languages as instruments of exclusion and presents the importance of local languages, varieties, dialects and multilingualism as an expression more layered identities (Polzenhagen & Dirven 2008: 240).

Spiros Moschonas has shown the dominance of the ‘romantic’ model in debates about Greek language (Moschonas 2004, 2009). His approach sees language ideology as a mental construct (2009: 293) and employs conceptual maps to present how Greek language is understood in newspaper-mediated debates. He makes the claim that the dominant ideology is a transformation of Benjamin Lee Whorf’s theory of linguistic relativism (Moschonas 2004). This ideology conceptualizes language as something with an imaginary “territory” and a “spirit”, i.e. Greek language has a territory – Greece and all Greeks living abroad, and a spirit – the cultural uniqueness of a nation is imprinted in the spirit of the language. He also notes that the cause of all debates about language is the perceived “disturbance” of this territory or spirit.

Linguistic purism, the idea that language should be free of foreign influences, is also a product of the above described Whorfian / Herderian ideology. The “imagined territory of language” was investigated quantitatively by Jürgen Spitzmüller (2007) in German metalinguistic discourse, where he found metaphors such as language is a substance / organism, which are used to show that language can be ‘polluted’ or ‘die out / become ill’ etc. He analysed representations of language on a large corpus of newspaper articles and found that the dominant metaphors were language is an organism / substance / artefact. In other words, language is something that is fragile, can be polluted, diluted and needs protection. Similar metaphors were found in
metalinguistic debates in post-Soviet Russia – metaphors from the sphere of biology and ecology, that point to ‘pollution’, ‘impoverishment’ of language etc. (Gorham 2000). The language debate after the fall of the Soviet Union in Russia was characterized by a search for a new national identity, most importantly the revival of the “Russian spirit” through use of a pure Russian language. However, in pre-1990s Russia Gorham finds a more instrumentalist metaphors; a tool or a weapon for civic liberty (Gorham 2000: 628) and as a tool for democratisation in the perestroika period. This indicates a shift (in my view) from a more rationalist to a romantic model of language.

Raphael Berthele (2008) compared two newspaper-mediated debates surrounding proposed language policies in the USA and Switzerland. He found metaphors such as LANGUAGE IS A KEY, and LANGUAGE IS A TOOL (in which language is presented as a key of success, tool of achieving social mobility), which would correspond with the ideal version of Geeraerts’ rationalist model. Other conceptual metaphors, such as LANGUAGE IS A SOUL OF THE PEOPLE lie closer to the romantic model. However, a great number of conceptual metaphors is used in different contexts and cannot be exclusively connected to either of the models. For example, LANGUAGE IS A BOND could refer to an ethnic or to a civic bond, LANGUAGE IS A TOOL could be used in the sense that language is a tool of expression of identity, or a tool of communication. He found that the civic and ethnic identities are defined through conceptual metaphors of LANGUAGE IS A TIE / BOND / GLUE that holds people together, either as a marker of origin or as a marker of adherence to a nation-state. The methodological lesson to be learned from socio-cognitivists is that it is not enough to analyse the metaphor or cultural model of language if we want to claim how language is conceptualised in the discourse. One must also take into consideration the context of use, the pragmatic aspects in order to make a claim about the ideologies of language.

“ICMs, metaphors and metonymies play an important role in ideological discourse and they are worth studying for those who wish to uncover covert assumptions. However, language attitudes and other aspects of “socio-linguistic cognition” can only be fully understood if we manage to capture the role the metaphoric and other mappings play, together with low-level phenomena such as perception and categorization, in the construction of complex cultural models.” (Berthele 2008: 327)

A study by Neil Bermel (2007) provides a cognitive explanation on how written language in metalinguistic discourse tends to be understood as an essential part of language. We are all exposed to writing rules from an early age (these are usually the first ‘linguistic rules’ one learns) and scripts give languages a ‘visual identity’. Changes in orthography often activate ideological discussions about the nature of language – whether it should or shouldn’t, can or cannot be changed; what is ‘good’ and what is ‘bad’ language. Bermel finds conceptual metaphors used to talk about orthography, such as ORTHOGRAPHIC RULES ARE LAWS (2007: 275). This means that all changes in orthography mean that one is ‘changing laws of writing’. He also finds a “path metaphor” WRITTEN LANGUAGE IS A PATH TO SPOKEN LANGUAGE (2007: 280), which positions
written language as a pre-requisite (as *primary*) to spoken language (even though spoken language comes first in both historical and personal development). This explains why the orthographic reform was publicly deemed as a vulgarization of the Czech language (2007: 187, 207). Broadly speaking, this finding indicates that orthography can be understood, through a series of metaphors, as being connected to spoken language, and that changing orthography changes language essentially. Bermel’s research also shows that metaphors can form meaningful clusters that need to be explored, instead of focusing on the metaphor about language alone.

Another conceptual tool employed (however only in one study) are the *argumentation schemes*. They are defined as “(...)common-sense reasoning typical for specific issues” (van Dijk 2000: 98). By analysing re-occurring arguments in texts, one can detect a “common-sense” way in which a topic is discussed. As ideology is often defined as something “hegemonic” or “common-sense” (see 1.2.), so any “common-sense” belief or argument can provide insight into ideology. Argumentation schemes in language debates were employed by Antonio Reyes (2013) who analysed online discussions about language reforms in Spain, initiated by the Spanish Royal Academy. One such scheme denies the authority of the language institutions, claiming that common language users hold proprietary rights over their own language, and they cannot be forced to use language in a certain way ‘from above’ (Reyes 2013: 347). This scheme expressed the idea that language is an attribute of the speakers, while two other schemes express the opposite idea – that language is a system beyond the speakers. One scheme accepts the orthographical reform because they accept the linguistic authority that initiated it; the other rejects the reform calling it a *deterioration of the Spanish language* (Reyes 2013: 349). Even though one is for and the other against, both schemes suggest the view of Spanish language as something that is something beyond the speakers (either for an institution to decide, or something that exists for itself, removed from both speakers and authorities). Those in favour of changes claimed that it would make communication in the Spanish language more efficient, or in other words, the communicative function of language was idealised (Reyes 2013: 352). These findings tell a lot about ideology, because they show how the relationship between the speakers, authorities, language and its functions is conceptualized.

1.3.2. RESEARCH IN THE CRITICAL PARADIGM

The *critical* approach borrows from *Critical discourse analysis* (CDA). CDA builds upon the tradition of criticism of ideology that shares same philosophical grounds in which discourse analysis began, in social research and social philosophy. It, therefore, takes its main social-theoretical roots in works of Michelle Foucault, Jürgen Habermas, Pierre Bourdieu (van Dijk 2001: 364) and Antonio Gramsci (van Dijk 2001: 355). Power analysis and social critique are central to CDA; they aim to point out “regular”
or “common sense” thinking and social practices that are actually in the service of
the powerful, according to scholar who is considered to be the father of CDA, Nor-

CDA has three steps of analysis: The first step of the analysis if contents and textual analysis – text disposition, grammar, spelling, orthography, use of emoticons etc. Then pragmatic analysis: who is talking, to whom, where is the discourse produced, who is reacting to what. Then, the societal context is analysed: social institutions, identities, interdiscursivity and intertextuality.

Interdiscursivity is a concept often connected to Kristeva’s notion of intertextual-
ity, which explains the relationship of texts to other texts, as well as the construction of meaning through these relationships. Intertextuality on the most basic level is copying of one text into another context (for example, using a Hamlet quote in a modern novel). On a more abstract level shows and explains the relationship of ut-
terances to each other, as they circulate in society through practices of talking, writ-
ing and reading. To explain this, one can refer to Bazerman (2003), who lists six levels of intertextuality, the first three of which will be considered intertextual, and the latter three interdiscursive. They are: “1) Direct quotation 2) Indirect quotation 3) Mentioning of a person, document or statement 4) Comment or evaluation on a statement, text or otherwise invoked voice 5) Using recognisable phrasing, terminol-
ogy, associated with specific people or groups 6) Using language and forms that seem to echo certain ways of communicating, discussions among other people, types of documents” (Bazerman 2003: 88-89). Interdiscursivity will be understood as a much less recognisable type of intertextuality – it concerns the use certain forms of speech that resemble certain social groups or identities. Studying interdiscursive connections can also reveal ideological workings behind productions of discourse, because “...interdiscursivity keeps us aware that all utterances are ideologically informed; Bakhtin-
ian perspectives alert us necessarily to language ideologies—and to the sites where they are enacted, voiced, and respond to.” (Bauman 2005: 146).

If the discussion is a part of a larger set of topics discussed in the public (for ex-
ample, emigration, or political stability), the text has to be treated as text in a certain order of discourse. An order of discourse is the “semiotic aspect of the social order (...) It is the way in which diverse genres and discourses are networked together.” (Fairclough 2001b: 235).

A number of studies in this tradition has focused on how the ideologies of the modern nation-state sustain uneven power relations. Christopher Stroud (2004) has pointed out how the language of immigrants is used to create ‘double’ linguistic discrimina-
tion: because of the language variety that they speak, perceived as a ‘mixture’ of Swedish and their native languages (multiethnolects), immigrants are attributed not only partial knowledge of Swedish, but also of their own mother tongue and conse-
quently discredited from participation in the civil society. This also helps create an imagined border between the ethnic and the immigrant Swede. Furthermore, Tom-
maso Milani (2010) showed how stereotypes of identities of social groups are connected with the linguistic variety they speak. His study shows that the speakers of multiethnolects are envisioned as macho/sextist by the actors in the debate speaking from a socially dominant position, while the speakers of this multiethnolect themselves present their own language variety as a positive product of different cultures coming together. In a “struggle for authoritative entextualization” (Blommaert 1999: 9) in the media, the ideology of the dominant group prevails.

Discriminatory attitudes towards minorities can also be masked by arguments that language is a tool of communication and that ‘language serves to unite people’. This is confirmed in Tardy’s (2009) research on the US language policy and the debate surrounding the introduction of English as “the national language”. The belief that language (and communication in that language) is an assimilating force has been constructed in the discourse by the use of powerful metaphors such as the famous American ‘melting pot’ metaphor (Tardy 2009: 280) and corresponds to the ‘rationalist model’ of linguistic standardization (Gerraerts 2003, see 1.3.1. above). The potential of this historically-bound metaphor is seen in the fact that the discourse on language policy in the US has progressed towards assimilationism since Kathryn Woolard analysed a similar debate (about the English-only movement) in 1989. Woolard showed the use of the conceptual metaphor of “imprisonment” used in the discourse of opponents of monolingual policies – this was a particularly potent instrument which highlighted how monolingualism put Spanish language speakers in a “linguistic prison”. The US debate in Tardy’s 2009 analysis is also interesting because “communication” is a word used on both sides of the debate (both by the proponents and the opponents of the policy), but what lies beyond the proponents’ notion of “communication” is, in fact, the notion of “Americanism”, or in other words – identity. The reason for this may well be that the notion of “ethnic American” does not resonate in the USA as strongly as it does in European nation-states.

Blommaert’s (2011) research on a linguistically atypical nation-state, Belgium – that has two regionally defined national languages and a bilingual capital – has shown that the one-nation-one-language ideology survives even an officially multilingual states. He also notes that, as the Herderian ideology has a focus on the ethnic group, the monoglot ideal is applied not just to the public sphere, but to schools, businesses, even private homes.

1.3.3. OTHER RELEVANT RESEARCH – ONLINE METALINGUISTIC COMMENTARIES

As this dissertation will compare the discourse of ‘experts’ and ‘vox populi’, special focus will be put on research exploring ideologies of language amongst language experts and ‘vox populi’ in media and online environment.
Research has pointed out that traditional media has the power to choose who will be considered an ‘expert’ and who a ‘layman’ (Johnson & Milani 2010), that media has historically had the role of constructing subjects of the modern nation-state, including those who have authority and who do not (Heller 2011). On the other side, the Internet has allowed possibility of mass participation and a less hierarchical platform for the negotiation of opinions and attitudes.

A few articles explored the divide between an expert and a non-expert (‘vox populi’) in this new environment. Antonio Reyes and Juan Eduardo Bonnin (2016), that has taken up a related question of how and expert (an authority on language) is constructed ‘from the below’, among the lay users. In an online setting, one can create his or her identity as an authority on language through semiotic means. By analysing an online WorldReference, that people often use for advice on correct language, Reyes and Bonnin conclude that those voices that want to be recognised as experts shape their discourse using several techniques, first of all through correct consequent use of punctuation, complex syntax (2016: 148). They can also construct authority on language by using intertextual means – references to language authorities (such as language academies), grammar books – as well as interdiscursive means3 – adopting ‘institutional / authoritarian voice’, answering questions in a categorical way (2016: 153). So, ‘imitating the traditional linguistic authority’ of a teacher, grammar book or a school textbook is what makes one an expert. This tell a lot about the discursive nature of authority in general, as well as the nature of linguistic prescriptivism.

Reflecting the same prescriptivist ideology is the internet phenomenon called ‘grammar Nazis’, which has received some academic attention. One research has showed that this ‘online grammar Nazism’ has different functions in different countries: the function to show off ones’ wits and entertain was present in the US, while in the Czech Republic, the ‘grammar Nazis’ were ‘protecting the public space’ from language mistakes (Švelsh & Sherman 2017). Also, grammar Nazis are perceived differently by other, for example in English language social media, grammar Nazis were interpreted as extreme liberals or feminists (Bayer 2014).

In a study by Philipp Krämer (2017) on online metalinguistic discourses in creole societies (Jamaica, Trinidad, Réunion, Mauritius), it was noticed that creoles are evaluated from the ‘pure, standard language’ ideal, as in non-standard varieties in European countries. All -lects perceived as ‘mixed’ are delegitimized as they do not match the ideal of a homogenous society. This also confirms that purist, nationalist and prescriptivist ideals guide and create a strict hierarchy of language varieties in any imagined linguistic society (also mentioned in Niedzielski & Preston 2003).

Lastly, it should be mentioned that ideologies are a central part of some seminal sociolinguistic studies, devoted to how the development of the nation-state and stan-

3 The concepts of interdiscursivity and intertextuality are based on Bakhtin’s notion of ‘dialogue’ and both will be employed in the analysis. See section Error! Reference source not found.
standard languages (through obligatory schooling) has affected the way language is understood (Milroy 2001, Fishman 1972, Fishman 2006, Cameron 2012/1995, Billig 1995). The appearance of national language standards and obligatory schooling in the 19th century changed the relationship between language and society essentially and has been a subject of many sociolinguistic studies. Language standardizations can be viewed as ideologies, since they represent a mental construct where linguistic norms match with reality, which is impossible in practice (Milroy & Milroy 1999).

Research so far has suggested that language ideologies are not much different amongst non-linguists in countries where there is a linguistic standard, which is usually considered the ‘best’ variety. According to James Milroy, it is often the case that ‘a language’ refers to ‘a standard language’ metalinguistic discourse, which is the consequence of the standard language culture. The standard is located highest on the hierarchy of all varieties, followed by colloquial speech, and “dialects” and “errors” are located at the bottom of the hierarchy (Milroy 2001, Niedzielski & Preston 2009).

The main theoretical question in this paper is what types of ideologies of language can be found in the period of late modernity in online discourse, which of them are dominant and which are not. The comparison of three rather different countries hopes to shed some light on the universal and country-specific ideological processes that take place in the online environment.

1.4. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON METALINGUISTIC DISCOURSES AND LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES IN LITHUANIA, NORWAY AND SERBIA

This section will review the available research on language ideologies in metalinguistic texts in Lithuanian, Norwegian and Serbian discourses. This section will not discuss the ideologies in state-driven language policies and of LP institutions as, as these will be presented in detail in chapter 2.

1.4.1. LITHUANIA

The past decade saw an increased interest in metalinguistic research in Lithuania. They all point out that the metalinguistic discourses in the public sphere have always been connected to highest national issue – statehood. Lithuanian language is a central part of the Lithuanian national identity, and the national intelligentsia has been engaged in language questions since the first nationalist magazine “Auszra” ([The Dawn], first appeared in 1883) called for a purging of all non-Lithuanian words from the language (Tamaševičius 2016: 244).

In the interwar period, during the era of the first independent Lithuanian republic, the metalinguistic discourse was dictated by the large-scale political processes: inten-
sive nation-building, linguistic standardization. They required a stress on language and its role in the creation of national identity. Language was compared to a “sick man” (Tamaševičius 2011, Ralia & Subačius 2012) plagued with foreign words, as a means of stressing the need to “nationalize” the language. Good, correct and pure language was considered to be a moral obligation of the new intellectual elite by many linguists of the interwar period, but the elite itself often protested such idea (Ralia & Subačius 2012). In this period, a language ideological debate that still goes on in today’s Lithuania sparkled concerning the language of media (radio at that time). A prominent linguist (Juozas Balčikonis) called the language in Lithuanian radio “the enemy of the people” (Tamaševičius 2013: 483) and language enthusiasts supported the idea that radio language was not correct enough for such an important function it performs. Ever since then, language experts have never looked particularly favourably upon the language of the media.

A large shift in the metalinguistic discourse occurred after World War II. Despite the fact Russian had become the language of international communication, the main nationalist argument of the inseparability of the Lithuanian nation and its language stayed the same in the discourse of language professionals. But their practices essentially changed and along with them – the metalanguage. The Soviet system sought to micro-control as many spheres of public and private life as it could; consequently, language control amongst students and linguists was encouraged. Metalinguistic debates were no longer happening in the domain of high culture on the linguist–intellectual front, but in-between professional linguists, who asked the question how to impose the standard language standard on the people. The linguistic discourse was no longer about the personal obligation of an individual to improve his or her language, but to the large-scale linguistic project to make all language in the public sphere match the norm; to educate the masses in ‘correct language use’. Young linguists even performed “language raids” in which they went into public enterprises and collected examples of language that does not match the norm, in order to determine the state, the language was in and what needs to be fixed and how (Ralia & Subačius 2012).

There is a number of studies on contemporary (post-Soviet Union) metalinguistic discourse in the discourse of experts, public, institutional and internet discourse. Vaicekauskienė (2012) has explored the different understandings of good language amongst Lithuanian journalists – the most common targets of language surveillance nowadays (more detail 2.1.4.). She found that their understanding of good language is very different from the officially defined standards of good language: journalists emphasise attributes such as liveliness, clarity and simplicity, while the Lithuanian LP institutions define good language only in terms of adherence to their own pre-defined norm.

In a study of teachers’ standard language ideologies, Vaicekauskienė and Keturkienė (2016) found that teachers reproduce a classical hierarchy of linguistic varieties: standard language at the top, other varieties “below” the standard language. Especially interesting is the different evaluation of youth language vs. dialects. Youth language was seen either negatively as “bad language” or neutrally as a “language specific for
a group with a certain function”. On the other hand, dialects were evaluated positively using ethnocultural schemata (dialects as a symbol of origin), but it was considered a ‘mistake’ to speak dialect in the classroom or use dialectal forms.

The public discourse on language has not been studied comprehensively, but from the present research, we see that both interwar and Soviet era discourses are present. The “disease” narrative is present in the words of the main linguistic authorities, such as the Baltistics professor Zigmas Zinkevičius and the main standard language scholar Aldonas Pupkis – who call the Lithuanian language “seriously ill”. Language was also presented metonymically as a “weapon” and a “flag”: the contemporary linguists present Lithuanian as a “secret weapon” of Lithuanians during the Soviet time, as well as a flag that should be defended by one’s life (Tamaševičius 2011).

In the Lithuanian online space, attitudes towards state-sponsored LP have been analysed by Nevinskaitė (2008) and Miliūnaitė (2006). These articles show a few interesting attitudes towards ‘expert’ work on language. Rita Miliūnaitė (2006) found that some ‘lay users’ are against the control and surveillance exerted by linguists while others support them, due to factors such as too much slang and ‘incorrect language’ in public space. Laima Nevinskaitė (2008) found that what internet users are mostly not satisfied with the new rules, created by linguists. The arguments include linguists create rules for rules’ sake, language politics is creating fear of public language use, the linguists’ monopoly over language issues. On the other hand, language purification efforts have mostly been positively evaluated. This gives some insight into what values can be expected in the comments – linguistic purity, inclusion of the people into public (language) matters and self-confidence in language use. Kazimieras Župerka (2012) has given a very detailed treatment of how non-linguists in Lithuania talk about language in the public spaces, using both newspaper and online data, exploring many levels of language as well as cultural and ideological aspects. One ideological aspect noticed was that the talk of ‘foreign elements’ of language activated the belief in linguistic purity, i.e. “[comments about Lithuanian-ness of words appear in texts especially often, when juxtaposed with a foreign word]” (Župerka 2012: 271). Even a small metalinguistic connector kaip sakoma (translated directly “as said”, actually meaning “as we say here”) was used to signify the “Lithuanian-ness” of word; this connector usually came after a Lithuanian proverb, word or phrase, which is a Lithuanian alternative to the same proverb, word or phrase of a foreign origin (2012: 272-273). This confirms the importance of ‘we’ in analysis of ideologies, both overtly expressed and implied (Fairclough 2001a).

To summarize, the studies on the experts Lithuania shows the dominance of nationalism and prescriptivist idea (with the exception of journalists), while results of the studies on non-experts display more varied ideological beliefs about language.

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4 These include surveillance of spoken and written media, government documents, books and many more areas of language use, as well as issuing warnings and administrative penalties for incorrect language use. They are described in more detail in 2.1.4.
In Norway, the discourse of language experts has not been studied to a large degree. Endre Brunstad pointed out in 2007 that a new notion of language is emerging, where language is seen as an individual’s possession, proposing a ‘democratic view of language’ – language is formed by all social groups that speak it, even those who speak it as a second language (minority and immigrant groups) and they will eventually claim ownership over the language or its variety (Brunstad 2007: 39). ‘Claiming ownership over language (varieties)’ is explored in the in the research on presentations of multiethnolects in Norwegian media. Bente Ailin Svendsen (2015) has explored media debates about a multiethnolect in Oslo, the so-called “Kebab Norwegian”. She finds that the media constructed an understanding of the multiethnolect as a “homogenous variety” that has a territory (Oslo) and a homogenous group that speaks it (young immigrants), as well as that it closes doors to employment. Also, this happened in spite of the participation of linguists in the media, who held a neutral/positive attitudes towards the variety, claiming that it was nothing to be afraid of. The linguists participating in the debate ultimately contributed to the spread of the ideologically-laden term “kebab-Norwegian” (Svendsen 2015: 75). Svendsen’s article points out that the experts’ voice, in spite of their beliefs being opposed to the ones projected by mainstream media, did not manage to establish an authoritative understanding of a phenomenon that is essentially within their direct field of expertise. “Kebab-Norwegian” is also understood differently by common Norwegians, who perceive it in a variety of ways and attribute a whole palette of value-loaded names for it from “street / gangster language” to “immigrant / Pakistani Norwegian”, but also neutral ones (Ims 2013). The perception and the way non-standard language varieties are discussed by ‘lay people’ can reveal a lot about how language in general is conceptualized. In a study of the perception of the same multiethnolect, Ims (2014) finds that some Norwegians to have an imagined “standard spoken Norwegian”, defined through ethnic lenses (despite the fact most Norwegians would probably say that Norwegians “speak in dialect, but write Bokmål and Nynorsk”, cf. Vonen 2012). When hearing a ‘mixed Norwegian’ variety, speakers start differentiating between a Norwegian that is ‘domestic’, and the one that is ‘mixed’. The multiethnolect speech of a young person on a Norwegian TV show was considered to deviate from “standard spoken [Norwegian] language” (Ims 2014: 25).

Studies on language attitudes can also reveal a lot about dominant ideologies. It has been shown that most (67%) non-linguists in Sweden tend to express the purist attitudes towards language use, there are too many English words in their respective national languages (Wingstedt 1998, as quoted in Sandøy 2009a: 71), while only a small number of Swedish professional linguists (11%) express such attitudes (Josephson 1999: 10). On the other hand, both linguists and non-linguists mostly agree on the importance of reading, correct spelling, and that a few spelling errors are not a sign of anything bad (Josephson 1999: 7).
A large-scale project called “Moderne importorda i språka i Norden” [Contemporary borrowings in the Nordic languages] explored the use of new and old borrowings in Nordic languages, but also the attitudes towards them in lexicographical practice and amongst non-linguists. The results reveal that the attitudes do not correlate with the actuality of language use, but with the feeling of “cultural domination”. Most negative attitudes towards English were expressed by users of Nynorsk, Icelandic and the Finlabd Swedes, those smaller communities that otherwise feel a pressure from the larger communities. Attitudes towards English were not positive overall, with the slight exception of Denmark, where about 50% expressed a positive attitude towards the use of English. The attitudes towards non-standard linguistic varieties were also measured amongst different Nordic communities: it is generally high: above 50% in most countries, except on Iceland (31%) and amongst the Finland Swedes (45%). The highest in Norway (81%) and amongst Finland Finns (79%) (Sandøy 2009a).

In short, the literature on ideologies has been focusing on the attitudes and ideological beliefs of non-linguists and the media that display a plethora of diverging attitudes. I have not found many studies focusing on the ideologies of language experts.

1.4.3. SERBIA

The metalinguistic discourse of Serbian language experts has been described in a number of studies by contrasting them to the Croatian discourses that reveals a different attitude towards purism (Ivić 2001, Radovanović 2004, Bugarski 2004). Serbian linguists have a long tradition of rejecting stronger versions of purism, while retaining a slightly negative attitude towards foreign words, especially if a foreign words is ‘unnecessary’ or ‘pushes out a domestic one’ (more in 2.3.5.). The Croatian linguists, on the other hand, have embraced purism, even in a playful form, where they encourage their colleagues as well as non-linguists to come up for new words for new realia, based on ‘domestic linguistic material’.

The lack of purism does not mean that the Serbian expert discourses are free of linguistic nationalism. Research has pointed out that linguists in Yugoslavian times were a part of the intelligentsia that prepared the atmosphere for war (Budding 1998). Tollefson emphasized the switch of the ideology of linguists towards nationalism in the 1980, following the death of marshal Tito, the lifetime dictator of Yugoslavia (2002: 68). In a country that had Serbo-Croatian as the official language, a group of Serbian academics published a controversial text called the “Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Science and Art”, where they warned that Serbian language and nationality is endangered in Croatia and other parts of Yugoslavia.5 In this document

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5 Serbo-Croatian was the largest of the three official languages in Yugoslavia. To officially consider Serbian and Croatian separate languages was considered an attack on the stability of the state. See 2.3.
they “repeatedly used the term “genocide” to describe what it considered anti-Serb language and nationality policies in the other republics” (2002: 70). Clearly, a part of Serbian linguists engaged in a dangerous form of ethnic nationalism, that played a role in the largest conflict on European soil since World War II.

An even more nationalist type of metalinguistic discourse about the Serbian language emerged among a number of influential linguists in Serbia after the 1990s, that Greenberg labelled “Neo-Vukovites” (2004: 67). The main thesis of these linguists is that there ever only was one language in the Balkans – Serbian – and that the Bosnian, Croatian and Montenegrin languages are made-up languages, thus they are linguistic varieties “taken away” from the Serbian people (Bugarski 2018). This radical claim is in fact based on a specific type of primordial nationalism Serbian-nationalistic rhetoric relies upon an aggressive expansionist ideology called “Greater Serbian ideology” (Guzina 2003). Greater Serbia is an idea that Serbia should have the boarders of the medieval Serbian Empire, covering many areas of contemporary Bosnia, Croatia, Montenegro and Macedonia (compare maps 1. and 2. below). It also suggests that all the people living in the territory of Greater Serbia are originally Serbs, only some of them changed their religion to Catholicism and therefore became Croats, some changed it to Islam and became Bosnians (called Bosniaks by the Serbian linguists, see 2.3.5. for more details).

The Greater Serbian idea is based on not just historical, but also on linguistic arguments. The hypothetical territory of Greater Serbia (map 1.) more or less matches the historical territory of the Stokavian dialect group (the yellow, blue and red areas on map 3.). This dialect group is considered to be the central and most widespread group of dialects in the South Slavic dialect continuum. The other two dialects in the area of former Yugoslavia are the Kaykavian dialect (covered the territory of Slovenia and North Croatia, shown in purple in map 3) and Chakavian (the sea coast area of Croatia and parts of Bosnia, shown in green in map 3). The “Neo-Vukovite” linguists consider all “speakers of Stokavian to be Serbian”, which was also the opinion of Vuk Karadžić, the first standardized of Serbian language and this group’s ideological authority (hence the name “neo-VUKovites”). Thus, the original territory of the Stokavian is considered Serbian language, while the Chakavian and Kaykavian dialects are considered to be Croatian and Slovene (compare map 1. and map 3.).

Jovanović (2018a) analysed texts of these right-wing linguists and found that an additional elements of the Serbian intuitionalist discourse are the Cyrillic script and Orthodox Christianity. In the understanding of those linguists, the Cyrillic script and its close history connecter to the Orthodox church is what makes the Serbian language unique, hence insisting on a protection of the script, that they see “occupied” by the Latin script. These linguists are now the dominant type of linguists publishing article in the largest daily newspaper, “Politika”.

The review of the literature on both Croatian and Serbian linguists shows that – on an ideological level – there are many more similarities than differences, one of them
Map 1: Map of Greater Serbia

Map 2: Current ex-Yugoslav countries

Map 3: Distribution of Kaykavian (purple), Chakavian (light green) and Stokavian (red, blue and yellow) dialects (Brabec, Hraste & Živković 1970)
being an inclination towards monolingualism. Also, there is a dominant understanding of language as a twofold system, consisting of ‘organic’ language varieties (“ethnically pure” dialects) and ‘non-organic’ varieties (i.e.) standard languages (cf. Greenberg 1996, Greenberg 2008). There is a constant disagreement in the academic literature of Serbian and Croatian linguists on which ‘organic’ and ‘non-organic’ language varieties should be labelled ‘Croatian’ and which ‘Serbian’ (Greenberg 2008), but the general ideological mechanism that dictates how language is understood appears to be the same – on an ethnic basis.

Snježana Kordić has written extensively about the ideologies of Croatian linguists, whose ideologies are interesting as they are often formed through the criticism of Serbian linguists and vice-versa. Firstly, linguists describe “standard language” as something opposed to language as a system and as a “non-organic” creation. Croatian language planners understand the non-standard language as a “system”, while the standard language is not a system, since it is not governed only “purely linguistic” rules, but “societal and linguistic” rules (Kordić 2010).

In short, the research has been focusing on the influence of nationalism on the linguistic practices and discourses of Serbian linguists, as well as what differentiates them from their Croatian counterparts but little about the discourses of non-linguists.

1.5. RESEARCH METHOD

The approach used in this dissertation will be to triangulate by combining qualitative and quantitative methods, as well as the comparative method.

This section will first specify the research object and the related terms (1.4.1.), describe the theoretical model for the analysis (1.4.2.), present the discourse-analytical tools that will be used in the analysis (1.4.3.), present the comparative method used in this dissertation (1.4.4.) and the research data (1.4.5.).

1.5.1. LIMITATION OF THE RESEARCH OBJECT

The dissertation is limited to the discussions about the majority languages in these three countries – Lithuanian, Norwegian and Serbian, as well as how they are perceived in relation to minority languages and the global languages (English).

This dissertation will not analyse all ideologies connected to language, since – as previous research has shown, an abundance of societal and political ideologies is at play. There would be no possible way to compare all aspects of ideologies that come up in the debates about language, connected to politics, gender, economy, social class, power etc. The aim is to compare ideologies of language, meaning only conceptualizations of language as a phenomenon itself in the discourse, as formed by various non-linguistic ideologies.
For this reason, a theoretical model for the analysis will be used, limiting the ideology of language to three aspects – representation, expertise and function. The following section will describe the model.

1.5.2. REPRESENTATION, EXPERTISE AND FUNCTION AS THEORETICAL CONCEPTIONS

This research employs a pre-constructed analytical model. Since using an etic approach for such a diverse set of discourses would lead to incomparable results, the theoretical model is constructed to achieve comparable results about the similarities and differences between ideologies of language in the three countries.

Previous research of public discourse on language has highlighted the main aspects of language that are subject to ideologization. From the 12 studies that I have reviewed (Berthele 2008, Bermel 2007, Geeraerts 2003, Gorham 2000, Moschonas 2004, Pohlenz 2008, Reyes 2013, Spitzmüller 2007, Milani 2007, Milani 2010, Stroud 2004, Tardy 2009) I have drawn three aspects of language that are subject to ideologization. These are:

I. Representation, or the idealized relationship between language and the group that speaks that language. The relationship is considered idealized if there is a process of essentialization between the two phenomena – Lithuanians are linguistically represented by the Lithuanian language.

II. Expertise, an aspect that idealized understanding of what defines legitimate, or ‘good’ language. It can be either external sources (grammar books, dictionaries, other authorities) or internal sources (the linguistic capacities of the language speakers themselves);

III. Function, or what function of language is idealized. In most cases it is the communicative or the symbolic function.

Representation. In linguistics, a language variety is usually defined through a group of people that share it. A dialect is shared by a territory-based group, sociolect by age-based or class-based groups, idiolect by one person’s language, and a standard language by a large ethnic or civic group of people. Of course, linguists are aware that these concepts are more idealisations, as boundaries between dialects and sociolects are fuzzy, and standard languages are products of linguists rather than people. But in the metalinguistic data, the relationship between the group and the spoken variety is essentialised. A certain social group is represented by the language or a variety that it speaks. This can be, like in Geeraert’s (2003) models, a civic group or an ethnic group, or a social group of, for example immigrants that claim their version of the majority language as their own, as in the researches of Stroud (2004) and Milani (2007).

Expertise. Linguistics hold that linguistic competence is an innate ability of every human being. Noam Chomsky famously gave the example that there is no human
without at least one mother tongue, which means that linguistic competence is inborn. Saussure claims that *langue* is an innate and shared ability by all speakers of the same language. This static version of competence is challenged by sociolinguists, who employ concepts such as *linguistic repertoires* (Gumperz 1964) in order to have a more nuanced view of all the linguistic and stylistic variation. But in debates about language, the beliefs about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ language are often central points of discussion, a product of the introduction of compulsory education and *standard language ideology*. The consequence of this is a belief that to language experts such as teachers and linguists have to engage in language maintenance (Milroy 2001). The ultimate consequence is that elements of language (usually new and foreign), or entire language varieties (the non-standard ones) are categorized into ‘good’ and ‘bad’, as well as a discursive division between those who ‘know and ‘do not know’ a language. The belief that language is a system *beyond* the speaker (a set of rules found in a grammar book, a dictionary, a linguistic authority or institution etc.) will be referred to as **external expertise**. The belief that language is located *within* the language speaker (the mother tongue competence, the inborn ability to learn language, the natural ability to communicate and express oneself through signs etc.) shall be referred to as **internal expertise**. As shown in Bermel (2007) and Reyes (2013), these can be expressed through attitudes about both spoken and written forms of language.

**Function.** Two main opposing views for this question come from the period of the standardization of European languages, in which a tension between the ideas of the enlightenment and romanticism have played a great role – as a **tool of communication** and a as a **tool of expression** (Geeraerts 2003). As shown in studies by Gorham (2000), Polzenhagen & Dirven (2008), Moschonas (2004), Berthele (2008), language is very often seen as a tool of expression national identity (shall be referred to as the **national-identificational function**), very often expressed through metaphors that point to language as an object that needs care (body, organism, soil, substance) or protection (artefact, treasure).

### 1.5.3. DATA FOR THE DISSERTATION

As described in 1.3., studies of metalinguistic discourses in European countries display some very similar results. The prescriptivism, purism and linguistic nationalism surfaces in the discourses, due to the standard language ideologies and the European ideas of the monolingual nation-state. In this aspect, the choice of Lithuania, Norway and Serbia is beneficial as:

1. Each society is a standard language culture, but each has some unique features, described in the introduction.

2. The comparative perspective of these similar-yet-different societies will reveal the universal and specific aspects of ideologies of language.
All material for this research is metalinguistic in nature— all consists of texts that talk about language. They are five types of data. Research on state-sponsored LP: 1) Primary sources: State documents regarding language, 2) Secondary sources; 3) Interviews conducted with Lithuanian, Norwegian and Serbian linguists; Sources for analysis of metalinguistic texts: 4) Articles/interviews published in online media by language experts (authorities in questions of language), and 5) Comments from online news portals and forums about language. The expert articles will be marked with “Exp” followed by the country code and the number of the article (f. ex. Exp-LT-1) and the comment sections or comment threads will be marked in the same style “Com” (f. ex. Exp-NO-1).

The state documents and previous research on LP were collected through governmental websites and the Vilnius, Kaunas, Oslo, Copenhagen university libraries and their databases.

1.5.3.1. The ‘expert discourse’ data

This part of the data consists of online news portal articles that are either written by or contain the voice of the ‘language expert’ (years 2008–2016). Who is a language expert is defined by the media: usually by crediting their knowledge as “professional or scientific” (Habermas 2006: 416), so for example by referring to their profession (teacher, university lecturer, researcher), through affiliations (universities, linguistic academies, societies) and similar. The articles were collected by searching the most popular news portals. I included all genres— general news, opinion pieces, columns, interviews, chronicles etc.

**Lithuania.** I used six of the most popular national news portals (arranged according to popularity): “Delfi.lt”, “15min.lt”, “Bernardinai.lt”, “lrt.lt”, “lrytas.lt” and “lzinios.lt”. *Delfi.lt* is the most popular Lithuanian website, 5th according to AlexaRating6, right after Google.lt, Google.com, YouTube and Facebook. It is the fastest producing news portal, with the greatest amount of comments. Delfi is not associated with any political or ideological preference, it has received criticism for being exclusively profit-seeking. 15min.lt is currently the second most popular online portal. It has recently started focusing on investigative journalism; it has also blocked the possibility of anonymous comments. Delfi is not associated with any political or ideological preference, it has received criticism for being exclusively profit-seeking. 15min.lt is currently the second most popular online portal. It has recently started focusing on investigative journalism; it has also blocked the possibility of anonymous comments. It is currently ranked 14th most popular website in Lithuania. Lrytas.lt is a news portal connected to the main newspaper in Lithuania “Lietuvos rytas” [Morning of Lithuania]. However, the online news portal has a different editor-in-chief and news are much shorter than the print version. It ranks 17th in Lithuania. Lrt.lt is a news portal connected to the state radio and television channel LRT. It is ranked 55th in Lithuania. Bernardinai.lt is the first one; an online portal that states as its goal to spread Christian values. The last one is “Lzinios.lt” is a news

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6 All website ratings have been checked last time on 1 February 2019.
portal that bears the name of one of the oldest newspapers in Lithuanian language “Lietuvos žinios”. Since the 1990s the newspaper has changed its political views from centrist to right-wing, and then towards more Tabloid journalism.

**Norway.** The Norwegian portals were “Aftenposten.no”, “Dagbladet.no”, “nrk.no” and “vg.no”. Newspapers in Norway has played a role in the ‘language disputes’ as they showed their support for a certain form of Norwegian written language by deciding to print in that form. Even though these disputed are formally over, the linguistic practices and ideologies from that time remain. Research has even suggested that the *de facto* written norm is decided upon by the major newspapers (Dyvik 2003, Ims 2007). Vg.no is the most visited news portal in Norway (6th most visited website in Norway). It is connected to the daily newspaper “Verdens gang” [The course of the world], which claims to be the biggest newspaper in Norway. It is politically unaffiliated, populist, mostly tabloid in format and content. Aftenposten.no is a centre-right intellectual newspaper (24th most visited in Norway). During the ‘language disputes’ of the post-World War II in Norway, it took a ‘conservative’ stance – defending the most traditional form of the Norwegian written language *bokmål*, a form of written language often associated with the Oslo elite. It was the newspaper with the strictest language policy, having had an obligatory language test for new employees, and even an internal language council (Gundersen 1998). In the past decades, it has softened its position towards a more moderate language practice but remains one of the few newspapers in Norway with an explicit language policy. It is ranked 24th by popularity of all websites in Norway. Dagbladet.no is a tabloid newspaper with an online edition, ranked 11th most popular website in Norway. The newspaper was affiliated with the liberal party (Venstre), but nowadays claims neutral. Unlike Aftenposten, it has no language policy. Nrk.no is the news portal of the Norwegian Broadcasting Company (NRK). It is the 9th most popular website in Norway.

**Serbia.** The Serbian portals were “politika.rs”, “B92.net”, “blic.rs”, “danas.rs” and “novosti.net”. Like in Norway, certain media outlets in Serbia have language-ideological preferences. One of the most visible ones is the use of script. It has been shown that the use of Cyrillic script on the internet in connected by users to pro-Russian political ideology and the Latin script to a pro-Western ideology (Ivković 2013). The choice of the script in the portal is therefore important. “Politika” [Politics] is the oldest Serbian newspaper, and it has a corresponding news-portal “Politika.rs”. It is partially state-owned, and generally considered a centre-right, more intellectual newspaper, in Berliner format with a greater focus on culture. The news portal has its own editor, but it is not radically different from the newspaper – the articles found in the data on the online portal “Politika.rs” have also been printed in the paper edition. The script of choice is Cyrillic. Another outlet is called “Večernje Novosti” (Evening Newspapers), with a corresponding portal “novosti.rs”. This is a right-wing newspaper, it also uses the Cyrillic script. It should be noted that both “Politika.rs” and “novosti.rs” portals have an option to change between the Cyrillic and the Latin script,
while the print newspapers are printed only in Cyrillic. “B92.net” is a popular news portal of a radio and TV station B92 (currently O2); it played an important role in the 1990s as one of the few major radio channels that was openly against the authoritarian regime of Milošević. It is commonly known as a liberally-oriented channel but is said to have become more profit-oriented than political in the past decade. “Blic.rs” is a portal owned by the newspaper “Blic”: a tabloid newspaper, ideologically centrist, owned by the largest media publishing house in Europe, “Alex Springer” and partially by the Swiss company “Ringier”. The last portal is “Danas.rs”. It is run by the “Danas” newspaper company, and is considered a progressivist, centre-left newspaper. The last three portals use the Latin script only.

Expert articles were searched in the websites own search engine using keywords language, Lithuanian/Norwegian/Serbian language, linguist and language policy. The search terms in Lithuanian were “kalba”, “lietuvių kalba”, “kalbininkas / kalbininké”, “kalbos politika”. The Norwegian keywords were “norsk språk”, “språk”, “språkvitet / lingvist”, “bokmål”, “nynorsk”, “språkpolitiikk”. In Serbian, the keywords were “jezik”, “srpski jezik”, “lingvista”, “filolog”7, “jezička politka”. When possible, the portals own subject-tags were used. I have limited the choice of the data to articles either fully written by or containing statements of ‘language experts’. I have excluded the news that contain no belief about language, for example a short comment of a linguist on a words / phrase, or news about a project started by a LP institution. In this way, 62 articles in Lithuanian, 44 in Norwegian and 79 in Serbian were collected.

Supplemental data was taken from language experts engaged in state-sponsored language planning (LP). The purpose of the interviews was to gain knowledge about LP that could not be obtained through an analysis of secondary sources. The interviews were conducted face-to-face with three Lithuanian, five Norwegian, and three Serbian language experts (in total 11 interviews). The interviews were semi-structured, starting general information about the informant his or her interest in language issues, history of engagement in language politics, followed by a more general discussion about language policy in the country. The experts were selected to represent various institutions that shape language policies, and, accordingly, would represent some kind of “official voice” of that institution. I tried to get an interview from at least one respondent from each institution.

In Lithuania, I interviewed two experts who worked or used to work at the at the State Commission of the Lithuanian language (LT-INT-1, LT-INT-3) and one from the Language Inspectorate (LT-INT-3). For the Norwegian case, more experts were included, because one such expert was engaged in Nynorsk LP, some only in Bokmål, others in general LP. Two were from the Language Council of Norway (NO-INT-2, NO-INT-5), one from the Nynorsk Cultural Centre(NO-INT-3), one engaged in writing the general language policy of Norway (NO-INT-4) and one was a retired expert.

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7 In Serbia, it is common to refer to linguists as ‘philologists’.
who was engaged in language-norming projects (NO-INT-1). In Serbia, two experts were involved in the work of the Commission for the Standardisation of the Serbian Language (SR-INT-1, SR-INT-2), and one in minority language planning projects at the Office for Minority and Human Rights (SR-INT-3).

1.5.3.2. The ‘vox populi’ (non-experts) data

The data collection of the ‘vox populi’ discourse was a methodological challenge. The aim is to give a clear picture of the discourse found in the ‘public’ part of the internet, that is available for everyone to see and read. Another criterion is that the data should be drawn from ‘central places’ for virtual public debate, for example, a comment section from a popular news portal is considered more central than a comment section under a popular blog.

The sampling strategy can be described as a mixture of sampling by theme (points 2–4.) and phenomenon (point 5.). The principles for sample are as follows:
1. Determine the central places of internet debate in Lithuanian, Norwegian and Serbian-language virtual sphere.
3. Search discussion forums with a topic-tag “language” or look for language sub-forums.
4. Gather all comment sections and threads that have more than 10 comments (I exclude those with less than 10 comments, because they usually do not get to the essential questions; no real debate develops).
5. Exclude threads that do not match the researched phenomena – ideology of language. These include many threads that were made for entertainment only (for example a thread “What is your favourite dialectal word?”) or those where the debate starts revolving about an unrelated topic (such as a news about “National language exam questions and answer”)*

‘Central/public’ places for virtual debate are quite different in the studied countries. The most popular place for commenting in Lithuania is one news portal – Delfi, where most comments are anonymous. Norway has a more controlled virtual space, as all news portals require a login or a Facebook profile in order to comment. This results in less comments per discussion. Most news portal have also started closing comment sections, and the central place for debate remain two websites: vgd.no and diskusjon.

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8 I am also aware that ‘linguistic play’ can point to certain language ideologies, but I chose to limit the scope of the analysis to the data that can tell something about the three aspect that I have chosen to research (representation, expertise and function), as described in 1.4.2. See section 4.3. for a more detailed critique of the research method.
no. In Serbia, the comment sections on news portals are not as regulated as in Norway, but there is no ‘central’ place for commenting, like in Lithuania. Most comments are found on the news portals Blic.rs and B92.net.

In Lithuania, the news portal Delfi has attracted international attention by its low-censorship policy in regard to comments. Delfi exists in all three Baltic states, and it has successfully allowed a lot of participation from the readership. However, this resulted in many court cases against the portal, due to comments of extremely offensive nature (cf. Voorhoof 2015). Nevertheless, this made the portal the central place for discussion of news articles, and language-related issues, produce over 600 comments per article, while the second most popular news portals portal, 15min.lt, has over 100 comments per article, and not even over 20 for news about language. Thus, the comments were taken from Delfi only.

In Norway, but posting a comment is available only through a login or a Facebook profile. This makes the comment section much more personal in contrast to the totally anonymous Lithuanian virtual sphere. One central commenting place has become the website ‘vgd.no’, opened as a forum of the portal VG.no. There, one can find discussions about language of a similar scope to the ones in Lithuania. What is different is that every user must have a (made-up) name and a profile in order to comment; also, these debates are initiated by a user and not a news article. In a few rare cases, the discussion is started by a news article – a user posts a link to an online news article, and comments on it, thus inviting to a discussion. I have chosen to study this portal primarily in this dissertation because it is the only virtual, public website place available for everyone, and generally known by most Norwegians (it is the 110th website by ranking in Norway). It can be assumed that the commentators on VG.no do not represent the majority of internet commentators, but mostly the readership of VG.no.

The Serbian virtual sphere is much more fragmented. I have included the comment sections of those news portals that engage in language issues, namely: Blic.rs, b92.net, Novosti.rs, danas.rs and politika.rs. There used to be a large forums for discussions (forum.b92.net and forum.krstarica.com), which are still relatively active, but as far as linguistic issues are concerned, a much larger number of comments can be found in the comments sections of news portals than these forums.

As mentioned, the period studied in this dissertation in this was from 2008 to 2016. I have performed the searches with the keywords listed above and included the discussions (comment sections and forum threads) with more than 10 comments. In that way, I collected 5797 comments were gathered from Lithuanian portals from 34 comment sections under Lithuanian news articles (168.37 comments per comment section on average), 2332 comments from 22 threads from the Norwegian forums (106 on average), and 2371 comments from 37 comment sections under Serbian news articles (64 comments per thread on average). In the Serbian data, due to a generally low number of comments per thread (usually below 10), I have included three articles from the year 2017, where larger discussions evolved. In total, a population of 10500 comments was collected.
2. THE RESEARCH CONTEXT:
LANGUAGE PLANNING (LP) IN THE BALTIC, SCANDINAVIAN AND EX-YUGOSLAV REGIONS

Language planning (LP) is “a body of ideas, laws and regulations (language policy), change rules, beliefs, and practices intended to achieve a planned change (or to stop change from happening) in the language use in one or more communities” (Kaplan & Baldauf 1997: 3). This dissertation is limited only to the state-driven or state-sponsored LP (planning ‘from above’), as the goal is not to understand the efforts of language planning in a whole linguistic community but only the ideas and language ideologies of the most powerful ideological broker – the state.

Although the main focus of the dissertation are Lithuania, Norway and Serbia, I include proportionally shorter sub-sections on LP in other Baltic (Estonia and Latvia), Scandinavian (Denmark and Sweden) and Ex-Yugoslav (Bosnia, Croatia and Montenegro) countries. The comparison will seek to highlight the ideological similarities and differences. I also limit the study to the main official language (I briefly reflect on the interplay between minority language policies the official language policies). The main goal of this section is to create a framework for the interpretation of the metalinguistic texts in a political light in chapter 3.

Lithuania is often placed as a “Baltic” country according to LP, but studies have shown that Baltic countries exhibit much more differences than similarity, based on studies of the minority language treatment and bilingual LPs (cf. Hogan-Brun & Ramoniene 2004, Hogan-Brun 2007). To my knowledge, there is no comparative study of the ideologies in LPs concerning majority languages, so this comparative overview hopes to shed some light on the practical and ideological subtilities that could be different between these countries. Much of Norwegian LP comes from Nordic cooperation, through the initiatives of the Nordic Council of Ministers, some quite recent and ongoing ones, so I had to acquire data on them through interviews. The understanding of Serbian language ideologies would not be complete without a review of the Belgrade-directed Serbo-Croatian language policy, which is a relevant subject in both Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian public spheres.

As mentioned, I have relied on language policy documents, interview data and secondary sources. For the Baltic countries, I was limited by the lack of competence in Estonian and Latvian, so I had to rely on English-language publications, supplemented with insights from personal communication with scholars from those countries. In the Scandinavian and Ex-Yugoslav data, I could read the documents in both the local languages and English.

This chapter will review and compare (1) goals of state-driven LPs in the three regions, (2) tools for achievement of the goals, i.e. institutions and laws and (3) ideologies. It has three sections, arranged by the three regions – Baltic (2.1.), Scandinavian (2.2.) and Ex-Yugoslav (2.3.). Section 2.4. presents a comparative overview of the LP goals, institutions, power and ideologies.
2.1. THE BALTIC STATES

2.1.1. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: “LATE STANDARDS” DEVELOP AND FALL UNDER SOVIET RULE (1900–1990)

The Baltic languages were standardized in the 19th and 20th centuries, making them “late standards”, and gained official status around by the end of the World War I, when all three countries became independent and internationally recognized states. After World War II, all three of them fell under Soviet rule, and the three states were re-installed as republics within the Soviet Union (whose politics were under the control of the central policy makers in Moscow). Here, the process of Russification played an important role. The available research shows that Russification was directed toward status planning, i.e. increasing the status of Russian language as the administrative and international language (Šepetys 2012). Some places it is stated Russian was a *de facto* official language, even though it was not the main language *de jure* (Pavlenko 2008: 281), but more detailed research says that the Russification policy did not affect Lithuania in such a high status as Latvia and Estonia, due to lesser amount of migrations; Lithuanian remained the dominant language in most domains of life (Vaicekauskienė & Šepetys 2018: 198). However, the general inclination towards Russification caused unrest in the Baltic states for the future of the national languages and could be one of the reasons that very strict and wide-reaching national language policies were established in the three countries following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Some important differences between these three countries can be noticed in the Soviet period. Firstly, the migration of the population from other Soviet countries was greater in Latvia and Estonia than in Lithuania. Currently, 60.2% of Latvian citizens are ethnic Latvians, 68.7% of Estonian citizens are ethnic Estonians; the Russian-speaking minorities are the most numerous (37.2% use Russian as a home language in Latvia, and 29.6% in Estonia). Lithuania is the most ethnically homogenous country, according to the 2011 census, there are 84.2% Lithuanians, and two main ethnic minorities: Polish (6.6%) and Russians (5.8%). After the dissolution of Soviet Union, Estonia and Latvia introduced test-based requirements for the acquisition of Latvian citizenship for migrants from other Soviet countries, one of which was to pass an exam in Latvian language. Large portions of non-Latvian speaking minorities consequently became stateless persons (which is still a persisting problem that often attracts negative attention from the United Nations, as there were 85,301 stateless persons in Estonia, and 252,195 in Latvia in 2015). Lithuania, on the other hand, has virtually no stateless persons, as such test-based citizenship requirements were not introduced. This could be one of the reasons that the LPs in Estonia and Latvia are more focused on status planning, while Lithuanian LP is more focused on corpus planning (Hogan-Brun, Ramonienė & Grumadienė 2007), as I, too, will show in the following sub-sections.

Due to similarity in nominal legislation, the three Baltic states have been put in the same category, but more recent studies have pointed out that the actual LPs need
to be compare in between each other to gain a more realistic picture of the Baltic region (cf. Spolsky 2004, Pavlenko 2008). Thus, the next sub-section will briefly point out the general traits of the legislations and focus more on the differences in institutional practices.

2.1.2. ESTONIA – HOW TO TEACH “THEM” ESTONIAN?

The changes in language legislation in Estonia in the past three decades suggest that the principal goal of LP in Estonia has been to achieve a dominant status of Estonian language in state institutions and public services. The Estonian Language Act was updated as many as three times (in 1989, 1995 and 2011), each time providing more detailed descriptions on how Estonian and non–Estonian may be used in local government offices. The monolingual ideal is present in the documents, but is not fully enforced in practice, as many state services are provided in Russian to meet the real-life needs of the citizens (this has been researched in greater detail by the Estonian researcher Maimu Berezkina in her PhD project, cf. Berezkina 2016, 2017).

It has been remarked that the overreaching goal of Estonian LP goes beyond language at state institutions and aims is to increase the status of Estonian language “in all domains across the entire country” (Verschik 2005: 302). A special accent was put on the acquisition of Estonian language for non–Estonian speaking population, as a part of the government’s integration strategy. Language itself occupies a central place in the Estonian integration programmes, both for the period of 2008-2013 (EE-DOC-3) and 2014-2020 (EE-DOC-4). The latter document ("Integrating Estonia 2020") mentions language camps for children, abolition of Russian language at secondary schools, discounted Estonian language courses for adults as means of achieving this result (EE-DOC-4: 6). This language policy is a part of the general integration policy run by the Estonian government since the 1990s that has focused on the increase of national sovereignty, that has – in terms of language – resulted in an Estonian-only language policy (Agarin & Regelmann 2012), probably because of the influence dominant Herderian ideology described in the introduction, that a single language automatically guarantees a higher degree of national unity and stability. The research available to me in English has pointed out that the Russian speaking minority has little interest in learning or improving their knowledge in Estonian language (Vihelemm 1999, Toomet 2011), and that they prefer to learn English over Estonian because of the economic gains; the only target group that was motivated to learn Estonian are governmental workers, since proficiency in Estonian could give a chance to acquire a higher position at work (Toomet 2011: 529). This can be interpreted as the government’s attempt to impose a monolingual standard on a population– or large parts of it – that has little need for it.

The main institution implementing status planning in Estonia is the Language Inspectorate, functioning under the Ministry of Education and Research. This institu-
tion has had many names and different functions: in the 1990s, it was a centre for adult language teaching (teaching Estonian to non-Estonians) and an expert institution for the development of LP, as well as a surveillance institution; over the years the teaching and planning functions were replaced by surveillance functions, and since 2002, the institution only observes the implementation of the Language Act (EE-DOC-1). Other than this institution, the Estonian government established a temporary expert body between 2011 and 2017, for the purpose of developing a language strategy. The Language Inspectorate has the task to control the language level of Estonian of employees in government institutions; and those who have not reached a certain level of proficiency in Estonian, the Language Inspectorate can suggest them to be dismissed from their workplaces (EE-DOC-5: 5).

The document “Development Plan of the Estonian Language 2011–2017” sets out principles for the codification and the status of Estonian. According to it, corpus planning is regulated by the “committee of the Mother Tongue Society (provision of norms and recommendations in fundamental questions), the department of language management at the Institute of the Estonian Language (compilation of the dictionary of correct usage)” (EE-DOC-2: 21). The Language Inspectorate is “authorized to check compliance of official language use with the norm of the standard language and observance of the requirements for the language of administration in language of administration in local state institutions and local governments during their sessions, in the procession of documents and communication with people” (EE-DOC-2: 69). This suggests that both written and oral language is subject of control. I have found no study that would report that this is actually done in practice, except for this part of the official Development Plan of the Estonian Language 2011-2017, which expresses worry that there is not enough legislation that would enable surveillance:

“According to the Language Act, official language use has to comply with the norm of the standard language; however, the requirement of correct language use has not been set in several important domains of public language use (of facial websites, signs, signposts, advertisements, notices). Legal acts do not define the concepts of a language of administration and an in-house language of administration, which complicates supervision in these domains.” (EE-DOC-2: 69-70)

2.1.3. LATVIA MAKES IT EVERYONE’S NATIONAL DUTY TO STRENGTHEN LATVIAN

“I, upon assuming the duties of a Member of the Saeima, before the people of Latvia, do swear (solemnly promise) to be loyal to Latvia, to strengthen its sovereignty and the Latvian language as the only official language, to defend Latvia as an independent and democratic State, and to fulfil my duties honestly and conscientiously. I undertake to observe the Constitution and laws of Latvia.” (DOC-LA-1, italics by me)
The quote above is taken from the Latvian Constitution, which defines the solemn promise a new MP has to give upon assuming their duties in the Saeima (Latvian Parliament). This serves as an illustration of how highly status planning was prioritized in Latvia, since the fall of the Soviet Union. The explicit goal to establish Latvian as the principal language in the country. The leading language planning scholar in Latvia, Ina Druviete, the first chairman of the State Language centre’s Language Committee (1992-2002) has been raising concerns over the status of Latvian language. She claimed that Latvian – even though a state language – is an endangered language in Latvia, and therefore needs state protection (Druviete 1997: 183, also cf. Druviete 2002). As in Estonia, the surveillance work that takes place is focused on ensuring that employees in state institutions are able to speak the national language (more on the control institution in the next paragraph). The monolingual LP ideals caused Latvia to receive great criticism from international organisations such as the OSCE and also the EU, during the period these countries were applying for membership in the EU (Ozolins 2003). The main points of criticism were that the laws prevent the non-citizens from obtaining citizenship and prevent participation of minorities in public life (Ozolins 1999, compare EE-DOC-5).

The State Language Law was adopted in 1999 and defined the obligatory spheres of Latvian language use: “state language at state and municipal institutions, courts and agencies belonging to the judicial system” (LA-DOC-2 §2-1) as well as private companies, when dealing with information about “legitimate public interests” (LA-DOC-2 §2-2). Another noteworthy law was the Educational Law adopted in 2004, which introduced a requirement for a gradual transition from non-Latvian (predominantly Russian) into Latvian language in secondary education (Schmid 2008). This law was dealing, again, with the status of Latvian, rather than its corpus. The implementation of Latvian-only secondary education is foreseen (at the time I am writing this) for the school year 2020/2021.

The State Language Centre was established under the Ministry of Justice to see the implementation of the Latvian as the official language in 1992. It grew into a body with three main departments – Terminology and Translation, Latvian Language Expert Commission and Language Control Department. The first department does all the official translations, the second is responsible for the codification of norms of Latvian standard language (LA-DOC-2 §23-2) and the third performs the surveillance function. As a special accent was put on “the certification of the level of Latvian language skills of speakers of languages other than Latvian” (Priedīte 2005: 411), the main function of control was put on determining whether those employed in state administration and public institutions speak Latvian at a certain proficiency level. Another LP institution was established in 2002 under the office of the President of Latvia – the State Language Commission. Its main task is to create plans for the future of LP. It should be mentioned that this institution is rarely mentioned in research, as still the main LP documents are produced by the Centre. This could be due to the fact that the Commission works “on a voluntary basis without any remuneration.” (LA-DOC-3).
The corpus planning is done at the State Language Centre, according to the law: “The norms of the Latvian literary language shall be codified by the Commission of the Latvian Language Experts of the State Language Centre.” (LA-DOC-2 §23-2). Unlike the language-status ideals, the language corpus-ideas are not enforced; no state institution oversees, corrects or penalizes language incorrectness. Protectionist prescriptivism is common in Latvian society in general (Latvian language is seen in need of protection from big languages such as English and Russian) (Strelēvica-Ošīna 2016). But it has not been noticed in the practice of state institutions, despite the fact that there is a legal basis for this practice.

2.1.4. LITHUANIA IS REBORN: NEW FREEDOMS AND NEW RESTRICTIONS

The new Constitution of Lithuania made Lithuanian language the “state language” in 1990 and continued passing more language-regulating laws which foresaw more language planning institutions.9 The Lithuanian linguistic legislation is much more far-reaching, as Lithuanian must be is obligatory in the state system, as well as in all media outlets and all publications10 (LT-DOC-1 §22), as well as public signs (LT-DOC-1 §23).

Lithuania is the only country of the ones in the analysis with two fully independent and fully financed separate LP institutions. The first is The State Commission of the Lithuanian Language (SCLL) that was opened in its current form in 1995, to which the tasks of language regulation, norm-setting and “directions for the care of Lithuanian language” were entrusted (LT-DOC-1 §20). The legal definition of the Commission’s jurisdiction is rather vague. Two tasks concerning status are advisory, “[to solve questions of the implementation of the State Language Act]” (LT-DOC-2 §3-1), to “[provide state institutions and organisations with conclusions about bills, where there are provisions that regulate the use of the state language]” (LT-DOC-2 §3-3) and there is one point that suggests that the Commission decides on the status, namely “[the Commission discusses important questions raised in the society about language use and norm and takes decisions about them]” (LT-DOC-2 §3-9). In an-

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9 The phrasing used in the constitution is somewhat tricky to translate, namely valstybinė kalba could be either “state language” or “national language”. An alternative phrasing, such as valstybės kalba, would be translated only as “the language of the state (apparatus)”, while the current phrasing can be interpreted in two ways – as the official language, or as the language of all the nation, which would mean obligatory use of Lithuanian language in all spheres of life. There is a similar situation with the Latvian valsts valoda and the Estonian riigkeel.

10 Even though the law clearly states [all book and other publication publishers are obliged to comply with the correct language norms] (“visi knygos ir kitų leidinių leidėjai privalo laikytis taisyklingos lietuvių kalbos normų”), works of fiction are no longer checked for compliance with language norms, but non-fiction, especially textbooks, are.
other law, regarding the implementation of the Language Act, the Commission is given jurisdiction to “[decide on how information regarding international matters will be provided in foreign languages in transport, hotels, banks, tourist agencies as well as advertising]” (LT-DOC-6 §2).

The Commission works by publishing “agreements” on certain language issues. The large majority of these agreements concern the corpus. I have only found one directly concerning about the status of Lithuanian vis-à-vis foreign languages, namely the Commission has ‘allowed’ use of foreign languages in the above-mentioned areas (from transport to advertising), but only if the script in foreign language is not larger and if the voice message is no longer than the Lithuanian one (LT-DOC-7 §2). The Commission has monopoly on questions of corpus planning. The “agreements of the Commission” concerning language norms (corpus) are agreements that the members of the SCLL vote in meetings. If the vote is positive, they automatically legal acts that are obligatory to follow by all state and local institutions (LT-DOC-2 §6-2). The ‘correct Lithuanian language’ defined in such a way (as compliance with the norms of the SCLL) is also obligatory in all media and publications (LT-DOC-1 §22) and public signs (LT-DOC-1 §23).

The implementary institution is the Language inspection, that oversees the compliance with the norms of the standard language, as prescribed by the SCLL, as well as the use of Lithuanian language in obligatory spheres of use. The maximum fine today amounts to 400 euros (LT-DOC-8 §489). Fines can be sent to institutions, companies, organizations or individuals that do not use Lithuanian, but another language. For a period of about 24 years (1995-2019), the same type of fine could be administered to those institutions that make a language mistake listed in The List of Major Language Errors (LT-DOC-3) compiled by the Commission (this provision was abolished by the SCLL on 31 January 2018). From a legal point of view, the Inspectorate has until recently been the most powerful institution of language control (probably in whole Europe), since it coercively and directly influenced all public language use. Apart from imposing fines, the Inspectorate used to, and still does, give recommendations, warnings and demand from institutions to report back on improvement in language use. These warnings and recommendations are perhaps as powerful as the fines: for example, one journalist of the Lithuanian national television service, was replaced from the morning show he was hosting because of the warning of the Inspectorate; due to another similar warning, one reporter’s time on air was reduced, as the television station promised that his reports would be read by professional anchors, and not he personally (Pupkis 1996: 5).

Recent research on language ideologies in Lithuanian has identified some of the main historical and institutional conditions that sustain the rigid system of surveillance and norm enforcement. The first aspect is historical: the ideologies behind the above-described practices are a combination of a romanticized linguistic purism originating in the inter-war period (when the standard language was being established), and an
intellectual regime often called “Soviet modernity” (Vaicekauskienė 2011). The Lithuanian romantic purism bares no significant differential characteristics in comparison with other purisms: it is characterized by a desire to free language of all elements seemingly foreign, as well as an adoration of the ‘ancient’ character of the Lithuanian language and culture (Spires 1999, Subačius 1999). Another trait of a standard language in the making is the need for correctness, and the role of the linguists as a norm maker. This was also the case in Lithuania, where the prominent linguists, through periodical publications, started pointing out the mistakes in language that they find in public discourse (Tamaševičius 2013). It should be mentioned that at this point in time, no institution had formal power to implement the desirable standards of purism and correctness. Following World War II, a new mode of thinking became widespread in Lithuania, often labelled as “Soviet modernity” is characterized by an imposition of social norms from “above”, that encompass everything from the way one should dress, eat, drink to the way one ought to talk (cf. Hoffmann 2003). In that context, language was seen by the norm-setting linguists as a “regulative idea” (Keršytė 2016: 104), meaning it is not a part of social reality, but an abstract, perfectly constructed system that is supposed to regulate social reality.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Lithuanian authorities provided a budget for LP efforts and formally institutionalized a LP based on the above-described ideas. Critics have pointed out that this system survives to this day (almost 30 years) through a constant warning about ‘dangers to the language’ coming from those institutions, which can be interpreted as the need to justify their own existence and sustain their power (Vaicekauskienė 2016). It is, therefore, believed that this system will most likely not change essentially in the near future (Vaicekauskienė & Šepetys 2018).

Another part of the system of LP institutions includes two departments at the Research Institute of the Lithuanian Language: first, The Centre of Terminology provides a database of Lithuanian cognates of new words that stem from foreign languages, and second, the Centre for Standard Language Research (formerly called “Department of Language Culture”) is the main centre of construction of language norms. The normative ideas are developed in the journals Bendrinė kalba [Standard language, formerly “Language Culture”] and is popularised through a specialised journal Gimtoji kalba [the Mother Tongue]. Although there is no detailed process-tracking study of Lithuanian LP, a recent article by Vaicekauskienė and Šepetys (2018) suggests that the language policy itself is dictated by the same professional linguists that work on its implementation. There is also a significant overlap of membership in formal institutions like the Commission, the academic ones such as the Research Institute of the Lithuanian Language, and in the above-mentioned journals as editor-in-chiefs or on the editorial boards.

An additional aspect to be considered is how the efforts of LP institutions in Lithuania extends and works effectively well beyond the state apparatus. The extensive system of surveillance supported by law requires any business or state institution working with
language to take extra care about norms. Many publishers, media houses and marketing/public relations agencies employ language editors to check with the requirements of language commission and to avoid problems with the Inspectorate. News presenters undergo extensive training in speech correctness and their language is monitored by a locally employed language corrector, so that the employer would avoid getting warnings or (earlier) fines. Additionally, all municipalities are obliged by law to employ a ‘language inspector’ or ‘language manager’ (Lith. Kalbos tvarkytojas), who assists in the writing and revision of documents and control the language of public signs. They also perform a function of control, because they can warn about and penalise incorrect language use at the municipality level (DOC–LT–5 §3–4.). The Lithuanian LP, thus, sustains a proportionally large (for a small country like Lithuania) market for language-correction and language-advisory jobs. The journal Gimtoji kalba also reports on the additional needs of the market, such as: creating a term bank, an onomastic database, the development of language technologies (Smetonienė 2004), publication of more exemplary handbooks on the use of standard Lithuanian (Stundžia 2007), to name a few.

2.2. THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES

This part will review the LPs in three Scandinavian countries – Denmark, Norway and Sweden. These three counties have very different language political histories, but their current LPs have become more unified under the guidance of the Nordic Council of Ministers (and the Nordic Language Council under it). Historically, Denmark and Sweden have had a much longer history of standard languages than Norway. Standard Danish and Swedish are old standards that developed during the times of the reformation, when the Bible was translated to these languages. The Norwegian language started to be standardized in the 19th century and has two written standards: Bokmål was used by about 85% of the population and Nynorsk was used by about 15% of the Norwegian citizens in the year 2014 (Grepstad 2015). The Scandinavian countries did not have any long-term language strategies until the turn of the millennia and the term “language policy” was generally unknown and little used (Lindgren 2005: 23). The work on the written norm was seen at the only important task. This work is institutionalised in Denmark (Danish Language Council) and Sweden (The Swedish Academy), while in Norway written norms were for a long while created ‘non-officially’, through language societies and publishing practices rather than by a state institution (Dyvik 2003), although this has changed somewhat in recent years (cf. Linn 2010 and Røyneland 2013) and will be discussed in detail in 2.3.3.

11 In case of journalists and book authors, the principle of the State Language Inspectorate was that the individual is not fined, but rather the whole institution, and the journalist is warned (until 31 January 2018).
2.2.1. TRANSNATIONAL LANGUAGE POLICIES IN SCANDINAVIA THE NORDIC COUNTRIES

This section will shortly discuss the history of the Nordic linguistic cooperation and then discuss, in greater detail, the ongoing LP projects in the Scandinavian countries, that have been developing since the turn of the millennia.

For a long time, the main issue of Nordic cooperation was mutual intelligibility. It is a well-known fact that there is a great level of mutual intelligibility between the speakers of the three continental Scandinavian languages, both due to the linguistic continuum and due to the proximity of their standard languages. Additionally, Swedish is broadly spoken in Finland, Danish is spoken on Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Iceland. The policies of the Nordic Council of Ministers have focused on fostering and improving Nordic communication, avoiding use of translation and English.\(^\text{12}\)

By the end of the 20th century, the LP took a turn towards status planning putting international English as one of the main targets of LP. Through initiatives of linguists working at the national LP institutions, the status of English in the Nordic Countries was put on the agenda and gained support from the Nordic Council of Ministers.\(^\text{13}\)

A “Declaration on a Nordic Language Policy” was signed in 2006 by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, which set clear guidelines for the future of political engagement in language.

Denmark, Norway and Sweden introduced the main overreaching goals from the declaration into their national language policies: ‘inter-Scandinavian communication’ (encouragement of communication in national languages rather than English or through translation), ‘plain language’ (simplification of bureaucratic language) and ‘parallel-lingualism’ (encouragement of the use of national languages in domains where English language is dominant, such as higher education and international business).\(^\text{14}\)

This dissertation will deal only with the policies and ideologies connected to the majority language in these countries.\(^\text{15}\)

The first goal, ‘inter-Scandinavian communication’ is a continuation of the above-described goal to increase mutual intelligibility amongst the Nordic countries, avoid-

\(^{12}\) Of course, communicating in these languages is not always easy, speakers of certain languages and dialects understand others better, and some worse; for example, the most Swedes have trouble understanding the Danish, unless they are from South Sweden. See Lars Vikør’s seminal publication “The Nordic Languages: Their Status Interrelations” from 1993.

\(^{13}\) The Nordic Council of Ministers also commissioned research on the status of English and national languages in the Scandinavian countries around this time.

\(^{14}\) Minority languages are another focus, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation. It has been noticed that their treatment of minority languages is very different in the national policies, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation (cf. Josephson 2015)

\(^{15}\) It should be mentioned that a great deal of scholarly papers was written on the subject of parallellingualism, reaching beyond the scope of this dissertation. I refer the interested readers to Hultgren (2013) and Hultgren, Gregersen & Thøgersen (2014)
ing use of translation and English. The main task is to stimulate production of inter-Nordic dictionaries in paper and electronic form (Språk i Norden 2006). The second goal, ‘plain language’ (no. / se. klarspråk, da. klarsprog) encompasses codification of a new administrative language, publication of guidelines, trainings with municipalities etc. The third goal is the most complex and most discussed – ‘parallellingualism’. With this goal, the Declaration brought a new aspect to Scandinavian language policy – planning of the status of national languages vis-à-vis English. The central part of the new language policies was the idea that national languages – Danish, Swedish and Norwegian respectively – should be “society-bearing” [da. samfundsbærende, no. nynorsk samfunnsberande, sv. samhällsbärande]. Next to “society-bearing” the words “strong” and “main language in the society” are used, meaning that the languages should be visible and usable in all spheres of public life. The main idea of parallellingualism was to increase the status of the national languages in the fields where it was felt it suffered ‘domain loss’. The original term ‘domain loss’ was accentuated in the Declaration as an upcoming problem, and two fields were identified as especially problematic – the higher education and international business.

The ambitious plans of the Declaration have been criticised on both on a practical and ideological level. Tore Kristiansen reported, based on a long-running research about loanwords in the Nordic countries, that LP cannot directly influence nor overt or covert attitudes about the English vis-à-vis national languages, unless done through the education system (2005: 110-111). Linus Salö (2012) claimed that the goals concerning reducing ‘domain loss’, introducing ‘parallellingualism’, creating a ‘society-bearing language’, show that the LP document is based on a monolingual language ideology, where the national language should be raised above all others. Andrew Linn (2010, 2014) claimed that these policies have been adopted and promoted by language institutions and the state (top-down), without much concern for the opinions and interests of the language speakers and stakeholders. The project of fostering inter-Scandinavian communication was also criticised as being based on an ideology of “a common Nordic culture”, that that excludes speakers of non-major Scandinavian languages, Icelandic, Faroese, Sami etc.: as these linguistic communities would communicate more successfully in English on a Nordic level, the insistence on major Scandinavian language would actually impair communication, rather than improve it (Kristinsson 2012: 223). The ‘plain language project’ was mostly focused on in Sweden, less so in Norway and Denmark. On the ideological level, this task was justified as a something that would improve democracy and emancipation, yet it faced the criticism that it turned into an ideology of ‘optimisation and cost-effectiveness’ (Palicki & Nord 2015). Other criticism has suggested that these policies will not resonate with the target audiences, will have limited field of influence and probably won’t last long (Kristinsson 2014).

The current status of these policies is difficult to assess, as they are still ongoing at the time I am writing the text of the thesis, but I will review their status based on
the available reports and the interviews I conducted with experts involved in LP for each individual country (I interviewed only the ones in Norway, but two of them were involved in the Nordic cooperation projects, so they were able to provide insight). The ‘plain language project’ is still ongoing, new research is currently being commissioned by the Language Council of Norway. The goal to apply ‘parallellingualism’ in international business has largely failed, in spite that business showed interesting in cooperating (NO-INT-02, NO-INT-3). At universities, new LPs are developed on the principles of the Declaration. The most recent development at the time I am writing this (2018), was that the Nordic Council of Ministers issued 11 recommendations (NM-DOC-1) for how to achieve better parallellingualism in the Nordic universities. The first and clear recommendation states that “All universities should have a language policy” (NM-DOC-1: 27) and continues to define it. Four recommendations are about what language policy should include, namely language of the classroom, language of administration, digital resources and dissemination of research. Three recommendations are about language courses that should be offered at universities, and another three are about practical side implementing language policy: establishment of a language translation centre, a language policy committee and to observe and document the use of languages.

The next three sections will discuss the specific traits of LP in three Scandinavian countries.

2.2.2. DENMARK ACCEPTS ENGLISH

Denmark made a “Law on Orthography”, that states that the only official institution entrusted with LP tasks is the Danish Language Council, under the Ministry of Culture (DA-DOC-1). Its main task is research on Danish language, especially focusing on the documentation of new words and language development. Its second task is advisory – to advise language users on language norms, to advise the government on LP issues. Finally, the Council has the duty to decide on the written norms and the codification of new words (DA-DOC-2). It does not have the possibility to control language use – it only monitors language change.

In 1994, the representative of the Danish Language Council said that English influence is small, not dangerous, and even makes the Danish language richer (Brunstad 2001: 126). This makes the Danish case quite unique: this was the period when globalisation was becoming a buzzword and fear of English was growing, yet the Danish LP institution claimed the opposite. This led to them being using norm-creating principles, set by the prominent linguist Paul Diedrichsen. He saw the ideology of the schools as characterized by “linguistic correctness”, and the language ideology of the universities as “naturalistic ideology” (referring to empiricism in linguistics) and sought to bring about a balance between those two oppositions (Brunstad 2001: 151).
2.2.3. NORWAY’S CRITICAL CULTURE

There is no general “Language Act” in Norway, the two main legislations are the “[Law on language use in public services]” (NO-DOC-2) and the Parliament decision under the name “Mål of meining”, an LP document that incorporates most main ideas of the Declaration on a Nordic Language Policy.

Norway is a unique example of language planning. Most nation-states went through a period where one linguistic standard became proclaimed the national one, and the other potential ones were discarded, but this never happened in Norway, two standards – Bokmål and Nynorsk – fought for their status in Norway.

The historical development of these two Norwegian standards and the related planning efforts is a well-known example used in language planning handbook. The two standards established themselves in the 19th century: one was based on a Norwegianized Danish standard (today’s Bokmål), and one based on Western Norwegian dialects, considered to be ‘the purest’ by the standardiser (today’s Nynorsk). There was an attempt to resolve the struggle between the two standards by creating a common language, which would be called “Samnorsk” (literally “joint-Norwegian”), but the government-initiated efforts were met with very strong resistance from the stakeholders and the general public and ultimately failed. The end of the “Samnorsk idea” marked an end of government-led interventions into language. Bokmål and Nynorsk are officially allowed to “develop separately” in communities who practice them (Papazian 2012b), but these struggles have shaped the language-ideological climate in Norway, critical of any linguistic authority and top-down planning of language (Sandøy 2011).

Norway has had, since 1952 an officially recognized LP institution currently goes under the name Language Council of Norway (since 2005). Its authority has been quite low, making room for “non-official norming of language” (Dyvik 2003). The centres of linguistic authority and ideological brokers have been linguistic societies – the Riksmål Society (supports a conservative version of Bokmål), the Bokmål Society (supports a moderate version of Bokmål), Noregs mållag [Language Organisation of Norway] (that promotes Nynorsk) to name a few. These informal institutions have had traditional allies in political parties, newspapers, publishers etc. When trying to initiate reforms or solve a linguistic issue, the official language institutions in Norway have to take great care not to anger any of these stakeholders.

In corpus planning, different ideologies are dominant for different standard. The last two reforms of Bokmål (in 2005) and Nynorsk (in 2012) will be described as examples of how LP institutions balance between the interest of linguists, the public and the state. The last reform of Bokmål was created based on linguistic corpora (Sandøy 2005: 100), which is supposed to reflect “actual use” of the written language (Sandøy 2009b). However, critics have pointed out that newspapers that are represented in corpora have strict ideologies about what good language is, and they have strong old alliances with linguistic societies (for example the centre-right newspaper...
“Aftenposten” has close ties to *Riksmålsforbundet*, an organisation that supports a conservative version of Bokmål), thus language norming is indirectly in the hands of those organisations.

The situation in Nynorsk is slightly different. The Nynorsk community is much smaller than the Bokmål community, and the feeling of a ‘language culture’ is strong; traditionally, it is the prominent Nynorsk users (authors, intellectuals) who have the power to decide on what is good and what is bad Nynorsk in practice (Brunstad 2009: 92). This causes the community to take a much stronger stance towards LP efforts. For example, when both reforms of Bokmål and Nynorsk were presented in 2003, the reform of Bokmål was accepted, but Nynorsk was not, due to very strong resistance from the stakeholders involved (Røyneland 2013). In 2009 the government commissioned a reform of Nynorsk again. That time around, a clear guideline was provided: the old Nynorsk norm is too ‘broad’ (there are too many morphological subsidiary forms), which confuses the pupils who are learning Nynorsk, thus the Language Council of Norway was entrusted with the task ‘narrowing’ the norm. The Council organised a reform commission consisting of two professional linguists and non-linguists (two editors, one journalist, two teachers), they organised meetings with stakeholders making sure that no one is left unhappy. When the commission manages to provide a norm that made all the linguistic societies and other influential Nynorsk-users happy, it was accepted in 2012. However, the new norm was *even broader* than the past norm; even more new subsidiary forms were added (Røyneland 2013). This shows that the government and the Language Council of Norway have a very limited influence over the norm. Top-down planning is impossible without a broad societal support and (in the case of Nynorsk) broad participation of the stakeholders in the process.

The only sphere where the Council can have direct influence are ‘school glossaries’, special glossaries made for school that list all the possible spellings of words and all possible morphological forms. According to the Education Act, the Language Council of Norway formally approves whether such glossaries reflect all the norm are acceptable for school use (NO-DOC-1), they check whether all the possible varieties in the official norm are included in the glossary.

Another unique feature is the high status of dialects in Norway. They are used in public and private communication, in media, SMS, in the parliament and in church (Sandøy 2011). In other words, Norway has a “pro dialect ideology” (Røyneland 2009). The idea of a “spoken national standard” is considered obsolete by most language users (Vonen 2012). The only place that enforces some kind of “standard spoken language” is the Norwegian Broadcasting Company during news-reading – this means that the news anchor reads from a screen and abandons the morphological and lexical choices of the dialect but keeps his/her dialectal phonology.\(^\text{16}\)

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\(^\text{16}\) In Lithuania and Serbia, a news reporter would also be expected to alter the phonology to standard speech.
2.2.4. SWEDEN PRESERVES THE PURITY OF SWEDISH...
BUT NOT REALLY

Sweden is the only of the three Scandinavian countries that adopted a Language Act, in 2009. It copied much from the Nordic Declaration, putting in that “Swedish is the principal language in Sweden” (SE-DOC-2 §4).

Since 2007, the main institution that implements LP has been the Swedish Language Council (under the nation-wide Swedish Institute for Language and Folklore). The task of the Council is partially research and partially implementation of LP, work on terminology, to give opinions on language issues, place names, to implement the plain language project. The Council also does surveillance of the use of Swedish and national minority languages in local municipalities; in 2012 the strengthening of interscanvinavian communication was added as a task of the Council (SE-DOC-1 §2).

Sweden has established the Swedish Academy in 1786, an institution famous for awarding the Nobel Prize in Literature. The original goal of the Academy was to “work on the purity, strength, and sublimity of the Swedish language”, inscribed in its statue. The Academy issues two publications – the Dictionary and the Glossary of the Swedish. The dictionary, just like all the ‘grand’ dictionaries, is not finished yet (it is currently at the letter V), but the Glossary was for a long time considered an authority for all orthographical solutions. Here I will review the corpus-planning solutions of the Glossary in the past (cf. Johannisson 1974 for a review of the first editions of the Glossary).

The long history of the Glossary shows that both its status in society and principles of codification have changed radically over the years. In the 19th century it started a spelling reform and became the norm for school teaching. However, towards the end of the 19th century, it switched from being a norm-reformist to be a norm-preserver. The ideology of the Glossary was conservative in the aspects of morphology, orthography, preserving even some forms that did not exist in spoken language. Sven-Göran Malmgren remarks that the conservative attitude costed the Glossary authority, especially when one of the Glossary’s editor-in-chief himself used morphological forms that ‘forbidden’ by his own Glossary. This attitude towards preservation of old forms changed essentially from the 20th century, and the Glossary started to follow the development of written and spoken language (Malmgren 2002).

The attitude towards loanwords, one of the main goals of the Glossary has also changed radically. Linguistic purism, inscribed in the title of the title of the Academy, has been absolutely abandoned in practice. Around the 1950s, the English spellings of new loan words started being accepted (Malmgren 2002: 14), the English morphological ending –s was no longer from the 1980s (Malmgren 2014: 83). The relationship towards loanwords has changed essentially at the end of the 20th century, as the original spellings of both new and old loanwords is now preferred to the Swedish transcription (Gellerstam 2003). Today, the Glossary is the main orthographical-advisory source on Swedish language and does not “impose” the norm (Malmgren 2014).
2.3. THE EX-YUGOSLAVIAN COUNTRIES

The topic of this chapter are the not all ex-Yugoslav countries, but only those where Serbo-Croatian was the official language: Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia or BiH short), Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia. These are important both because they were under the influence of the Serbo-Croatian LP driven from Belgrade and (somewhat) Zagreb during Yugoslavian times, and also because Serbian language is official in one part of Bosnia, a minority language in Croatia, and a large group of Montenegrins consider Serbian, not Montenegrin, their mother tongue. The status of Serbian and attitudes towards Serbian in these countries are a frequent subject of debate in media and would be impossible to understand the debates with an overview of the politics of language in these countries. For a recent review of nation-re-building in English see Kolstrø (2016).

2.3.1. A COMMON SOUTH SLAVIC LANGUAGE:
EFFORTS AND FAILURE (1850–1990)

Much of the LP in ex-Yugoslav countries is influenced by the first regional standard, the Serbo-Croatian standard language. This section will briefly present the standardization history in the 19th and 20th centuries, until the start of separate LPs around 1990. LP in the Ex-Yugoslav region began in the 19th century as a part of a pan-Slavic (Illyrian) movement; an idea that all the Slavic peoples living under Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian rule (nowadays Bosnians, Croats, Montenegrins, Serbs, as well as Slovenes) should unite as one nation, under one language. However, LP went over to being part of the process of political separation in the end of the 20th century.

State-driven language policies of south-Slavic languages (excl. Bulgarian and Macedonian) were initiated by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, whose initiative urged Serbian and Croatian linguists of the time to agree to standardize a common literary language for the South Slaves living in Austro-Hungary (Herrity 1992). In the year 1850, in Vienna, it was agreed that “one people must have one literature” (Langston & Peti-Stantić 2011: 345, my italic), which meant ‘a single literary/standard language’ at the time. The common language was called differently: Serbo-Croatian, Illyrian, slovenski/slovinski, “our language” and many others, but already in the end of the 19th century, separate names – Croatian / Serbian – were non-official in use, as well as the name “Serbian or Croatian language” (Sotirović 2006). Historical circumstances have led speakers of this, formally single, language to identified themselves more with the separate ethnic identities (Croatian and Serbian respectively), than with the pan-national (Illyrian or Yugoslavian) identity, and the same goes for the common Serbo-Croatian language (Bugarski, 1997). This is mostly likely due to strong religious identities (the Croatian population is largely Catholic, and the Serbian is largely Or-
thodox), that have formed and continue to form identities in the Balkans much more so than linguistic identities (Kolstrø 2014: 6). This was the situation until World War II. After 1945, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was replaced with the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). It consisted of six republics, in four of which (Bosnia, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia) Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian language was the official language.

There is a standard myth about the Serbo-Croatian language of the Yugoslavian times, which goes as follows: ‘Serbo-Croatian was one standard language, and after the breakup of Yugoslavia it split into two separate standard languages Croatian and Serbian’. Serbo-Croatian was in fact two standard languages, with one official name. It was defined as ‘plurinational’ language with two varieties – the Eastern (used in Serbia and Montenegro) and Western (used in Bosnia and Croatia). On the other hand, the structural differences in these two varieties were minor, some in pronunciation, as well as vocabulary, for example – train (Western: vlak, Eastern: voz), system (Western: sustav, Eastern: sistem). The mother tongue subject in schools was called “Croatoserbian” in Croatia and “Serbocroatian” in Serbia. There were also two official writing systems (Cyrillic and Latin), each nominally equally positioned in all four countries (although the actual use of the scripts and varieties was not equal – Cyrillic was used much more in Serbia and Montenegro).

In the first decades after World War II some deals had been made between the linguists of all four countries to develop a unified language policy, that would bring these two standards even closer together. But already in the 70s, national tensions started growing. Croatian linguists leaned towards purist practices, and Serbian linguists towards vernacular-based language planning (Greenberg 2004: 47). The demands for a separate language could be seen amongst linguists in both Croatia (Brozović 1971) and Montenegro (cf. Dulović 2013) in the 60ties and 70ties.

The government practiced a strong anti-nationalist censorship, eliminating cultural products that could indicate nationalist feelings or separationist tendencies. The most obvious result of such censorship in the linguistic field was the repossession and destruction of two dictionaries – one published in Serbia in 1966, and one in Croatia in 1971, both were seized and destroyed by the SFRY authorities. The dictionary published in Serbia contained positive descriptions of words such as “Greater Serbia” and similar nationalist terms (Vučetić 2016). The Croatian one was destroyed because the very name [Orthographic Glossary of Croatian] (without the necessary Croato-Serbian) of the dictionary indicated separatist tendencies to the centralist Yugoslavian regime (Greenberg 2004: 118).

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17 This was the official term in that time. The official name of the language was changing during the Yugoslav period, from just Serbo-Croatian, to the one mentioned in text, and up to the politically hypercorrect “Serbo-Croatian, Croato-Serbian, Croatian or Serbian language” in an encyclopedia issued in 1988 (Brozović & Ivić 1988).
Towards the break-up of SFRY, in the 1980-ties, linguists assumed an important role in the construction of national and ethnic identities, often taking the role of the critical voice, which accuses the government of not taking enough care for the national languages (c.f. Tollefson, 2002). This role very much continues into the post-Yugoslav period.

The break-up of SFRY marked the end of the attempts of a unified language policy. After 1990, the names were changed to Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian language respectively. This did not mark a great change in that actual language standard or in linguistic practice (language norms and typical ways of talking publicly were already different in the Serbo-Croatian times), but it did mark a change in the general ideologies and attitudes towards the role of language in society.

### 2.3.2. BOSNIAN ORIENTALISM

Bosnia and Herzegovina (official name, Bosnia short) was constituted as a country after long an extremely bloody war, fought on ethnic basis. The leaders of the Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia signed a peace agreement 1995, agreeing that Bosnia and Herzegovina will be split into two republics – the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (with two major ethnic groups – Croats and Bosnians) and the Republic of Srpska (with Serbs as the major ethnic group). Moreover, this country has three presidents, one Bosnian, one Croat, one Serbian, as well as a High Representative – an internationally allocated official that supervises the implementation of the international peace agreement.

The constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not mention language (except for general mentions of universal rights to language and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages). However, the constitutions of the two separate entities clearly define the official language. The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina defines **Bosnian** and Croatian as the official languages, while the Republic of Srpska defines **Bosniak**, Croatian and Serbian as the official languages. The fact that two constitutive parts of the same federation use a different name for the same language causes great debates; the whole debate is beyond the scope of this dissertation. It should be noted that **Bosnian** is used by the ISO, while in the region, individual laws and standards vary between **Bosnian** and **Bosniak**, sometimes employing both. The Serbian government in Srpska hold the position that **Bosnian** is unacceptable, arguing that it would refer to the entire population of Bosnia and Herzegovina (of all ethnicities), so only **Bosniak**, which would denote the language of the Bosnian Muslim population, is acceptable. The Commission for the Standardization of the Serbian language (CSSL) in Belgrade backs this idea, insisting that in the Serbian language one can say only **Bosniak** to denote this language.

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There is no formal body governing the Bosnian standard on a federal level, so the re-standardization is guided by linguists who support the idea of Bosnian as a separate language. Already during the Yugoslav times, these Bosnian linguists created a more specific Bosnian standard in practice, with more oriental lexicography, combining some Croatian and some Serbian orthographical choices. (Mønesland 2007: 1109) According to Halilović, the main language standardization scholar in Bosnia, the standardization of Bosnian was finally achieved in 2010, with the completion of the single-volume “Dictionary of Bosnian language” by the Halilović, Palić and Šehović (2010). The main innovations were introduced in the field of lexicography. ‘Bosnian lexicographic purism’ preferred *orientalisms* – words of Turkish and Arabic origin – to Slavic ones (which are seen as Serbian and/or Croatian words). Lexicographers explain that these word “[...highlight the *special and characteristic feature of the Bosnian language*]” (Mešanović-Meša 2012: 36, italics in original).

Due to the specific political climate of Bosnia, where a lot of power-balancing takes place, language is very much an unresolved issue even on a constitutional level, and both the Bosnian and Serbian media take up the subject (3.1.3. and 3.2.3.1.).

### 2.3.3. Croatia's Infamous Purism is Not State-Sponsored

The new Croatian constitution published in 1990 defined the Croatian language as the official state language. Shortly after the proclamation of independence, the purification of the Croatian language was made an LP priority by both linguists and politicians (Kordić 2010). An especially important role was played by Dalibor Brozović, a prominent linguist who also served as a vice-president of the country, and later as Member of Parliament; due to his influence, this idea gained acceptance in broad spheres of society (Kordić 2011). Although these ‘purified’ words are a marginal part of the lexicon from a linguistic perspective, they have a strong symbolic value.

The first words that were to be purified were those from Serbian (Pranjković 1997), as well as those that had to do with communist ideology, such as the word for “worker” (*radnik* became *djelatnik*) (Kapović 2011: 108). These changes were introduced more symbolically than systematically (“working time” still remained *radno vrijeme*, with the same old root in word for “work”). ‘Anglicisms’ came second, due to the fear of globalisation; although a negative attitude towards them had been present in the Yugoslav period as well (Truk & Opašić 2008). Also corrected were some ‘Germanisms’, ’internationalisms’, words from Russian or Old Church Slavonic origin (Štrkalj 2003:176–177) words from Arabic and Turkish (Greenberg 2004: 124). On the other hand, words from Italian, Hungarian and French origin tend to be labelled ‘adoptees’, and many of them were kept in their original form (Greenberg 2004: 123). The main principle here is probably that of “reformist purism” (Thomas 1991: 79): choice of desirable vs. undesirable words is based on the ‘linguistic identity’ the purifier seeks.
to create. Clearly this is a more Western (yet anti-globalist) identity, clearly separated from the Eastern and Southern geopolitical enemies.

Asides from ideas of corpus planning, LP activities were guided by the political need to scientifically and politically define Croatian as a national language (Busch 2010: 191). This was necessary to establish the one-nation-one-language ideal that the Yugoslav authorities were seemingly trying to prevent.

Today, in Croatia, the state does not recognize any institution as a formal authority on language planning or language norm, which means that the LP system is largely informal. There are two main players. The first is a group of linguists based at the university of Zagreb and at a research institution – the Institute of the Croatian language and Linguistics. The law defines this institution as a research centre, not mentioning LP work at all (CR-DOC-1 § 3), but in the statute of the Institute, there are some additional tasks, one of them concerning “[providing advisory services, making studies and expertise (...) especially concerning the status and the place of Croatian language and its standard language norms]” (CR-DOC-2 § 8). The second group of LP players are based in three institutions: the Croatian Academy of Science and Arts, the Lexicographic Institute Miroslav Krleža and some smaller institutions, most notably “Matica” Hrvatska” (Langston & Peti-Stantić 2014: 168), academic institutions with the freedom to define their own goals, one of them planning of Croatian language.

These two groups hold different ideologies when it comes to corpus planning. The ideological split in Croatian academia became clear in the early 2000, when a huge debate erupted about the nature of Croatian language, orthography and norm in the media (Babić & Ham 2005). Two opposing groups reached no compromise, therefore, both groups decided to publish their own Orthographical manuals. The first has issued a “descriptivist” Orthographic manual (originally created by linguists who previously has started a work on a joint “Serbocroatian Orthographic manual” in 1986), while the latter issued a “prescriptivist” one was (Greenberg 2004: 129).

The first group is based in the Institute for the Croatian Language and Linguistics and has ties to the University of Zagreb’s department of Croatistics. Their descriptivist manual allowed more than one variety of a word, usually one ‘domestic’ and one ‘international’ (for example, accepting both avion and zrakoplov for “plane”). This group has gained momentum after the unsuccessful attempts of the ‘prescriptivist’ group to establish an LP institution. This group issued a newer Orthographical Manual 2013, with a new descriptivist approach (cf. Badurina, & Matešić 2012), which was heavily criticised by the group behind the ‘prescriptivist’ manual (c.f. Bašić 2014).

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19 Some of the first cultural institutions in the Slavic world are called Matica, established to promote national language, literature and culture.

20 These manuals are important in Croatia, because they are used in elementary and high schools, and are a potentially large market for publishers. However, there is no consensus on which of the two should be applied on a national level. Thus, each group has been promoting their own manual.
The second group, behind the ‘prescriptivist’ manual, has ties to the centre-right party Croatian Democratic Union. Their orthographic solutions were based on the infamous “Orthography of Croatian”, mentioned in 2.2.1. This group managed to create a LP state-sponsored institution, called the “Council for the Norms of the Croatian Standard Language”, under the Ministry of Science and Education. The goal of this institution was surveillance of correct language use, working on the Croatian norm and codification of new words (Langston & Peti-Stantić 2011). However, it existed only between 2005-2012, when there was a minister from Croatian Democratic Union in the Ministry. It was ultimately closed when a Minister from the opposing Social-democratic party took office in 2012. Their ideology of the ‘prescriptivist’ group is strictly purist, their normative solutions favour only one correct variety (Greenberg 2004).

In a short summary, the main motivating factor behind Croatian LP is the need to define, codify and promote a new standard Croatian language, which would differ from the old, “Western Serbo-Croatian” standard. However, the LP efforts are driven by the language academy and partially by a research institution (both working on a voluntary basis). A more permanent LP body was never established due to very different political views of the political parties, also probably due to the linguists’ alliances with those parties. Regardless of the ideological differences, there is a focus on purification (both new and old linguistic facts) and on language reform. Prescriptivism and purism are ideological grounds for one part of the language planners, but identity planning is a clear goal of the corpus planning efforts.

2.3.4. MONTENEGRIN – THE YOUNGEST STATE LANGUAGE IN EUROPE

Montenegro is the country that has the closest political and cultural connection with the former centre of power – Serbia. It is the only country that did not split from Yugoslavia during the wars of the 1990s. First, Yugoslavia was renamed in 2003 to “State Union of Serbia and Montenegro”. Three years later, Montenegro split from Serbia peacefully, through a referendum (55.5% voted for separation). Montenegro is not as ethnically homogenous as today’s Croatia or Serbia. According to the 2011 census, 45% of the population consider themselves Montenegrin, and the largest minority are the Serbs (28.7%) followed by Bosniaks (8.6%) and Albanians (4.9%). Another important factor that keeps Montenegro in especially close relationship to Serbia religion; the large majority of Orthodox Christians are members of the Serbian Orthodox Church.

The new constitution named the official language Montenegrin. This quickly became an issue, because there was no particular grammar or dictionary of Montenegrin language. The re-standardization process slowly began from there. Linguists in Montene-
gro have split into pro-Serbian and pro-Montenegrin over this issue. The pro-Monte-
negrin linguists originally had ambitions to profoundly re-standardize Montenegrin,
but those efforts have been largely unsuccessful; they tried to introduce two new letters
to the alphabet, for sounds unique in one of the Montenegrin dialects. Due to low
support for this change, they had to settle for an ‘optional’ status of these two letters.
(Felberg & Šarić 2013, Džankic 2016). Džankic suggests that the minor changes in the
standard and the change of the name are an act of “linguistic appropriation of space”
(Džankic 2016: 135) on the part of the Montenegrin government. One formal body
was created the Commission for the Standardization of Montenegrin Language whose
first task was to create a Montenegrin grammar and glossary (Čirgić 2010).

The pro-Serbian linguists have been reacting negatively to any change, advocating
the idea that the official language in Montenegro should be Serbian; they are active
in both Montenegrin and Serbian public and academic space, arguing against the
competence of pro-Montenegrin linguists. A prominent pro-Serbian linguist, Rajka
Glušica, has repeatedly claimed that the Montenegrin LP poses as a danger to the
Serbian language, and criticising the Montenegrin language solution for the ‘faulty’
standardisation and ‘nationalism’ (cf. Glušica 2009, 2010, 2011). This topic has been
vivid in Serbian media, it will be discussed in 3.1.3.

2.3.5. SERBIA KEEPS IT IN THE ACADEMY

Serbia has a law on official language use, defining how language is used within state
institutions, as well as public signs of enterprises – they can be in Serbian or language
of national minorities. The law also foresees fines for enterprises that do not provide
a public signs in the way defined by the law, but no research or report available to me
suggests such fines were administered. Also, in its current form, the law prescribes the
Cyrillic script as the official script of state institutions – this is the result of the gen-
eral policy to strengthen the Cyrillic script vs. Latin, as both are in active use in Ser-
bia. The Serbian state has not invested much financial means in LP since the break-up
of Yugoslavia. The first institution that might receive permanent financial support will
be the Board for the Serbian Language under the Ministry of Culture, foreseen to be
opened between the years 2017 and 2027, according to the Strategy of the Develop-
ment of Culture in Serbia. Its primary goals will be to implement the policy, determine
the norms of correct language, and “care for the Cyrillic script” (SR-DOC-12: 77).

For now, the only LP institution was created in 1997 within the Serbian Academy
of Science and Arts, called the “Commission for the Standardisation of the Serbian
Language” (CSSL). It is not sponsored by the state (with an exception of occasional
financing of publications or language campaigns), but their position within the Acad-
emy of Science and Arts gives them a privileged status in society and their members
often comment on language issues in the media as the ‘highest’ authority on Serbian
language (more in 3.2.3.). All the members of the Commission work on a voluntary
basis (SR-INT-02). The CSSL was created by a group of linguists who Robert Greenberg labels as “Status-quo linguists”. These academics saw the corpus purification efforts in Croatia and Bosnia as too radical (Bugarski 2004) and decided not to engage in language engineering on the level of lexicon or grammar (Radovanović 2004: 140). Rather, they thought that the new Serbian language through a process of slow evolution from the Serbo-Croatian language. The CSSL unites many linguists from Serbia, but also Montenegro (see 2.3.4.) and Republika Srpska (within Bosnia and Herzegovina, see 2.3.2.). The CSSL works in forms of ‘decisions’ that are published in yearly. The focus is on corpus planning; the CSSL has commented on the status of Serbian and the Cyrillic script only in a few occasions. A clearly ethnolinguistic ideology can be noticed in both corpus and status planning decisions.

Language engineering is denied in principle, but the CSSL retains a prescriptivist attitude based on the idea that ‘not all language that the users produce is good’. Commenting on a complex issue of female professions (they are marked by a great number of different suffixes, and not all accepted by linguists), the CSSL writes “[leave it over to spontaneous linguistic practice to create separate names for female professions, and to linguists and proper linguistic institutions to estimate the normative validity of the created words.]” (SR-DOC-10: 99). Language experts are, thus, ‘judges’ of good language, rather than ‘creators’ or ‘purifiers’. A clearer set of principles on what this ‘good language’ is, is given in one of the decisions, where the CSSL mentions that “correctness of language” is measured by: “[linguistic richness, clarity, effectiveness, beauty, continuity, realism, purity, authority of the institutions, linguists and renown writers]” (SR-DOC-5: 207-208, my italics). One portion of the decisions of the CSSL concern the Cyrillic script. Serbia is one of the few places in the world where children are thought two writing systems in school, first Cyrillic, then Latin. However, Cyrillic has been gaining importance as more ‘Serbian’ than Latin in the recent years. The 2006 Constitution defines the Cyrillic as the official script for use in government-issued documents (unless they are issued in minority languages). The CSSL sees the Cyrillic script “[main and genuine script of the Serbian language]” (SR-DOC-5: 213) and reports to the public about its status. For example, one decision of the CSSL is directed to a major book publisher, warning it to prioritize the Cyrillic in their publications, as “[the thousand-years-old language culture of Serbian language rests upon it]” (SR-DOC-8: 104). Consequently, the Latin script is seen as less Serbian, since “[...the Latin script was supported by the communist ideology]” (SR-DOC-5: 224). This LP goal is explained as the protection of “Serbian identity”, endangered by a “globalist worldview” (SR-DOC-4: 258).

The CSSL holds the attitude that there is no Bosnian language, only Bosniak. Linguists have seen themselves as protectors of the status of Serbian language outside of Serbia since the last years of the Yugoslav period. They, hence, expresses a ‘one-ethnicity-one-language’ ideology. This political discourse will be analysed in greater detail in the experts’ discourse (3.1.3.), as many of the experts who participate in the public sphere are also members of the CSSL.
To conclude the corpus planning principles, the goal of the CSSL’s corpus planning is clearly identity planning, guided by the idea of adopting the Serbo-Croatian standard to be more “Serbian”. It is rhetorically presented as the “protection of Serbian identity”. All supra-national ideas (globalist / Yugoslavian / European) are seen as dangerous. The same goes for and “imported ideas”, such as the Latin script. This is also manifested in the attempts to manage the image of the language: a “Cyrillic” one. The LP efforts in Serbia promote values attached to the standard, national language – correctness, authority of the linguist and (Serbian) linguistic identity. Some purism is present – nominally, linguists claim to be anti-purist, but prefer domestic linguistic material to foreign (label some foreign words as ‘unnecessary’).

As there is no LP sponsorship, the authority of the CSSL comes from informal recognition as an institution of authority by linguistic societies, certain publishers and members of the Serbian academia. This provides the CSSL with an arena for discussions, the possibility to influence public opinion, as well as the possibility to issue ‘normative grammar-books’ and ‘normative dictionaries’. Other institutions include the Institute of Serbian language, which takes part in the process of description of Serbian language on a project-basis. The CSSL sees this as an important part of standardization (SR-INT-02) but the Institute is otherwise not engaged in LP.

2.4. A COMPARISON OF LP GOALS, IDEOLOGIES, INSTITUTIONS AND POWER IN THE THREE REGIONS

This section will review the differences in legislation (2.4.1.), LP goals and implementation (2.4.2.), LP institutions and their power (2.4.3.) and conclude with a typology of ideologies behind LP efforts (2.4.4.).

2.4.1. LEGISLATION

In the Baltic region, legislation is quite similar: “state” languages are defined by the constitutions, the “Language Acts” focus only on the state language. Monolingual ideals are supplemented with provisions on the correctness of language (not enforced in Estonia and Latvia, strongly enforced in Lithuania). In Scandinavia, the legislation is more varied. Only Sweden has a Language Act that defined Swedish as the “principal” language of Sweden, focuses on minority languages, English and foreign lan-

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21 In ex-Yugoslav countries, the language norm is usually defined by three authoritative publications, a *normative grammar* (different from a regular grammar by excluding certain language forms that are labelled as non-normative, usually without explanation), a *normative dictionary* (similar to a regular dictionary, but also excludes forms and lemmas that are considered inappropriate) and an Orthographic Manual, with correct spellings of words (closest to a “Glossary” in the Anglophone tradition).
guages are not mentioned. Denmark has a law on orthography, Norway has a law on the official use of Bokmål and Nynorsk. None of the three countries defined the “state” or the “official” language in their constitutions (only the Swedish Constitution mentions the Sami language in the context of the protection of Sami ethnic culture). In Bosnia, Croatia and Montenegro, official languages are defined in the Constitution, but no language act have been passed. Serbia has a language act that defines the use of language within the state apparatus, focusing also on minority languages.

2.4.2. GOALS (AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION)

**Corpus**: Lithuania and all the four ex-Yugoslav countries have corpus planning in focus. The most similar principles of corpus planning are found in Croatia, Latvia and Lithuania – purist, prescriptivist, and a certain degree of language-engineering. The difference is only that Lithuania controls language use in many spheres and, until 31st January 2019, penalized incorrect language use, which is not done in Latvia (probably because of the current focus on status planning); it was attempted in Croatia but failed quickly. Serbian corpus planning refrains from language-engineering but on an advisory level gives priority to ‘domestic words’ (light purism) and sees linguists as the judges of what is good and what is bad language practice. Bosnian and Montenegrin corpus planning efforts are based on the need for a re-standardization and definition of a new language. In Bosnia, identity planning takes a form of ‘oriental purism’, where words of Arabic origin are preferred to Slavic ones (due to the Muslim religion being the main identity feature of Bosnians). Danish and Swedish corpus planning are similar, oriented towards the codification of news words, their introduction to dictionaries, their spelling and morphology. The only difference is that the institution responsible for this in Denmark is legally bound to carry out this work, and in Sweden, this is work is done in the non-governmental Swedish Academy. Both are based on the Usus-principle, linguistic corpora and internet sources are analysed for frequency when deciding on the normative proposal of a form. The Norwegian corpus planning is oriented towards reforms of Bokmål and Nynorsk, often according to the wishes of the main stakeholders, such as publishers, journalists, language societies etc. The main difference between corpus planning implementation is that in the Baltics, corpus planning decisions are enforced through warnings and fines, in the Balkans and Scandinavia, they are not enforced (with the partial exception – Norway – the only Scandinavian country that has some surveillance activity in corpus planning – school Glossaries are checked to make sure no morphological form of words (in both Bokmål and Nynorsk) is omitted).

**Status**: LP in Scandinavian countries, Estonia and Latvia are focused on status planning. In Scandinavia they were oriented towards the use of national languages in higher education and international business, with the goal of having both English and national languages used to a more similar degree. In Estonia and Latvia, these efforts
are oriented towards erasing non-state languages from state institutions, state services, and some other domains of public life. Additionally, Estonia has (based on the reports available to me) invested more into acquisition planning than Latvia. The main difference is in the way of implementation – the Nordic countries provide recommendations, and Estonia and Latvia have surveillance institutions that can enforce LP through fines and dismissals.

2.4.3. INSTITUTIONS AND POWER

The institutionalization of LP and the power of LP institutions is presented in the order from the most to the least institutionalized.

**Lithuania** has the most powerful system of LP institutions. The State Commission of the Lithuanian Language has the most stable legal status: it is the only European country (to my knowledge) with the status of an expert body under the Parliament (the highest authority in a Parliamentary democracy). It has the legal right to decide on the entire corpus of the Lithuanian standard language, including morphosyntax, codification of new words, the lexicon, spelling and even correct prosody. It can make decisions about status as well, though this is not as clearly defined in the law as the corpus. The law also give it the status of an ‘expert institution’ on all other language questions; the bills and LP strategies the Commission suggests to the Parliament have the status of documents of ‘highest expertise’. Along with the State Language Inspectorate (under the Ministry of Culture) and municipal language inspectors, they have the broadest sphere of control – all public signs, translations on commodities, names of companies in Lithuanian, all media (both spoken and written), all books (incl. school textbooks) and all work of art – books, subtitling in films and series. The instruments of regulation are both warnings and financial penalties. Official use of non-state languages can be penalized, and until 31 January 2019, Lithuanian language use that does not match the norm set by the SCLL could also be penalized too. The fines are set to up to 400 euros. **Latvia** has two language institutions, but only one – the State Language Centre – is legally recognized as a LP institution. Its primary function is the surveillance of whether Latvian language is being used in (primarily) state institutions as well as (secondary) public events and films. It can issue warnings and penalties for use of non-state language. When it comes to corpus planning, just like in Lithuania, an expert commission within this institution has the legal power to regulate the norm of Latvian language, but unlike Lithuania, there is no control of the language norm, except for official translations of governmental documents. The second institution, the State Language Commission, is a part of the Office of the President, it is a body that is legally supposed to set out directions for language policy in the future regarding the status of Latvian language, but their initiatives seem to be more about development of general linguistic resources, such as corpora. The LP strategies are still created and implemented through the State Language Centre.
So, in comparison with Lithuania, Latvia has a narrowed field of influence and does not control and penalize the use of the Latvian language norm, only non-use of Latvian as a state language. The **Estonian** LP goals and the language planning system are almost the same as in Latvia, but there are fewer institutions. The Language Inspectorate is the only permanent LP institution; it is primarily a surveillance institution; it can control and penalize the non-use of Estonian language amongst employees in the state apparatus. There is no permanent language planning body; an expert body was established temporarily to develop the LP (2011-2017). **Denmark** has one legally authorised institution – the Danish Language Council – to decide on spellings of words and orthography (but not other aspects of corpus planning). The principles of norm are research-based and Usus-based (new linguistic phenomena and their normative status is decided upon through frequency of use). This institution cannot control or penalize language use; it has a surveillance function, but only for the purpose of the following the development of language and documenting (and codifying) new words. They also advise on the use of correct Danish spelling and implement the plain Danish language project. **Sweden’s** Language Council has the responsibility to provide consultations and answer questions about Swedish, the official minority languages of Sweden (with the exception of Sami, for which the Sami Parliament is responsible) and also follow up on the status of non-official minority languages in Sweden. Their main task is to provide *recommendations* for the correct use of Swedish, use of ‘plain Swedish’ and the status of Swedish in the education system. The written norm is decided by a non-governmental institution, the Swedish Academy (by publishing the Swedish Academy Glossary). The Language Council can control whether the state and all the minority language are being used in municipalities (without possibility of fining). **Norway’s** Language Council is based on the same model as the Swedish one, dealing with both written forms of Norwegian and the official minority languages. When it comes to corpus planning, unlike in Denmark and Sweden where one institution decides on the spellings and the orthography, the Norwegian Language Council can decide on the written norm *de jure*, but *de facto* it can only do so through common work with linguistic societies, representatives of different language-related professions, as attempts to create a norm without consultations with stakeholders have proven futile in the past. In this sense, the Norwegian LP institution is the least independent of all Scandinavian countries in corpus planning. The supervisory duties include approving Norwegian (Bokmål and Nynorsk) glossaries for use in schools and the use of Bokmål and Nynorsk in municipalities (without the possibility of control or fining). **Croatia** is the only country in the Balkans where some permanently state-sponsored LP institutions existed (although for only 8 years). The institution (Council for the Norms of the Croatian Standard Language) had nominally many duties and high degree of power, both to decide on the norm and to issue warnings about the use of Croatian language (but it was dismissed with a change in cabinet). No institution has the legally recognised authority of neither status of corpus planning, and a number of different institutions are competing for
that role. **Bosnia, Montenegro** and **Serbia** have academy-based LP practice: based on a voluntary engagement of members of the Academies of Science and Institute of Bosnian, Montenegrin and Serbian languages respectively. The government does not provide financial support to these institutions but accepts their authority. They do not officially decide on the norm, but they are the only ones with ties in large publishing houses that issue normative linguistic publications, which gives them “soft power”. This is presented in tables 1. and 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country:</th>
<th>State-financed institution (+), self-financed institutions (-)</th>
<th>Language surveillance institution</th>
<th>Main language planning types (goals):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baltic region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Research (temporary: 2011–2017) +</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Research (permanent) +</td>
<td><strong>Status</strong> (Spread) and <strong>Acquisition</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>The office of the President +</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice +</td>
<td><strong>Status</strong> (Spread). Secondary – <strong>Corpus</strong> (terminology unification)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>The Parliament +</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture +</td>
<td><strong>Corpus</strong> (Purification, terminology unification)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavian region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture +</td>
<td>–</td>
<td><strong>Corpus</strong> (Orthography)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture +</td>
<td>–</td>
<td><strong>Prestige and corpus</strong> (reform, simplification)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Ministry of Culture +</td>
<td>–</td>
<td><strong>Prestige and corpus</strong> (simplification)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-Yugoslav region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Academy of Science and Arts –</td>
<td>–</td>
<td><strong>Corpus</strong> (Re–Standardization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Sport (2005–2012) / Academy of Science +/-</td>
<td>–</td>
<td><strong>Corpus</strong> (purification, reform)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>Academy of Science and Arts –</td>
<td>–</td>
<td><strong>Corpus</strong> (Re–Standardization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Academy of Science and Arts –</td>
<td>–</td>
<td><strong>Corpus</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1. Status and main function of the LP institutions*
Define Control Orthography Area of control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Baltic region</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Orthography</th>
<th>Area of control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+/+/-</td>
<td>+/+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>State institutions, spoken and written media, publishing, films, advertising, names of companies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>State institutions, local governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavian region</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+/+/-</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+/–</td>
<td>Use of written Norwegian languages and minority languages in municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>School dictionaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Use of Swedish and minority languages in municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-Yugoslav</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Power of LP intuitions to decide and control (through surveillance) the corpus and status of language of state-financed language planning institutions.

2.4.4. IDEOLOGIES

On the basis of ideology and the institutionalisation of that ideology, I have formed six types of LPs (shown in table 3).

It is only in Lithuania that the state enforces only one language and one version of that language and engages in purification of the lexicon. The first type of ideology (type A) consists of monolingual, normative and purist ideologies. The other two Baltic countries are enforcing one language in official use, but unlike in Lithuania, they do not enforce the pre-defined corpus of that language (type B). This will be called “monolingual ideology”, since it is based on the idea that one language should be absolutely dominant in important societal institutions and the state, as a necessary condition for the social order (it is seen as natural in many other European nation-states (Bauman & Briggs 2003) but institutionalised only in the Baltics).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Power of institutions</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type A</td>
<td>Monolingual, normativist, purist</td>
<td>“Hard power”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type B</td>
<td>Monolingual</td>
<td>“Hard power”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type C</td>
<td>Partially monolingual, Usus-ideology, functionalist</td>
<td>“Soft power”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type D</td>
<td>Monolingual, normativist, purist</td>
<td>“Soft power”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type E</td>
<td>Monolingual, normativist</td>
<td>“Soft power”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type F</td>
<td>Unclear (re-standardization)</td>
<td>No power</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Systems of LP in the Baltic, ex-Yugoslav and Scandinavian countries

The monolingual ideology is written in the laws and supported by two permanent institutions in each of the Baltic countries (except for Estonia, where the language surveillance institution is more permanent, and other one was temporary). Because of the state-financed task to monitor language use and the legal possibility to enforce LPs, the institutions in the Baltic states are labelled as “hard power” institutions (type A – enforcing both corpus and status, type B – enforcing only the status). In Scandinavia, the argumentation that Danish, Norwegian in Swedish should not be used less than other languages (they should be dominant), but at the same time – little actual attention and financing are given to achieve this goal – is interpreted as “partially monolingual” ideology. The implementation takes the form of recommendations, LP institutions also receive financing to monitor language use and change and give recommendations on good language. This is why all Scandinavian countries are labelled type-C – there is a concrete LP policy being implemented in various ways, but without the possibility to enforce it. In the Croatia and Serbia, the monoglot ideology is only written in the documents of the LP institutions, but there is not active financing, state-guided policy to implement the monoglot ideal. However, the LP institutions do have a “moral / intellectual” authority in society, because of their long tradition, therefore they are labelled as having “soft power”. The only difference between Croatian and Serbian LPs is that purism and systematic language engineering / loan erasure is much less present in Serbia as a practice (Type E), while Croatian LPs encourage linguists and lay-folk to engage in purist language engineering (Type D). In Bosnia and Montenegro, re-standardization is in process, and it is difficult to see if there is any clear ideology guiding these efforts, as the recent, radical re-standardization efforts have failed, it is yet to see whether the LP institutions will succeed in establishing their position and gaining power (type F).
Purism, as a corpus planning ideology has been detected in language-engineering efforts in Lithuania and Croatia, where invention of new words and terms is seen as positive and gains financial support in Lithuania, and moral support in Croatia. The difference is also in the scope of purism: it is institutionalised in Lithuania (Lithuania is the only country that finances control of lexical choices in the public space, the state and certain books), while in Croatia, purism is present in the self-initiated practices of the linguists who produce normative dictionaries (except for a short period of 2005-2012, when an institution existed with a much narrower field of influence than the Lithuanian linguists). In Latvia and Serbia purism takes a form of recommendations to avoid words of foreign origin is there is a domestic word for it, but there is no control of lexical choices. In the Scandinavian countries purism exists nowadays only on the level of orthography to a (slightly) varying degree, where Denmark is the most liberal, accepting foreign spellings, Sweden recently becoming also very acceptive of foreign spellings and Norway being perhaps a bit more conservative. These orthographic purisms, however, do not even compare to the systematic and political ideology-driven purism on the level of lexicon, syntax and morphology in Croatia, Lithuania, Serbia and Latvia.

Prescriptivism is an ideology that suggests that language is a system beyond the speaker (Milroy 2001), an ideal standard, and thus more perfect than all other forms for communication. The basis for prescription is normativist view of language correctness: the quality of language is not evaluated in terms of how successful the communication is, or how creative the language use, but on the basis of to which degree it matches the prescribed norm. Prescriptivists seek to regulate linguistic production by referring to rules, dictionary definitions, grammars etc. Prescriptivist LP takes the idea that language needs state regulation and ‘development’ towards the ideal standard. Below, I will discuss to which the degree does the state have the power to regulate language use.

Prescriptivism is institutionalised only in Lithuania on all levels of language structure from spelling to the lexicon, from phonetics to syntax. Legislation provides a single LP institution with the power to decide on the corpus, and another institution has the task to control language use. The field of control is the broadest of all the analysed countries, including spoken and written media, some areas of publishing, language in state documents, names of companies and advertising. In these areas, the use of non-standard language is considered illegal. Denmark has a Law on Orthography, which obliges state institutions to use the written norm prescribed by the Danish Language Council. There is, however, no mechanism of control of language use, so only the authority on the Council as an institution can influence real language use.

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22 Even after the monetary fines for ‘incorrect language’ were abolished, the SCLL made it clear on their website that they have not abolished the legal requirements of correct language, just changed the way they will be enforced.
Latvia, like Lithuania, has a law that allows a single institution to decide on language norms, and foresees penalties for those who break this law and the Estonian surveillance institution has legal right to check the compliance on norms prescribed by the Mother Tongue Society. However, no research paper has reported on anyone being warned or fined for a lexical choice in Latvian or Estonian. This could be because the surveillance institutions are too busy with the status of the language (increasing the status of Latvian / Estonian and decreasing the use of Russian). Another possibility (though mostly unlikely) is that some type of control is happening under the radar, or that LP institutions plan to start these activities after the status-planning goals have been achieved. Montenegro has established a regulative body that is responsible for the norm of Montenegrin language in 2010, but its authority has so far been low and has no way of implementing their decisions, it also has low authority as it is a brand-new institution and not all of its re-standardisation efforts have been successful. Norwegian LP institutions create (often through cooperation with grassroots institutions) the norms of both written languages, but due to the long history of ‘language struggles’, the authority of the LP institution is low, and the common users rely more on other sources for correct language (for example newspapers). There is no direct regulation in Norway, except for one type of publications: glossaries for school use are approved by the Language Council of Norway (controlling whether the morphological and spelling information matches the current broad norm).

The opposite ideology of prescriptivism can be called the “Usus-ideology”. The idea behind it is that only the users and the way they use language can define what language is (and what the norm is). It has been traditionally put forward by descriptive linguists. In the norming of Danish and Norwegian Bokmål, the principles of norming have been increasingly oriented towards use in the past century, building on corpora and trying to incorporate internet resources into their norming practices. Norms of Nynorsk are formulated by influential language users and organisations, though not formally recognized. In Sweden, the Swedish academy has switched from a prescriptivist to a Usus-ideology over the years, and how relies on its online publications that us. It is greatly respected amongst Swedes, because of its long traditions, even though its rules are not obligatory.

The ‘plain language’ project in the Scandinavian countries has been presented as a tool of democratisation, but critics have pointed out that it is more based on the ideology of “optimisation”. Either way, it can be interpreted as the ideology of functionalism. Functionalism is, according to the British dictionary “any doctrine that stresses utility or purpose”; in this case, the purpose is fostering understanding of legal and administrative texts.
3. METALINGUISTIC DISCOURSES
IN THE VIRTUAL SPHERE

The goal of this chapter is to provide a detailed ideological mapping of the virtual sphere, by analysing beliefs and notions of language, explaining their discursive construction in the light of the contemporary contexts. Therefore, no preconceived notion about the ‘truthfulness’ or ‘scientificity’ of the identified notions of language will be used. All notions of language are seen as products of discursive practices, whose nature is to be documented through the analysis.

The process of analysis is therefore such: The beliefs of language (expressed either directly through a number of attitudes or through metaphors, as discursive presuppositions, by using interdiscursive and intertextual techniques etc.) found in the texts are categorised according to the theoretical model (beliefs about representation, expertise or the function of language, marked bold), and an explanation of their historical and contextual meaning is commented on, when necessary. Special attention is given to clusters of such beliefs, here called notions of language (marked in italics).

The first section (3.1.) analyses and compares the expert voices and their notions of language in Lithuanian, Norwegian and Serbian online news portals, the second section (3.2.) describes and compares the beliefs and notions of language of the commentators, and the third section provides a comparative summary of which beliefs and notions of language are dominant, and which ones are marginal in these three virtual spaces.

3.1. LANGUAGE EXPERTS

“I require not only the advice of experts, but the prior advice of experts on experts” (Luckman & Berger 1991: 60).

It is not uncommon to hear experts of all fields express diametrically opposed opinions on issues within their expertise. This has been as one of the main traits of the ‘postmodern condition’, the absence of an overarching grant narrative, followed by a general rejection of authority (Lyotard 1984). In the public sphere, the voice of the expert is further complicated by the need to keep the news readable, resonate with the general audience, so experts are forced to simplify their academic language, use metaphors etc. In other words, the media industry, their discursive practices and genres play a big role in shaping of the voice of the expert.

Following the criteria described in 1.4.5., I have collected a total of 185 articles from online portals. Each of them contains an ideology of language (according to the theoretical model presented in 1.4.3.2.), expressed by a person presented as a language
expert. They vary in genre: from news with an expert commentary, interviews, opinion pieces to columns. Articles not containing any beliefs connected to the three aspects of ideology of language from the theoretical model have not been taken into consideration. Most articles have been found in Serbia (79), then Lithuania (62) than Norway (44). There could be different reasons for this disproportion. Serbian data is quite unbalanced year-wise, as there was a government-sponsored action “Let us preserve the Serbian language”, that attracted many academic linguists to write in the daily newspaper “Politika”. In Lithuania, articles appear regularly around important dates every year. The occasions are for example the international day of the mother tongue or after state exams in Lithuanian language. I expected to find more articles on the subject of language in Norway, as an important white paper concerning national language policy was accepted by the government in 2009, the Norwegian Language Council was fully reformed in 2010, but not too many articles discussing these subjects were found (and many of those articles that were found were short news with general information: about the establishment, who will represent the Council; in other words, no ideology was found). One explanation could be through agenda setting theory – mainstream media has seen issues of language as crucial in some cases, but in others as too specific for the news. Another explanation could be that the issue was discussed in greater depth in print media than in the online editions. The data therefore represents only the online discourse of language experts.

Another difference is in the genre of the articles. In Lithuania, the dominant genre “cultural news”, however, the issues of Polish language in Lithuania were categorised as domestic political issues. In Norway, they were mostly interviews with language experts under the ‘culture’ category and partially opinion pieces. In Serbia, most articles were opinion pieces authored by renown language experts, but mostly because the data from one of the newspapers, “Politika” has regular experts that publish such texts, as well as the above-mentioned campaign, whose idea was to gather and publish personal opinions of renown experts.

Experts in media can be of a different type. The first group are the academic experts – language experts with academic titles in linguistics or a similar field. The academic experts are usually represented by the academic institution they work or have worked at, academic titles and/or affiliations. The second group are the non-academics. They can further be divided into sub-groups. The first one are popular personalities: experts who are well known commentators on linguistic issues, that do not need to be represented by their academic titles or institutions, because they are well-known to the general public. These have usually achieved popularity in other ways than work with language (ranging from societal engagement, commenting, blogging to publishing novels) and are also engaged in language-related public debates. Then there are language teachers, journalists, editors, they can also be representatives of language societies, who are not academics, but are presented as experts by the news outlet. Also, the expert can be presented as a LP institution representative. In Lithu-
ania and Serbia, it is common practice to employ only trained linguists in such institution, while in Norway, some non-academic experts, such as for example a famous journalist, have been board members of LP institutions.

Also, it has been noticed that certain news portals have language-ideological preferences, and others do not. This will be discussed in the analysis.

3.1.1. LITHUANIAN EXPERT VOICES: RESERVED FOR ACADEMICS AND INSTITUTION REPRESENTATIVES?

Most of the total 62 articles have been gathered from the largest news portal in Lithuania, Delfi.lt (41), due to the fact it has been the most active in language related issues in this period, others are gathered from 15min.lt (4), lrytas.lt (6), Bernardinai.lt (5) and lrt.lt (6). No particular (language-)ideological preference was noticed in connection to the outlets. There are two main subjects – the correctness of language and dangers of foreign languages.

This section will be split into a description of the dominant discourse counter-discourse. What defines dominant discourse is that there is a pre-supposition that when one speaks publicly about language, one speaks about a ‘single’ Lithuanian language and the potential dangers or problems it faces. In other words, it belongs to the order of discourse that dictates that Lithuanian language is in danger because of internal (incorrect use of language amongst speakers) and external dangers (English and other languages), that is referred to by studies of language ideology in Lithuania (Vaicekauskienė & Šepetys 2016). Minority languages and foreign languages are marginal subjects in the Lithuanian virtual sphere. Even when the subjects come up, they are discussed in relation to how do they, or do not, affect the national (Lithuanian) language. For example, an article about foreign language learning in Lithuanian (Exp-LT-4) is entitled “M. Ramonienė: Learning foreign languages will not harm the Lithuanian language”. Another group of articles, concerned with the request of the Polish minority for their names to be written in original orthography (Exp-LT-38) and foreigners for their names not to be Lithuanized, was seen by some experts as a threat to the Lithuanian alphabet. That is why they became an important subject for the media (for example one called “A linguist warns: Lithuanian alphabet will get 150 new letters”). In other words, the constant “danger to Lithuanian language” is the criteria that makes a linguistic topic worthy of news. This is due to the fact that linguistic nationalism has always been strong in Lithuania, and increasingly so in the period of 1990s, when it has been institutionalised (see 2.1.1.). The counter-discourse denies this assumption; it is formed as a reaction to the dominant one, inverting some of the suppositions of the dominant discourse.

**Dominant discourse:** These articles and interviews with experts exhibit one or more traits of the “monoglot ideology” (Silverstein 1996). The first belief will be called
**ethnic representation.** It comes from the historically bound narratives of Lithuanian as ‘an ancient Indo-European language’. To illustrate this narrative, I will begin from an article, in which the interviewee, Zigmas Zinkevičius, a professor of Baltistics and former (1996-1998) Minister of culture, says:

1. O mūsų tautos kalba (...) liudija priešingai: ištisus tūkstantmečius buvome labai sėslūs, nes mūsų kalba išlaikiusi daug archaikos, kuri teaptinkama indoeuropiečių prokalbėje. (...) Sutikite, mažai tautai tai – didelis laimėjimas, dėl kurio didžiosios pasaulio kalbos atranda lietuvių kalbą – vieną archajiškiausių indoeuropiečių kalbų. [And the language of our people (...) witnessed the opposite: we were very sedentary for a thousand years, that is why our language keeps lots of the archaic features, which can be found only back in proto-Indo-European. (...) You have to agree, it is a great victory for a small nation, because of which the great languages of the world discover the Lithuanian language – one of the most archaic Indo-European languages.]

Studieds of Lithuanian language by the historical linguists in the 19th century have led to major breakthrough in reconstructing the Indo-European protolanguage. Searching for historical roots is strong in Lithuanian academia too and has been transferred from generation to generation of linguists, forming one of the main paradigms of linguistic research. However, what is of interest for this dissertation is the elevation of this ‘ancient character’ of the language to the status of a national symbol outside of academia. The words in italics point to the essentialization of the relationship between a language and a nation. *Deictic pronouns* are especially powerful in this type of discourse – the first-person plural refers to ‘all Lithuanians in the past several 1000 years’. This creates a view of there being a single (changing) language belonging to a single people over a period of a thousand years. This could be called simply a manifestation of the one-nation-one-language ideology, which equates nations or their languages, erasing linguistic variation, changing levels of national and linguistic awareness etc. from the picture. In all articles belonging to the dominant discourse, ‘language’ essentially refers to the ‘language of the Lithuanian people’, in singular form (also indicated by the use of ‘our’ in ex. 1, in emphasis). In the theoretical model, this is ethnic representation: it is supposed that ethnicity is determined through language.

**Ethnic** representation is manifested in yet another narrative, of ‘the aggression of foreign languages’. In many articles, the academic experts and language institutions representatives, use a ‘conflict narrative’ to talk about the dangerous influences of foreign languages on Lithuanian. Two former heads of the SCLL (ex. 2-3) talk about this in the contexts of English, while he first ever head of the Lithuanian Language Commission (from the Soviet times), talks the same way about the influence of Russian language (ex. 4).

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23 Italics will be used in all the examples to stress important keywords or phrases. Unless otherwise stated, all italics in the examples are my own.


(2) Mokyklose jau dabar nuo penktos klasės dvikalbis mokymas, *kišama svetima* kalba, *svetimas* mästymas. [Already now, from the fifth grade in school, pupils learn another language, a *foreign* language is being *forced* [upon children], *foreign* thinking.] (Exp-LT-14)

(3) Mūsų kalba yra vienas svarbiausių lietuviškos tapatybės veiksnių, (...) Tai lemia konservatyvnesį ir apdairesnį požiūrį į kalbos politiką ir norminimą ir šios pozicijos reikėtų ir toliau laikytis. Tinkama kalbos *apsauga* ir tvarkyba padeda išvengti bent jau kai kurių grėsmių. [Our language is one of the main subjects of Lithuanian identity. (...) This conditions a more conservative and prudent view of language policy and standardisation, and we need to hold on to this view in the future. Appropriate language *protection* and regimentation helps evade at least some dangers.] (Exp-LT-17)

(4) …visur patyrėme *rusybių antplūdį*, didelį poveikį gramatikos sistemai, įjaunėme tikrą kalbos *nuopuolį*. [... [in Soviet times] we experienced an *invasion of Russicisms*, a great influence on the grammar, we experienced a real linguistic *downfall.*] (Exp-LT-60)

Also, other academic experts, such as a professor of communication in ex. 4a below, uses the same rhetoric. The first opposition created in such discourse is ‘our’ language vs. ‘foreign’ language, through keywords such as ‘our’, ‘foreign’, ‘Anglicisms, ‘Russicisms’.

(5) Tik tokiu būdu mes galėsime *išsaugoti* save ir savo kalbą, savo mentalitetą ir kultūrą, ir nesiskūsti, kad anglicizmai *išstumia* mūsų kalbą. Jie *išstumia* ne šiaip sau, o todėl, kad mes neturime tinkamo supratimo apie kuriuos dalykus, todėl sakome: geriau vartokime angliškus terminus, bus daug aiškiau. Tai rodo mūsų kalbos *silpnumą*. [Only in that way can we save our language, our mentality and culture, and not complain that Anglicisms are *pushing out* or language. They are not *pushing* it *out* with no reason, but because we do not have the correct understanding of certain things, that is why we say: better to use English terms, it will be simpler. That shows the *weakness* of our language.] (Exp-LT-30)

Lithuanian and foreign languages are in a ‘battle’ or ‘conflict’, which is illustrated by the words in italics in ex. 2-5. These words are about attack, defence (‘pushing’, ‘invasion’, ‘forced’), winning and losing (‘weakness’, ‘save’, ‘defence’). This shows that the ‘battle between languages’ is like a battle between two nations – Lithuanian vs. a non-Lithuanian one. Anything that is non-Lithuanian is not acceptable, because it is understood as a loss. The pre-supposed normal state are a single language and a pure variety of that language. So, the Lithuanian language itself is defined through an *ethnic* criterion.

**Ethnic** representation dominates in the articles of both of academic and non-academic experts. In one article a group of linguists from the Institute of the Lithuanian Language demand a *Lithuanian* writing of foreign names and place names (Exp-LT-1 and Exp-LT-11). A popular commentator of linguistic issues, the linguist and Dean of the Faculty of philology of Vilnius university, sees the “introduction of bilingualism”,

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referring to a proposal to introduce more English-language teaching in experts, as a
*crime* (Exp–LT-2). The only competing belief amongst academic linguists is *geographical representation*, that comes up in dialect-related topics (ex. 6). However, dialects, along with all other non-standard varieties are treated with great care by the academics.

(6) Net ir broliai žemaicių jau kartais vengia tarmiškai šnekėti, dėl to iš tikro šnekto
labai nyksta. Mes bandome padėti jas išlaikyti – tai mūsų kultūros pavėdas... [Even
the brothers Samogitians*24 sometimes avoid speaking in dialect, that is why dialects
are indeed very much disappearing. We try to help preserve them – that is our
cultural heritage...] (Exp–LT-7)

Ex. 7 comes from the head of the SCLL at the time and perfectly illustrates the
dominant view of dialects, that they should be kept out of the public and high registers.

(7) Mes turėtume suvokti, kad bendrinė kalba yra kas kita nei tarmė. Ir tarmė turi savo
vartojojo erdvę, ir bendrinė kalba turi savo vartojojo erdvę. Reikia išmokti jų nepai-
nioti, kitaip, kai bandoma tarme pasakyti dalykus, kuriaus turėtume sakyti bendrine
kalba, ir kyla problemų. [We have to understand that standard language is something
other than a dialect. A dialect also has its sphere of use, and a standard has its own. We
should learn not to mix them up, otherwise, when one chooses to say things, which
should be said in standard language, in a dialect, problems arise. (Exp–LT-22)

Dialects are accepted into the big ‘we’ (ex. 6), but in the same article, the other expert
claims that ‘dialectal speech’ would mean difficulties in communication. Lithuanian ex-
erts exhibit a positive, but careful attitude towards dialects, exemplified in ex. 7. The
standard Lithuanian language and dialects are seen as a part of ‘Lithuanian-ness’, but only
when isolated both in form (unmixed) and physically used separately from each other
(this is explored further down, under expertise). These linguists do not deny that dialects
represent their speakers (*geographical* representation), but only if one accepts that the
standard language represents the ethnic group as a whole too. Hence, we have a mixture
of a primarily *ethnic* and secondarily *geographical* representation.

Dialects are seen negatively only in very rare occasions, by non-academic experts,
such as in ex. 8, which is a is a statement by a Lithuanian language teacher, who
served as a head of a linguistic society called “Lituanistų sambūris” [The gathering of
the Lithuanian philologists].

(8) Vietiniai, nesisteminiai Lietuvos regionų dialektai, (...) tai ne kas kita, kaip rusiciz-
mų, polonizmų ir kitokių slavizmų, taip pat germanizmų kratinys, 30 proc. tarmių
žodyno – skoliniai iš rusų, lenkų, vokiečių kalbų. [The local, non-systemic Lithua-
nian regional dialects (...) are nothing else but a mash of Russian, Polish, other
Slavic and Germanic words, 30 percent of the dialect vocabulary are borrowings
from Russian, Polish, German.] (Exp–LT-25, my italics)

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24 Samagotians are West Lithuanians, often referred to as “brothers” to East Lithuanians.
The denial of dialects into the linguistic Lithuanian ‘we’ by pointing out the ‘foreign’ elements in them, is a clear sign that language is understood in exclusively ethnic terms.

Moving on to expertise, the clearly dominant type is external. Language is defined through external authorities – institutions, dictionaries, grammar books, linguists’ research etc. The language that is defined by authorities is considered to be good, pure and correct, while the Usus is normally considered faulty, impure, bad or even dangerous to the set system.

Qualitative analysis reveals several keywords that point to external expertise, when language usage is discussed. These are references to language that is seen as incorrect: ‘semi-language’, ‘language errors’, ‘norm’, ‘rules’, ‘system’ and ‘structure’.

Very often, ‘language errors’ are the main topic of the article. It should be noticed that the term ‘language errors’ includes both spelling, and any other deviations from the set official language norm in written and spoken Lithuanian. This idea is very widespread in Lithuania, because of the “List of Major Language Errors”, that has 8 categories of “great errors”: lexical, word structure, use of cases, prefixes, use of forms (morphology), parts of speech and sentence conjunction errors, word order and pronunciation.25 One of the main targets of the SLI are journalists (Vaicekauskienė 2012: 88), whose quality of language is interpreted according to this list. Journalists are often aware of this List and the importance of ‘language correctness’ in their work, therefore they even often start interviews asking questions concerning such ‘language errors’:

(9) Minėjote, kad LR t televizijos ir radijo kanalų skaičius yra labai didelis, tad kaip spėjate pataisyti stiliaus, gramatikos, skyrybos, kirčiavimo ir kitas klaidas? [You have mentioned that there are many national television and radio channels, so how to you manage to correct all stylistic, grammar, punctuation, word stress and other errors?] (Exp-LT-58)

In the example (9), the journalist is interviewing a language corrector26 at the Lithuanian national television. Already from the journalist’s question, we see the idea that it is natural that there are many ‘errors’ everywhere, that is that the speech and writing of regular language users is naturally faulty, while it is the job of the editor – who has the knowledge of those external authorities such as grammar, dictionaries

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25 This is my own translation of the categories listed in the „List of Major Language Errors“. The list is available on this link: http://www.vlkk.lt/aktualiausios-temos/didziosios-klaidos. For more about the history and features of List, see Ralia and Subačius (2016).

26 In Lithuania, language editors (lt. kalbos redaktorius) and language correctors (lt. kalbos tvarkytojas / kalbos korektorius) are two different professions. The former is the same as a language editor in a publishing house, that works with the author or translator on improving the text. The latter corrects only the grammar and punctuation mistakes (according to the norm set by the SCLL). Most language correctors work in government offices with documents, but also in media companies, where these correctors listen to shows and programmes and correct the language of the journalists, so that they would avoid being fined by the Language Inspection.
and linguists – to produce correct language. This means that already the journalist has produced the frames for the interpretation of expertise as external in the article. Naturally, in the same article, the expert who is being interviewed, agrees.

The texts of the academic experts exhibit the same style of speaking about language as the journalists. This is most likely so because the journalists pick it up from their teachers, as all higher institutions are obliged to have Lithuanian language in their curricula. The subject was called “language culture” and has been renamed “Language of the profession” (lt. dalykinė kalba).

Thus, ‘language errors’ stand in sharp contrast to ‘language system’, ‘correct language’ and ‘rules of language’ (ex. 10-11):

(10) Gražios iliustracijos ir įdomus turinys ne visada dera su taisyklinga kalba, tinkamai pasirinkta leksika ir pan. Deja, pervertus kai kurias patraukliai atrodančias knygas tenka padėti jas atgal į lentyną aptikus ne tik korektūros, bet ir leksikos, rašybos klaidų. [Beautiful illustrations and interesting content is not always fit with correct language, appropriately selected lexis and similar. Unfortunately, when I open some attractive book, it becomes necessary to put it back to the shelf, when I find not just typing, but also lexical and spelling errors.] (Exp-LT-17)

(11) Laisvame pasaulyje kiekvienos profesijos žmogus kuria kalbą – tik ją turime, kaip minėjau, vertinti kaip sistemą. (…) Žinoma, taisykles galima keisti, jas interpretuoti, tam ir reikalingi kalbos vartosenos tyrimai. Tačiau tokį keitimų ribas aiškiai nustato sisteminiai dalykai. Noras keliauti be jokių taisyklių kyla iš menkai šeimos ir mokyklos subrandinto kalbos sistemos suvokimo. [In the free world, people of all professions create language, but we have to, as I have said before, evaluate it [that language] as a system. (…) Of course, we could change normative rules, interpret them, that is why we need research of language use. However, the limits of such changes cannot violate the systematic factors. The desire to drive against all rules comes from a poorly developed understanding of the language system in the school and the family.] (Exp-LT-17)

These examples illustrate the normativist attitudes to language – ‘good’ language exists only in language manuals. Every piece of concrete language use, such as a printed book, the speech and writing of pupils at school, is potentially ‘bad’ language. Good language is defined through constructed ‘systems’ and ‘rules’, while any type of language not in accordance with those rules and systems is considered incorrect. As mentioned before, this fits into external expertise, because the authority of the Usus of the language is denied.

In ex. 11, it is also seen as natural for the school and parents to not simply correctors of language, but active promoters of the idea of the standard language as the only correct language. This is also expected from academic experts, and those who oppose the sanctity of the standard language are seen as doing a great deal of damage to the language itself, as illustrated in example 12:
An often-used term in the discourse of the academic experts is “semi-language” (reference made to variant form of language), which is seen as the most dangerous form of language.

The academic linguists distinguish sharply between three types of Lithuanian language: (1) standard language, (2) non-standard language and (3) the mix of the two, often referred to as ‘semi-language’ (see ex. 13 and 14). Standard language is presented as the ‘best’, ‘most Lithuanian’ variety, suitable for public use, following the set of strict standard rules. Non-standard varieties are “allowed” variants, but only under certain conditions – isolated from standard language physically (in private) and linguistically (without mixing of the two codes). Semi-language is seen impure, as a quasi-language (ex. 13) and as the greatest catalyst of language death (ex. 14). This can be interpreted in the context of external expertise in the following way: only the systematic, ‘grammatical’ way of speaking and writing is acceptable, because there are external authorities that describe this type of language.27

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27 One aspect that could be explored further is how description becomes systematisation and then prescription in the discourse of Lithuanian experts. As we saw above, dialects are also tolerated if unmixed with the standard. The reason for this could be that they have been systematized by linguists. Dialects are described systematically in research, and standard language is described systematically in normative publications (lists of language errors, grammar books etc.). This could mean that for the experts, systematisation of a language variety is the pre-requisite to allow their use. Thus, any
The third aspect is the function of language. Two main functions are expressed: identificational and communicative.

The communicative function of language is very clearly divided into the public and private communication. This is pretty much a classical narrative that comes from the European nation-building times – a country needs ‘one’ language for effective communication (c.f. Geeraerts 2003). However, this argument is usually implied. The most usual line of argumentation for a unified-and-correct public language is based on the argument of identity, which brings into play the function of language as a tool of cultural identificational function. It entails that language is ‘more than just a tool for communication’; that it identifies certain attributes of the speaker(s). The identificational function has sub-functions: the function of national identification, and the function of social identification.

The function of social identification can be seen in those articles where there is an understanding of expertise as external. Cf.

(15) Ir kaip tuos dalykus mūsų jauniems žmonėms įkalti į galvą, kad graži, raiški, taisy- klinga kalba yra žmogaus vizitinė kortelė, o klaidos ir nemokėjimas reikšti minčių vis dėlto jo socialiniame gyvenime jam nepadės. (...) Kalba yra ne tik įrankis, bet ir žmogaus asmenybės viena iš spalvų. [How should we put into the heads of young people, that beautiful, expressive, correct language is one’ business card, and language errors and inability to communicate thoughts still will not help them in social life. (...) Language is not only an instrument, but one of the indices of one’s personality.] (Exp-LT-24, my italics)

Using the metonymy of a ‘language as a business card’, the expert presents language as one’s ‘face’, in the sociological meaning of the word. Also, all the mentioned keywords pointing to external expertise are present – ‘correct language’ and ‘errors’.

Language as medium that shows one’s personal attributes and even morals is seen through verbs such as ‘reveals’ and nouns ‘decency / indecency’.

(16) Ji labai greitai išduoda, kas esi, koks esi, kuo gyveni. (...) Mane ilgą laiką stebindavo išorinio padorumo ir netyčia išlendančio žmogų vidinio nepadorumo nedarna. Šiandien jau nelabai stebina net išorinis nepadorumas: jis virsta norma. Žmogus atsiveria viešumai toks, koks yra. (...) Lygiai taip ir jo kalba: teškia į pačią viešiausią viešumą

linguistic code that has not yet been documented by linguists is considered non-systematic. Anything non-systematic is considered dangerous (the criterion for language and its varieties to be systematic is seen in ex. 8, 11, 16, 27). ‘Semi-language’ is then, basically a joint name for all non-documented linguistic territories.

This is visible in the strict division between dialect as a medium of private communication and the standard Lithuanian language as a medium for public communications (see ex. 7 and 14). In some cases, the reason for this division is explained in practical terms – private communication needs to be warm, personal, while public communication needs to be effective, that is why a single language is considered better (Exp-LT-7).
intymiosios ir vulgariosios leksikos; į mados drabužių įvelka žargonybių ir paleidžia jas iš aukšto rango valdžios žmonių lūpų; barstytne barsto svetimų kalbų žodžius ir ištisas neverčiamas frazes [It [language] quickly reveals who you are, how you live (…) ]

I was, for a long time, surprised by the dissonance in peoples’ outer decency and internal indecency. Today, we can even notice even outer indecency: it is becoming a norm. A person opens to the public the way he is. The same with his language. He spills vulgar lexicon to the most public of public spaces; drags slang into fashionable clothing and releases it from mouths of the government officials; barges with words from foreign languages and entire untranslatable phrases.] (Exp-LT-9)

In this example, we see that language is a mirror of one’s inner life. Combined with external expertise (expressed in the idea that one needs to rationally acquire the language system), the ‘correct language’ becomes the scale against which one’s good attributes are measured. In such, these experts express a strict hierarchy of linguistic varieties and social identities. In the following example, an academic expert compares connects the standard language to directly to social standing – the more standard one speaks, the higher one’s position in society is.

(17) (...) iš kalbos nesunku atskirti Gariūnų berniuką nuo studento, mokytoją nuo fūristo ir pan. (...) aukštesniųjų visuomenės sluoksnų kalba bus labiau standartizuota, o iš žemesniųjų niekas to nė nereikalauja. [(… it is not difficult to separate a market seller from a university student, a teacher from a truck-driver and similar (…) the language of the higher classes will be more standardized, and no-one demands that from the lower classes.] (Exp-LT-16)

This mix of two beliefs – hierarchical social identification and external expertise – creates an understanding of the standard language as a tool for measuring a person’s moral and social values. This will be referred to as the normativist notion of language.

The second sub-function (function of national identification), is seen in those articles where ethnic representation is active. By using ‘his/her’ language, one is said to expresses national values, culture, worldviews.

(18) … kalba – visa jų įvairovė pasaulyje – yra unikalus žmonijos kūrinys, leidžiantis iš kartos į kartą perduoti atskirų tautų ir šalių kultūrų, patirtį, vertybes. Todėl su ją turime elgtis atsargiai ir apgalvotai (...) [... language – all its variation in the world – is a unique product of humanity, allowing us to transfer the culture and the value of different nations from generation from generation. That is why we should treat it carefully and thoughtfully(…)] (Exp-LT-48)

The same supposition is visible from the ideas about ‘linguistic pride and linguistic shame’. Some voices of academic experts express the idea that Lithuanians are not proud, and even ashamed of their language. They see it as their task to turn that shame into pride.
(19) ... mes esame silpna kalbos pajautos kalbinė bendruomenė. Mes vis jaučiamės nepatogiai, kad kalbame lietuvių kalba – kasdieniniame gyvenime jaučiamės lyg truputėli atsiprašantys, kad kalbame lietuviškai. Bet jei paliestume giluminius mūsų tautos ir kalbos gyvenimo pagrindus, tai turbūt vėl stotume už mūsų kalbą ir ją gintume. [... we are a linguistic community with a weak relation to linguistic. We constantly feel ashamed that we speak Lithuanian – it is as if we feel slightly apologizing that we speak Lithuanian in everyday life. However, if anything would affect the deepest core of our nation’s and our language’s existence, perhaps we would again stand by our language and defend it.] (Exp-LT-38)

(20) Kažkur dingo nuostata, kad aš esu lietuvis, rašau taisyklingai, viešai kalbu taisyklingai. [... The attitude that, I am Lithuanian, I write correctly, I speak correctly in public, has somehow disappeared.] (Exp-LT-15)

The two main presuppositions in these two excerpts (ex. 19–20) are that the normal condition is for one to proudly speak and defend one’s national language, and that the desire to speak another language or to allow the influence of another language is unnatural. Thus, the identificational function of language is understood as the function to mark one’s national identity. The combination of ethnic representation and function of national identification shall be referred to as the ethnolinguistic notion of language.

In some cases, we can see a combination of all three aspects. Example 20 exemplifies the idea that ‘correct national language’ has the function to identify ones national and social status (representation: ethnic, expertise: external, function: identificational – national and hierarchical-social). This will be referred to as the monoglot notion of language.

(21) Kažkur dingo nuostata, kad aš esu lietuvis, rašau taisyklingai, viešai kalbu taisyklingai. [The attitude that, I am Lithuanian, I write correctly, I speak correctly in public, has somehow disappeared.] (Exp-LT-15)

The ideology guiding the production of such discourse comes from the ideas of language cultivation (see Vaicekauskienė 2016a). This is clear from seeing language change as something controllable and worth controlling. The experts sees the need to both correct language and warn about the national importance of language, otherwise, that might lead to undesirable changes in the language (ex. 20) and even death (ex. 12).
Man atrodo, kad dabar mūsų tikslas yra naujus iššūkius kalbai priimti, laiku įvardinti problemas, kurių atsiranda dėl išorinio besikeičiančios visuomenės poveikio, ir lietuvių kalbai padėti, kad ji išliktų, pasiektų naują kokybę kaip intelektinės veiklos įrankis, kad ji liktų tokia pat graži ir kuo ilgiau išlaikytų savo senasias savybes. [I think we have to aim to approach the new challenges to [our] language, to timely identify the problems, which occur due to the external influence of the changing society, and help the Lithuanian language to survive, to acquire new qualities as an instrument of intellectual work, to remain as beautiful as it has been, keeping its old qualities for as long as possible.] (Exp-LT-10)

Only a few places it is overtly expressed that Lithuanians and non-Lithuanians are obliged to equally speak Lithuanian, such as in ex. 23, a statement from the same source as ex. 22 a linguist from a high position, the director of the Institute for Lithuanian Language:

O kad lietuvių kalba turi būti ne tik lietuvio, bet ir kiekvieno Lietuvos piliečio viena pamatinių vertybių, neturėtų kelti nei diskusijų, nei abejonių. [And that Lithuanian language should be a fundamental value not just of every Lithuanian, but of every Lithuanian citizen, should raise neither discussions, not doubts.] (Exp-LT-10)

In many more places, it is implied that knowledge of standard Lithuanian applies to non-Lithuanians as well. In an interview, the dean of the Faculty of Philology reacted to an initiative to reduce Lithuanian language correctness requirements in non-Lithuanian schools, calling it a destruction of the national essence of the schooling system (Exp-LT-23).

An alternative, but rare, understanding of expertise is autonomous. Language is seen as ‘its own master’, separated from the language speakers and authorities, changing and developing according to still unknown rules. It comes from the narrative of historical linguistics, when the nature of language was compared to ‘a tree’: it grows, develops and dies. The words ‘change’ and ‘development’ are keywords in this discourse, language has ‘its own tendencies’, disconnected from both the regular language speakers (ex. 24) and the experts (ex. 25). It is usually activated when talking about language changes on the level of the whole linguistic community, over long periods of time.

Nors žmonės mėgina šnekamąsias kalbas veikti, dažnai jos vis tiek kinta savo nenu-spėjamais būdais, tarsi pasijuokdamos iš tų pastangų. [Even though people try to influence the spoken languages, often they still change in their own unpredictable ways, as if making fun of those attempts.] (Exp-LT-41)

Kalba turi savo raidos dėsningumus, ji plėtojasi, vystosi pagal tuos dėsningumus ir nieko negalime padaryti. Kalbininkai tik aprašo, konstatuoja, kas darosi su kalba. [Language has its own developmental tendencies, it expands, cultivates, evolves according to those tendencies and we cannot do anything. The experts only describe and state, what is happening with the language.] (Exp-LT-29)
In some articles, the same beliefs about language development are expressed, followed with a necessary ‘but’, that signals that language still needs some regulation. These will be understood as external expertise, as language regulation is seen as necessary when it comes to what the experts label ‘systemic’ changes.

(26) ... reikia laikytis Jono Jablonskio nustatytos krypties. Reikia klausyti žmonių kalbos, išgirsti, kas joje atsiranda be sistemos darkymo ir tai toleruoti, o su kai kuriomis baisybėmis, besikėsinančiomis į sisteminius dalykus, kovoti. [(...) we should stick to the direction of Jonas Jablonskis.29 We should listen to people’s language, hear what is appearing in it without disrupting the system and tolerate it, and fight the other awful forms, that pose a threat to the system.] (Exp-LT-2)

Interestingly enough, ex. 25 and 26 are taken from the same language expert, a linguist and the Dean of the Faculty of Philology, only from different time periods. From the data I have gathered, it is unclear what is the actual opinion of the linguist, but it seems to have changed in the period that I am studying.

The counter-discourse. 12 articles present voices of academics who oppose and criticise the dominant ideas of language. Their position as an “alternative” voice is visible from the titles of the articles, designed to challenge the dominant narratives of ‘danger’ and ‘language deterioration / language errors’ such as, [“The Lithuanian language is not in danger”] (Exp-LT-5), [“Is the youth’s literacy decreasing? Let us not make an idol out of Lithuanian language”] (Exp-LT-32) or and ironical title [“The size of language errors”] (Exp-LT-41).

The external expertise in the dominant discourse is challenged via an internal understanding of expertise. The experts refer to mother tongue competence as proof that linguistic expertise is internalized in the minds of the speakers, and not in dictionaries or LP institutions (ex. 27-28), or directly say that what is normal in language come from the speakers’ perspective (ex. 29), not from norm-setters (ex. 30).

(27) Suaugusiam žmogui pakeisti gimtosios kalbos elementą – sakykim, žodį, išmoktą vaikystėje – reiškia pastangą įrašyti naują žodį į atmintį vienoje smegenų zonoje, ir kartu kitoje kažkaip užgožti įprastą žodį, nuo kūdikystės laikytą savu. (…) Bet ši substitucija yra kur kas sudėtingesnis veikmas nei sudužusio kiaušinio keitimas sveiku. Net ir išmokus naują pakaitą įprastasis žodis galvoje vis tiek išlieka. Negali-ma įsivaizduoti tokių keitimų sėkmės visos gimtakalbių bendruomenės mastu. Kaip yra žmonių, nenorinčių ir/ar nemokančių mokytis antrųjų trečiųjų negimtųjų kalbų, taip ir bandymas keisti jų įprastą kalbą gali pasirodyti beveik ar ir visai bergždžias. [To change an element of the mother tongue, let’s say, a word, learned during childhood – it means an attempt to write a new word in the memory in one zone of the brain, and simultaneously somehow somehow choke the regular word, which was considered

29 Author of the first Lithuanian grammar.
one’s own from childhood. (...) But this change is much more difficult than exchanging a broken egg with a new one. Even if one learns a substitute [word], the old one still remains. We cannot imagine such changes on the scale of a whole linguistic community. Just as there are people, who are unable to learn or don’t want to learn a second, third, non-native tongue, so can the effort to change the people’s regular language can turn out almost or totally futile. (Exp-LT -41)

(28) Lietuvai, kaip possovetinei valstybei, būdinga įstatymai numatyta privedė ir baudos už gimtąją kalbą. [What is characteristic for Lithuania, as a post-Soviet country, are legally foreseen duties and penalties for the [use of] mother tongue.] (Exp-LT -34)

(29) (...) didžioji bėda yra tų normų dažnos atotrūkis nuo vartos na, perdėtas kalbos gryninimas, netgi tarmės variantų skelbimas didžiosiomis kalbos klaidomis. [(...) it is very much regrettable that those [language] norms are often far away from the usage, that language is purified so excessively, and even dialectal forms are presented as major language errors.] (Exp-LT-32)

(30) (...) kartais net pikšnamiši dėl tų naujų žodžių, kuriuos kuria kalbininkai. Kalbininkas, kaip ir kiekvienas žmogus, gali sukurti žodį, bet tai tikrai nėra jo funkcija“ [(...) people are even sometimes indignant towards those new word, created by linguists. A linguist, like any other person, can create a word, but that really is not his function (…) Any one of us is the creator of language, and to see how we create language, to me that is beautiful.] (Exp-LT-36)

The keywords ‘use’, ‘mother tongue’ and ‘language creator’ are used to point out that it is the cognitive and social linguistic capabilities as well as experiences what makes one a language expert (internal expertise).

Contrary to the dominant discourse, where language is ‘more than communication’, the counter-discourse stresses that the communicative function is still ‘primary’. Communication is also used to point to internal expertise – what makes one an expert is the ability to communicate successfully, rather than to uphold normative rules and avoid non-domestic vocabulary:

(31) Mes kalbą naudojame komunikavimu – rašykite kaip patogu. Kai reikia greitai įrašyti žinutę, galiu prisielti, nė vienas tuo metu negalvoja apie lietuvių kalbos kančią – tokio dalyko nėra. (...) Siūlau į normą žiūrėti taip, kaip žiūri mokslas. Norma yra iš vartos na, o ne iš kalbininko galvos. Šiuolaikinis kalbotyros mokslas tuo prasidėjo – kalbos sistemą nustatome pagal vartos na. Kalboje naudojamos vartos na struktūros ir yra kalbos norma. [We use language for communication – write as you please [ref. to texting without specific Lithuanian characters]. When you need to promptly text a message, I can swear that no one is thinking about language that suffers – there is no such a thing. (...) I suggest looking at the norm in the way scholarship looks at it. Norms come from usage, not from the head of the linguist. Modern linguistics started from that – the description of language system is based on usage. The structures used in language are the norm of the language.] (Exp-LT-57)
As both beliefs – in the speakers' inborn expertise and communicative abilities – point to an understanding of language as an internalized tool of communication, their combination will be referred to as the **pragmatic notion of language**.

The **identificational** function is also found. The phrasing is the same as in the dominant discourse, that language is “an important part of identity” (compare ex. 32 and 3), but the representation is not **ethnic**, but **social**; it rather stresses that we can be “different” through language:

(32) Pagal socialinę nuojautą sprendžiame, kaip kada tinkama kalbėti, o ne visada vienodai. Kalba yra labai ryški tapatybės dalis ir, laimei, leidžia mums būti skirtin-gims. [According to the social instinct, we chose when and how we should speak, and not always the same way. Language is a very clear marker of identity and, luckily, it allows us to be different.]

This view of language does not offer a fixed group that is represented through language (i.e. ‘Lithuanians’), nor a social class / status in society, as we saw above, but rather groups based on different social identities. This **horizontal social-identificational function** relies on the belief that **social identity** is what is represented through language (**social representation**). This combination of beliefs (the social and the linguistic) comes from sociolinguistic research, so it will be referred to as **variationist notion of language**.

In the counter-discourse, the experts tend to distance themselves from belief that language necessarily represents an **ethnic** group:

(33) „Amerikoje yra lietuvių, nekalbančių lietuviškai. Tu jam nepasakysi, kad jis ne lie-tuvis. Jis jaučiasi lietuviu, jis didžiuojasi lietuvių kalba, kuria jis nekalba. [In America, there are Lithuanians who do not speak Lithuanian. You will not tell him, that he is not Lithuanian. He feels Lithuanian, he takes pride in Lithuanian language, that he does not speak.]

It is important to note that, even though no competing belief regarding representations is offered in ex. 33, the **ethnic** belief is intentionally deconstructed, by pointing out that there is not one-on-one relationship between language and ethnicity. This will be considered **anti-ethnic representation**, as it is also an important element in the construction of ideology.

To summarize:

In the dominant discourse, language is understood as the main feature of national identity, therefore, the speakers must reproduce the set standard norms when using it (especially in public), as it reveals something about one’s moral values and patriotism. To maintain the language and avoid presenting themselves in a bad way, language users should follow the directions of linguists, who hold the knowledge of what is ‘good Lithuanian’. The public rhetoric of the experts pre-supposes that any debate about Lithuanian language is only about standard Lithuanian language, other varieties are seen as exceptions of less importance or as problematic aspects of ‘lan-
language’. In the analytical model – the aspect of representation is ethnic; the expertise is external, and the function of language varies between two identificational functions: social status and national identity. The geographical representation is present amongst some academic linguists, as secondary, but not amongst non-linguists. The function is mostly identificational – in some articles, language is a symbolic act of showing a person’s social identity, and in others, one’s national identity (or both). This depends on whether only the ethnic representation, or the external expertise (or both – only in four articles) are activated in the same article.

The opposing notions of language are found in the counter-discourse of the academics, sometimes distinguished by journalists as “sociolinguistics”. Here, the aspect of representation largely remains unrealized or implies a social group, the expertise is internal, and the function is communicative. The advocates of this notion of language are a just a few linguists. Although they are all employed at institutions that are publicly perceived to have the responsibility for surveillance and control of language (the Institute of the Lithuanian Language and the Lithuanian University of Educational Sciences), they take a different position from what the institution officially represents (compare with 2.1.4.).

3.1.2. NORWEGIAN EXPERTS: CELEBS AND RESEARCHERS

The subjects dominating the Norwegian virtual sphere are somewhat different than the ones in Lithuania and Serbia. The larger number of recent immigrants in Norway and the many new linguistic phenomena emerging from the contact of immigrant and local languages, as well as the issues connected to languages at school, have created a dynamic semiotic landscape. Phenomena such as multiethnolects, immigrant children’s language are central in linguistic research, as well as debates.

The collected 44 articles encompass a broad range of topics. A series of five articles was a debate about bilingualism (a part of a large debate that took place in November-December 2013); another five more about youth language and emerging linguistic varieties in urban areas. Then, there are the more traditional topics: nine articles about dialects and written languages; five about language change. Four were about language and politics (two about language policy, and two about the language of politicians).

The largest number of articles collected was written by academic experts (30). The first group of academic experts are labelled “researchers”, because they are presented through research institution affiliations, they present the results of their research in the article, and comment on the linguistic issues from that perspective. The other group are the “popular experts”. This category consists of “linguistic celebrities” (12 articles), those who are regular commentators on language-related subjects – Helene Uri and Sylfest Lomheim. They do have a PhD in linguistics, but they are not pre-
sented as researchers in the news article, because of their general fame. Helene Uri is famous primarily as best-selling novelist and Sylfest Lomheim as a politician, the former head of the Language Council and a permanent commentator on a weekly radio show “Språkteiken” that deals with language. Therefore, they are categorized as “popular experts”. The other, non-academic experts include non-regular commentators such as language teachers, heads of linguistic societies, journalists and columnists (8 articles).

Amongst the academic experts, the largest discussion in the period studied in this dissertation is the “Bilingualism debate” that took place in the daily newspaper “Aftenposten”. It took place between three groups of linguists, from: The University of Trondheim, the Centre for Multilingualism in Society across the Lifespan (University of Oslo) and the Department of Education (University of Oslo). The debate erupted because of the question of immigrant children whose mother tongues are not Norwegian. The researchers from the Department of Education were in support of more Norwegian language immersion at kindergartens, in order to provide them with higher Norwegian language competence. The linguists from the other two institutions answered with a claim that bilingualism is an advantage, not an impairment. In this crossfire, many more participants joined the debate, including politicians, activists, parents etc. The linguists were essentially discussing one notion of language, and that is the function, more precisely, the instrumentalist and communicative functions. The researchers expressed worry over how children would best develop the cognitive linguistic capabilities – to understand, express themselves and to use language to achieve goals later in life. The word of “resource” was used often to describe language skills.

(34) Flerspråklighet er positivt i seg selv. Det er mye forskning som viser at barn som lærer flere språk utvikler kognitive evner og spesifikke ressurser. [Bilingualism is positive in itself. There is much research that shows that a child who learns several languages develops cognitive capabilities and specific resources.] (Exp-NO-19)

The only problem discussed was whether this function can be improved through learning of Norwegian or by focusing on bilingual competences. The researchers from the Department of Education see that more language training will improve one’s ability to understand language (a communicative ability):

(35) (...) deres forskning viser at de tospråklige har svakere språkforståelse på skolespråket enn de enspråklige barna. (...) Den gode nyheten er imidlertid at dette går an å gjøre noe med, dersom man setter inn innsatsen tidlig nok, sier Melby-Lervåg. Systematisk intensiv språktrening i barnehagen har nemlig klar effekt. [(...) their research shows that the bilinguals have weaker understanding of the school’s language than the monolingual children. (...) The good news is that there is something that can be done about this, if we begin the attempts early enough, says Melby-Lervåg. Systematic, intensive language training in the kindergarten has a clear effect.] (Exp-NO-17)
The other researchers see that the focus must be on the mother tongue and the bilingual resources that the children have:

(36) The kindergarten fosters the development of the Norwegian language better if it is based on the language children bring with themselves from home and create bridges between the known and the new – a central principle in all education and pedagogical facilitation. [the kindergarten fosters the development of the Norwegian language better if it is based on the language children bring with themselves from home and create bridges between the known and the new – a central principle in all education and pedagogical facilitation.] (Exp-NO-21)

The two sides raised suspicions about the other side’s ideological views: one side was seen as fostering a monolingual language ideology saying that the Oslo kindergartens want to “assimilate children” (NO-Exp-19); the others were accused of fostering a multilingual ideology that does not necessarily work in practice. The apparently strictly opposed views slowly became less polarized as the discussion went on. Essentially, the debate was about the functions of language in terms of achieving communicative goals and societal goals (social mobility, employability etc.). An MA thesis was written about the debate by Kristine Myhren Saltnes, whose analysis showed that “[It is to find good solutions and methods to help these children that all the researchers are ultimately looking for.]” (Saltnes 2016: 49). It is therefore that the function of language will be interpreted as instrumentalist in the articles of both sides of the debate.

In the discussions about multiethnolects, a more complex notion of language emerged. While in the above-mentioned debate, the identificational function was mentioned only in a comment “[the home language is important for cultural identity]” (Exp-NO-19) no essential debate about the identificational function of language took place. In the discussion about multiethnolects, they were used as an example to stress that identity is inevitably connected to language. In one article, a journalist explores the phenomenon that ethnic Norwegian young people are using the same variety of “mixed Norwegian” (often called ‘Kebab-Norwegian’) with a lot of words and phrases from mainly immigrant languages. An academic expert claims that this situation is typical and natural:

(37) Norwegian-born youth speaks with an accent because they will mark the affiliation to their friends who have immigrant background. This is about new ways of being Norwegian. Norway is more than Kari and Ola. [Norwegian-born youth speaks with an accent because they will mark the affiliation to their friends who have immigrant background. This is about new ways of being Norwegian. Norway is more than Kari and Ola.] (Exp-NO-7)

“Kari and Ola” mentioned in the text can be interpreted as a culturally bound phrase meaning “typically Norwegian”, as Kari and Ola are some of the most typical Norwegian names. Here, language is seen as a tool of identification, and also acti-
vates the belief that language represents a social group. In other articles on this subject, the ethnic representation is deconstructed first, as mixed and similar varieties are seen as natural. Language is presented as primarily a part of a group identity, not national identity. The next passage comes from the same expert as ex. 37, Bente Alin Svendsen, who tries to deconstruct the ethnolinguistic notion of language.

(38) Det går tilbake til prosessen med å danne Norge som nasjon. Da var det sett på som viktig at nasjonen hadde ett rent språk, og språket ble sett på som et uttrykk for folkets karakter, et blandet språk ble sett på som en identitet i opplosning. Men det er en forestilling. Et rent nasjonalspråk finnes ikke. Vi snakker ikke likt som i Vikingtiden. [It goes back to creating Norway as a nation. Then, it was seen as important that a nation would have a pure language, and language was an expression of national character, a mixed language was seen as identity in dissolution. But that is just an idea. A pure national language does not exist. We do not speak the same as in the Viking times] (Exp-NO-28)

The next big topic is language change. Here, most of the academics function as “myth-busters”, deconstructing the notion that standard language is the only good language (external expertise).

A frequent belief that comes up is autonomous expertise, meaning that language is “its own master”, and that no grammar books, dictionaries or human factors can decide how language looks like. The example below even personifies language through the metaphor language is an organism, in which language possesses the attributes of a living being, such as a life and a will:

(39) Man kan lage regler, man kan bruke rød blyanten, man kan forklare og argumentere. Men språkets iboende krefter er sterkere enn alle foreldre og lærere til sammen. (...) Språket lever sitt eget liv og har en sterk egenvilje. [One can make rules, one can use the red pen, one can explain and argument. But the internal powers of language are stronger than all parents and teachers together. (...) Language lives its own life and has its own strong will.] (Exp-NO-32)

Or internal expertise, that dictates that language comes from the speakers’ mental capabilities:

(40) Hva er grammatikk? Tørre regler som Språkrådet har pønska ut for oss? Nei, språk er en sosial og mental egenskap hos oss mennesker, og vi har på sett og vis funnet opp grammatikken sjøl, alle sammen. Nettøp derfor er den så spennende. [What is grammar? Dry rules that the Language Council punched out for us? No, language is a social and mental ability and we have in a way created grammar ourselves, all of us. It is exactly therefore it is so exciting.] (Exp-NO-23)

They also discuss the notion of representation, detaching it from the ethnic notion and the idea that elements of language have to be “ethnic”.
Norsk er likevel ikke et truet språk. Men det endrer seg, slik det alltid har gjort. Et språk består i stor grad av lånord. På den måten er alle språk hybrider. [Norwegian is still not an endangered language. But it changes, as it always has done. A language consists in a high degree of borrowings. In this way, all languages are hybrids.]

The non-academic experts comment on a broad spectre of linguistic issues. The two main voices – Helene Uri and Sylfest Lomheim are often constructed as the “liberal” (the first) and the “conservative” (the latter) voice on language issues. The ideology seen in Lomheim’s articles is based on ethnic notion of representation and external expertise.

Denne og flere andre undersøkelser viser at vi savner bevissthet på å ta vare på det språket vi er best på, norsk [This and more other studies show that we do not have the consciousness to take care of the language that we know best, Norwegian]

Sylfest er omringet av ord som blir brukt feil. Han blir bombardert av «helt syke» og «sinnsyke» formuleringer. [Sylfest is surrounded with words that are used incorrectly. He is bombarded with “totally sick” and “mentally sick” formulations.]

“Hele syk” and “sinnsyke”, translated word-by-word here, are actually references to youth language, in which these phrases mean “extremely”. Youth language is indirectly considered bad / incorrect. Many linguists in Norway see Lomheim to be a lone voice in his conservative views of language, yet they acknowledge his popularity amongst non-linguists (No-Int-5). It is important to notice that Lomheim was the head of the Language Council from 2003 to 2010, but his ideas were met with strong resistance from other academics. Some critics claimed that his “doomsday prophecies” about Norwegian language are not academic enough. This was claimed by a public commentator in “Aftenposten” in an article entitled “[Is Sylfest Lomheim stupid?]” (Exp-NO-3).

On the other hand, Helene Uri is constructed in the media as the liberal expert, who is ‘pro English words’, ‘pro youth language’ etc. The notions of language found in her articles vary greatly from article to article. In most cases the function is communicative and expertise internal, like in the example below where good language is the question of the speaker and the communicative situations.

Det er ikke noe som er lov og ikke lov, det er opp til språkbrukeren selv. Det kommer også an på hvem avsenderen er. [There is no allowed and not allowed, that is up to the language users themselves. It also depends on who the sender is] (Exp-NO-33)

The notion of representation is sometimes activated in Uri’s articles, and varies between very different ones: anti-ethnic (ex. 45) and ethnic (ex. 46). Cf.
(45) Lånord er et resultat av kontakt mellom språk. Og norsk forblir norsk likevel – selv om det skulle komme inn enorme mengder lånord og oversettningslån fra engelsk [Loanwords are a result of contact between languages. And Norwegian will be Norwegian anyway – although enormous amounts of loanwords and translation loans will come from English.] (Exp-NO-17)

(46) Den største trusselen er at man bruker engelsk der det er fullt mulig å bruke norsk. Den strategiske språkpolitikken i Norge må dermed legge opp til å vise at norsk duger. [The biggest threat is that one uses English languages, [in situations] where it is totally possible to use Norwegian. The strategic language policy in Norway, therefore, has to make sue to show that Norwegian is good enough.] (Exp-NO-4)

I do not exclude the possibility that these discrepancies are a product of journalistic practice, as only one of Uri’s articles in my data was authored by Uri herself. But they could also be a result of a changed opinion.

Articles of language teachers and other non-academics mostly exhibit language ideological traits found in the Lomheim’s articles: **external expertise** and **ethnic representation** (5 of 6 articles, one was closer to Uri’s ideology). In an opinion article, a language teachers as “[Is the Norwegian Language Council asleep?]”, referring to a lack of normative practices. He writes that Norwegian is still “too Danish”, and that the language Council should fight the Danish linguistic heritage. He refers to a linguist, Finn-Erik Vinje, who, he claims, used to function as a **language police**:

(47) Finn-Erik Vinje er min språkhelt. Før i tida var han på TV og snakka om hva som var lov og ikke lov. På et eller annet tidspunkt må Vinje ha blitt ei belastning, for en dag var han borte vekk. Dermed forsvant språkpolitiet. [Finn-Erik Vinje is my linguistic hero. Before, he talked on TV, and talked about that is allowed and what is not. At one or another point, Vinje must have become a burden, because one day he was gone. Then the language police disappeared.

I thought that the Council should protect the **Norwegian** language (...) **Finn-Erik Vinje**, we need a language police!] (Exp-NO-25, emphasis and italics in original)

Interestingly enough, this monoglot ideal was recognized by the Norwegian Language Council, and they answered in an article “[We are awake!]”

Vi rykker ikke ut overfor den enkelte språkbrukeren og påpeker feil, men vi gjor mye for å øke kunnskapan og bevisstheten om god og korrekt språkbruk. [We do not address individual language users and point out errors, but we do a lot to increase the knowledge and awareness of good and correct language usage.] (Norsk språkråd 9.10.2014)

The notion of **function** was not much expressed in the discourse, except in the debate on bilingualism, where both sides employed the **instrumentalist** notion of
language. The communicative function was found in 5 articles, and the symbolic in those discussing multiethnolects.

To summarize: The distribution of the beliefs about representation is clearly role-depandant. The ethnic representation is found amongst non-academics, while the academic linguists either distance themselves from the ethnic notion of language or employ the notion that language represents social groups.

Norwegian academic experts exhibit only internal or autonomous expertise, in no case external. External expertise is found amongst non-academics and the linguist-superstar Sylfest Lomheim. Internal, as well as autonomous expertise is also found in the articles another popular expert, Helene Uri.

The reason academics are clearly different from non-academic could be because their participation in the public sphere is partially promotion of their research, partially because they take the role of “myth busters”: they take a purist or normativist belief about language and then deconstruct it. They hold the position that all language change and variation is natural, all new linguistic phenomena, in both speaking and writing does not present a danger to language.

The academics most likely take their understanding of expertise from schools of linguistics. The first one is the school of historical linguistics which sees language change – on a macro level – as inevitable and often independent of the language users’ efforts (autonomous expertise), while the sociolinguistic view based on the study of language variation and change: language is formed and created by the users themselves through acts of communication, therefore language – on a personal level – is also determined by the users (internal expertise). In 3 articles, both notions were found in the same article, in the voice of the same expert.

In the debate about bilingualism the instrumentalist function of language – language as a tool of achieving non-linguistic goals, such as success in finding a job, earning money, participating in the public sphere etc. The academics that present their work on youth language and identity, express the idea that (horizontal) social identification is an important function of language.

3.1.3. SERBIAN EXPERTS ARE NOT JUST FROM SERBIA

Unlike in Norway and Lithuania, it is the news-portal ideologies that form the notions of language, rather than individual experts. Three of the five news outlets chosen for this dissertation function as ideological brokers. The more right-wing “Politika” and “Večernje Novosti” are in one group, gathering the main experts from Serbian academic institutions as their experts, as well as all the pro-Serbian linguists from Bosnia and Montenegro, as well as the most famous editors and representatives of LP institutions. “Danas” supports linguists with that criticise the ideologies of language of the first group. Their ideology is represented by like-minded experts from
both Serbia and linguists from Bosnia, Croatia and Montenegro. The experts gathered around “Danas” are labelled as “pro-Yugoslav” by the first group, as they have expressed the idea that Serbo-Croatian was a more logical standard language than the current four standards, as well as that Serbian is the same language as Bosnian, Croatian and Montenegrin, linguistically speaking. “Blic” and “B92” have no specific language ideology, various experts and ideologies are found in both of them, very often copied from other news portals.

A large part of the linguists represented in the discourse of the centre-right daily newspaper “Politika” are a part of an ideological group that has, since the beginning of the 1990ties, been employing “Greater Serbian narrative” (1.4.3.). The unique feature of their discourse is the belief that language represents a primordial ethnic group. They consider all “speakers of Stokavian to be Serbian” and show clear references to a far-right political ideology, which has Greater Serbia in its core. To illustrate the similarity of the discourses of the linguists active in “Politika” to the “Greater Serbian narrative”, I will present some passages from the book of the main ideologist of Greater Serbia, Vojislav Šešelj. He employs a one-dialect-one-nation way of thinking to discredit the existence of large parts of the Croatian nation and language.

(...) Данашњи Хрвати су очигледно, потпуно нови, вештачки народ, сачуван од однарошених Срба, и имају веома мало заједничког са изворним Хрватима, заправо у оној мери у коjoj данас rođeni чакавци и кајкавци процентуално учествују у укупном броju хрватских становништва. [...] (…) Today’s Croats are clearly a fully new, fake people, preserved from de-nationalized Serbs, and have very little in common with the original Croats, actually just as much as today’s Chakavian and Kaykavian [-dialect] speakers participate in the total number of Croatian population.] (Šešelj 2002: 323)

It is typical to see those Croats who speak a Stokavian dialects are ‘catholicised Serbs’, Bosnians (Bosniaks) as ‘Islamised Serbs’, because of the history of missionary work of the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian empire in the Balkans during the late middle ages and the early modern times:

(...) многi од њих [Срби] су однарошиваљали прелазећи у католичанство јер се српска национална свест чувала само у оквирима разбијене и поцепане, али духовно очеличене и непоколебљиве Српске православне цркве. [...] (…) Many of them [Serbs] de-nationalized themselves, by going over to the Catholic faith, because the Serbian national awareness was protected only in the domain of the shattered and broken, yet spiritually strengthened and unflinching Serbian Orthodox Church.] (Šešelj 2002: 323)

The linguists in “Politika.rs” follow the exact same line of linguistic arguments as the main ideologist of Greater Serbia, employing slightly different rhetoric. In the example below, the linguist claims some that some Croatian, Bosnian and Montenegrins are actually Serbs, referring to two leading figures of the era of the Enlightenment (Dositej Obradović and Vuk Stefanović Karadžić), as authorities on what “Serbian” is:
(48) Ни Доситеј, ни Вук, нису желели српски језик да намећу несрбима. Српски језик је само за Србе, и то за све Србе. А и оно што Доситеј и Вук подразумевало под Србима – свим Србима готово никад није било по вољи. Ни у Вуковом добу, као ни данас, сви Срби – Србима нису хтели да се зову. У скоро двестогодишњем ходу српског језика (од Вука до данас), делови штокавске језичке заједнице – прогласили су се посебним народима. Два дела, на основу верских критеријума: Хрвати и Муслимани, с тим да су ови други себи наденули име – Бошњаци. Трећи део, иако верски подударан са Србима, угледајући се на Хрвате и Муслимане, такође се прогласио посебним народом – Црногорцима. И што је најинтересантније, сви српском Вуковом језику укинуше српско име, и преименоваше га у тзв. хрватски, босански/бошњачки и црногорски језик. [Neither Dositej nor Vuk wanted to impose Serbian language upon the non-Serbs. Serbian language is only for the Serbs, and all the Serbs. But what Dositej and Vuk understood as Serbs – was not always liked by the Serbs. Neither in Vuk’s times, as today, did all the Serbs, wanted to call themselves Serbs. In a nearly two hundred years of the history of Serbian language (since Vuk till nowadays), did parts of the Štokavian language community proclaim themselves separate peoples. Two of them, according to religious criteria: the Croats and the Muslims, and the latter ones gave themselves the name – Bosniaks. The third part, even though religiously identical with the Serbs, looking up to the Croats and the Muslims, also proclaimed themselves – Montenegrins. And what is more interesting, all of them abolished the Serbian name of Vuk’s language, renaming it so-called Croatian, Bosnian/Bosniak and Montenegrin language.] (Exp-SR-36)

In a soft rhetoric, the linguist quoted above claims that parts of Bosnians, Croatians and Montenegrins are Serbs, based on linguistic evidence. This linguist is, a dialectologist by field of expertise; he holds a high position in two universities (Belgrade and Kragujevac in central Serbia) as a professor of “Serbistics” (this is the name for the mainstream way in which Serbian is studies in Serbia – the philological study of Serbian language, including language, literature and history). He has also been suggested for the role of the head of the “Office for Serbian Language”, scheduled to be opened under the Ministry of Culture (SR-INT-02).

Linguists with the similar opinion to him use dialectal data as proof of Croatians being a nation on the far periphery, while Serbs take the central place amongst the South Slavic nations:

(49) Ако су Хрвати били периферно српско племе, а све дијалекатске чињенице на то упућују, разумљиво је да и „хрватски језик“ нема утемељења: њега су се Хрвати одрекли сами у оно време кад им се учинило да ће им словеначка кај-кавштина донети много богатији „род“ од онога који им је доносила „домаћа чакавштина“, али су брзо схватили да су им добили једнаки, тј. никакви, и окренули се српском језiku лепећи преко њега „своју“ етикету. [If the Croats
were a peripheral Serbian tribe, and all dialectological facts point to that, it is understandable that “Croatian language” does not have a basis: Croatians denounced it themselves when they thought that the Slovene Kaykavian dialect would bring them a better “harvest” that what “domestic Chakavian” brought to them, but they quickly realised that their gains are equal, i.e. none, and turned to Serbian language, sticking on to it their “own” label.] (Exp-SR-45)

This rather bold statement is about what is shown on map 3. (1.4.3.). Kaykavian is considered Slovene (it is not visible on the map, but Kaykavian extends into Slovenia, and is the basis for the standard Slovene language) and Chakavian is considered Croatian. This is a common motif in the debates of Serbian linguists: dialect and language are equated (the Stokavian dialects are often called “the people’s language”, see ex. 50 below), and then language and nation. But since Croatians also use the Stokavian dialect as the basis for the Croatian standard language, the Serbian academic linguists consider the Croatian linguists to have “stolen” a part the Serbian language from the Serbs.

(50) kako nam je objasnio, Hrvati imaju namjeru da dokažu da imaju primat nad narodnim jezikom, odnosno onim što smo u SFRJ zvali srpskohrvatskim jezikom. - Oni tvrde da su prvi narod koji (...) polaže pravo na to polaže pravo i na štokavski jezik, što je zapravo narodni jezik, od koga je najpre nastao srpski jezik. [As he explained, the Croatians have the intention to prove that they have the priority over the people's language, that is, what we in the SFRY called Serbo-Croatian language] (Exp-SR-12)

The Stokavian dialect is explained to be “Serbian folk language” (using the word “narodni”, which could be translated as “people’s” or “folk”). The one-dialect-one-nation idea is used to essentialise the relationship between a nation and a language.

The same logic is employed to other linguistic phenomena, such as the Cyrillic script, that is considered the only Serbian script by the linguists. When Croatian linguists talk about Cyrillic in the context of the Croatian language, that is also considered a theft. For example, a conference about Cyrillic script in Croatian linguistic heritage was presented as theft of the Cyrillic script, because Cyrillic can only be Serbian. The article was entitled “[A LINGUIST WARNS: Croatians are stealing the Cyrillic script from us!]” (Exp-SR-12)

The language is thus connected to an ‘imagined territory’ (of Greater Serbia) and an imagined speech community (The Stokavian / Serbian / Cyrillic linguistic community), so, in their view, language represents a primordial ethnic group. There is only one example where this ideology is directly expressed, in this statement by retired professor of Serbian language from the University of Novi Sad (authored by himself, and published on “Politika.rs”):

(51) Језик је датост која се не може лако сагонити у калупе према жељама оних који би да од њега неки део „одсеку“ или да из њега нешто „оскубу“. За те послове Хрвати су се кандидовали почетком прошлога века, „Бошњаци“ – пре
коју деценију, а Црногорци – пре коју годину. И сви се надметали у томе ко ће уверљивије и успешније лагати не водећи рачуна о томе да су пре тога сви они до јуче били Срби и сви говорили српским језиком. [Language is a given, which cannot be re-shaped according to the wishes of those who wish to “cut off” or “reduce” some of its parts. The Croatians engaged in such activity in the beginning of the last century, the “Bosniaks” – a few decades back, and the Montenegrians - a few years ago. And they all competed in who would tell more believable lies, careless of the fact that they all used to be Serbs and spoke in the Serbian language.] (Exp-SR-27)

On the other side, the experts in the liberal-left news portal “Danas.rs” speak directly to this notion of representation and offer a competing notion. In the following quote, the one-nation-one-language ideal is taken from the discourse of the linguists described above, deconstructed as “Nazi ideology” and presented as not scientific.

(52) „Jedna država, jedan narod, jedan jezik“ bio je Hitlerov ideal (…) Nauka je tokom prošlog veka napustila romantičarsku ideju o jedinstvu jezika i nacije, aktuelnu u vreme kad su se one tek formirale, uvideći da nacije ne nastaju na osnovi jezika. Današnje države i jezici koji se u njima govore jasno to pokazuju (Austrijanci nisu Nemci, ali govore nemački…). „Pa kad balkanski intelektualci početkom 21. st. poistovjećuju naciju i jezik, to znači da su prespavali najmanje pola stoljeća znanosti [“One state, one people, one language” was Hitler’s ideal (…) Science has during the last century abandoned the romantic idea of the unity of the language and the nation, [that was] relevant in the time of their formation, realizing that nations do not appear on a linguistic basis. Today’s states and language that are spoken there show that clearly (Austrians are not Germans, but speak German…) So, when the Balkan intellectuals essentialize nation with language, it means that they slept over at least half a century of science.”] (Exp-SR-24)

The experts refer to a general statement that language belongs to the “speaker”, but do not closely define what they mean by that:

(53) Jezici pripadaju svojim govornicima ma kojem narodu oni pripadali [Languages belong to their speakers, no matter what people they belong to] (Exp-SR-73)

The intentional and explicit separation of “people” from “language” will be treated as an anti-ethnic representation. No concrete notion of representation is provided, but the discourse clearly talks to the dominant discourse and tries to dismantle some of its’ pre-suppositions.

The notion of expertise and function often come in pair in both the discourses of the right-wing and the left-wing news outlets.

In the next two examples, a professional linguist is answering to a worried mother, that has noticed that her son talks to her using a lot of slang words. This activates
two notions of language: external expertise (ex. 54) and the identificational function (ex. 55).

(54) Мада је модерни живот у великој мери демократизован, а граница између допуштеног и недопуштеног померене, мора се имати више мере када је језик јавне речи у питању. Жаргон не би смео да продире у књижевни језик. Опасност не представљају поједине речи већ конструкције које нарушују језичку структуру. [Even though the modern life is mostly democratized, and the border between the allowed and the not allowed moved, we have to have moderation when it comes to language. Slang should not penetrate into the literary language. The danger are not single words, but constructions that disrupt the linguistic structure.] (Exp-SR-9)

As in the Lithuanian data, mixing of varieties is seen as dangerous; what is perceived as language change is referred to as “disruption”. Use of different varieties of language is seen as a lack of cultivation. Later in the same text, the linguist phrases the phenomenon of variety-mixing as “sinning against the norm”.

(55) Требало би да се запитамо откуда код младих схватање да огрешити се о језичку норму и није велика грешка. Код великог броја њих не постоји свест о потреби за добром и правилим изражавањем, о важности неговања језичког израза. (...) Нема сумње да је однос према језику одраз духовне климе и стила живљења. Да бисмо променили тај однос, морајмо променити неке системе вредности и, пре свега, однос према култури и школству. [We should ask ourselves where this understanding amongst people comes from, that to sin against the norm is not a big mistake. Amongst many of them, there is no conscience about the need for correct expression, for the importance of the preservation of linguistic expression (...) No doubt, this is the reflection of the general spiritual climate and the style of living. To change that, we have to change some value systems, and, first of all, our relationship towards culture and the school.] (Exp-SR-9)

I should note that my translation “to sin” does not do the phrasing full justice. “Огрешити се” has a clear spiritual, church-like cling to it in Serbian: greh is sin, and greška is a mistake/error. Although both are of the etymological origin as the verb ogrešiti se, this particular verb means to do someone moral harm, or to coming a sinful act, although it technically can mean “to make a mistake”. The neutral way to say “to make a mistake” would have bene pogrešiti. This morally-loaded word, combined with the reference to language use as a “system of values”, are clear signs that bad use of language is connected to something morally wrong. Also, language is connected to its social function – through language, one can measure how much of social norms and social value systems the person uphold or does not. The function of language as a tool of social identification is here seen in a hierarchical way, in which “lower” varieties are seen as faulty and dangerous, and “higher” as morally superior and valuable.

In the counter-discourse, the internal expertise is stressed by referring to the main point of language: to produce meaningful utterances (communicative function).
Also, the internal expertise is said to be connected to linguistic varieties:

The reference to non-standard variety as something natural and not negative also signalizes that expertise is internal, meaning that all varieties of language in the heads and the mouths of the speakers are to be considered normal. Also, the inclusion of non-standard varieties into legitimate place of language points to the social identificational function of language, but unlike in the example above, it is horizontal, as all varieties are seen as valid.

Summary: The unique feature of the Serbian experts’ is primordial ethnic representation, while the other aspects shift between mutually exclusive beliefs such as internal vs. external expertise, the function of cultural identification vs. communication.

The distribution of these notions is based on the political ideology of the news portal. The experts in the right-wing “Politika” and “Večernje Novosti” promote a monolingual ideology (ethnic, primordial ethnic or civic representation, external expertise, the function of hierarchical social identification and national identification) left-wing “Danas” supported experts – both academics and non-academic – whose ideology is the opposite (anti-ethnic representation, internal expertise and the communicative and horizontal social identificational functions). The other two outlets do not have “their own” experts like the above-mentioned ones but publish interviews with experts of both sides (although more with those on the “monoglot” side, as they are more in number and more active).
3.1.4. QUANTITATIVE AND COMPARATIVE RESULTS

In this sub-section I will present a comparison of the expert discourses, supplemented with quantitative data.

1. **Beliefs and notions of language in the discourse.** I have sought to identify only beliefs about language connected to one of the three aspects of the ideology of language (representation, expertise and function). I have also identified sets of beliefs (notions) that occur together in a significant number of times. Those are:

1.1. **National-elitist:** This most complex notion, consisting of **ethnic representation, external expertise** and the **function of cultural identificational.** Ideal language is seen as pure, correct and is thus a reflection of one’s national identity and social status.

1.2. **Monoglot:** includes the beliefs in **ethnic representation** and **external expertise.** It essentially sees language as invariable and corresponding to one nation, without mentioning the function of language.

1.3. **Ethnolinguistic:** includes the belief in **ethnic representation** and the **function of cultural identificational.** The stress in this notion is on the ethnic nature of language and its function to express one’s national identity; language ‘belongs’ to the nation.

1.4. **Normativist:** This notions includes the belief in **external expertise** and the **function of cultural identificational.** Language is not seen as a part of one’s national identity, but rather of one’s status in society. Those who write and speak correctly (one or more languages) are seen are more competent and “better” language users and have a “high” in the social hierarchy, and those who speak incorrectly, “mixed varieties”, use only dialects or similar non-standard varieties, are seen as “less competent” users, but also as lower in the social hierarchy. Language is used to measure one’s adherence to societal (and not just linguistic) norms.

1.5. **Prescriptivist:** This notions includes the belief in **external expertise** and the **function of communication.** Essentially, language is presented as a means of communication, but “correct” language – the one set by norm-makers – is considered the ideal condition for successful communication.

1.6. **Pragmatic:** This notions includes the belief in **internal expertise** and the **function of communication.** Language is seen as product of humans and their interaction.

1.7. **Variationist:** This notions includes the belief in **internal expertise** and the **horizontal social identificational function** of language. Language is seen as a personal attribute and its many varieties corresponding to different social identities a person takes upon.
1.8. **Atomic**: This notions includes the belief in **individual representation** and the **communicative language**. Language is seen as a tool of communication between individuals, but each individual’s language is seen as unique.

In the points below, I will present the quantitative data. The number of identified beliefs and notions (and the percentage of the total number) is presented in appendix 1. In appendix 2, the numbers are shown divided according to the categories of language experts and in appendix 3, the same numbers are given in percentages.

2. **Expert types**: The academic experts in all three countries can be divided first into two groups – the academic (academy members, university professors, lecturers and researchers etc.) and the non-academic (language teachers, journalists, public intellectuals etc.). The academic experts can be further divided into two groups. In Lithuania, there is a division between the traditional “linguist” (lith. kalbininkas) and “sociolinguist” (lith. sociolingvistas). In Norway, there is a difference between “researchers” (those who represent a research institution and talk mostly only about their research) and “popular academics” (commentators of various linguistic issues). In Serbia, the one sees academic experts affiliated with the conservative newspaper portals “Politika” and “Večernje Novosti”, while the other is affiliated with the liberal “Danas”. In the Lithuanian and Serbian case, the second group of academic experts is defined by their direct opposition to and criticism of the “mainstream” academic experts, and therefore they will be labelled “alternative academic experts”. This is reflected in the great difference between their notions and beliefs about language. In Norway, they two groups of academic experts will be labelled “researcher” and “popular” experts.

2.1. In all three countries, the most common type of expert was the academic expert (LT: 69.%, NO: 59.1%, SR: 68.4%)

3. **Representation**: Beliefs about representation were expressed much more often in Lithuanian and Serbian than in the Norwegian discourse (LT:75.8%, NO, 38.6%, SR: 75.9%).

3.1. **Ethnic representation** was found in 59.7% of all Lithuanian articles and in 65.8% of all Serbian articles. In Lithuania and Serbia, it was the academic experts who mostly expressed ethnic representation (LT: 45.2%, SR: 55.7%). The alternative academic experts, mostly do not talk about representation, except in a few cases, where they express **individual representation** in Lithuania (5 articles) and **anti-ethnic** in Serbia (3 articles).

3.2. In Norway there is a clear divide – the (researcher-)academic experts expressed mostly did not express any belief about representation (it was

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30 All the numbers are presented as number of occurrences of a belief or notion per article. In many articles, two or more different beliefs about representation, expertise or function were found. This is sometimes due to the fact that more than one expert is present in the article, or because the same expert expresses different beliefs in the same article.
found in only 7 out of 30 articles), and when they did it was either or **social group-based** (3 articles) and **anti-ethnic** 3 articles) and in one article **ethnic**. One the other hand, **ethnic representation** was found dominant amongst **popular** (in 6 out of 7 articles) and **the non-academic** experts (in 3 out of 4 articles).

3.3. The non-academic experts express similar beliefs of representation in all three countries (almost entirely **ethnic** in Norway, completely **ethnic** in Lithuania and Serbia).

4. **Expertise**: The distribution of the beliefs within the roles is pretty clear-cut (appendix 3). In Lithuania and Serbia, the alternative academic experts express **internal expertise** in all of the articles (except one in Serbia, see appendix 2). In both Lithuania and Serbia, the mainstream academic linguists express predominantly **external expertise** (appendix 3). In Norway, none of the articles of researcher-academic experts express **external expertise**, but rather **internal** or **autonomous** (or, in 3 articles, both of them). Also, **autonomous** expertise is much more prominent amongst all Norwegian (including popular experts) than Lithuanian and Serbian experts. The non-academic experts express similar beliefs of expertise in all three countries (**external** is dominant).

5. **Function**: The two most prominent functions in all three countries are the **function of cultural identification** (language is a mirror of **social status** or **nationality** or both) and **communicative function** (language is primarily a tool of communication). Like with the beliefs about expertise, the beliefs about function are clearly distributed amongst the roles: the academics experts in Lithuania and Serbia predominantly express the function of **cultural identification**, while the Norwegian ones express the **communicative function**. The alternative academic experts in Lithuania and Serbian express the **communicative** function of language in all their articles that contain beliefs about the **function** of language. In Norway, because of the 6 articles that fall into the “bilingualism debate”, the **instrumentalist** function is also prominent.31

6. **Notions of language**: The **national-elitist** notion was found 4 Lithuanian, 1 Norwegian and 4 Serbian articles. Much more were the **monoglot** (LT: 17.2%, SR: 13.9%) and **ethnolinguistic** (LT: 12.9%, SR: 8.9%) notions of language (appendix 2). Most of these were found amongst academic experts in both Lithuania and Serbia, a smaller part amongst the non-linguists (appendix 4). In the Norwegian data, the most prominent notion of language was **pragmatic** (20.5%), and it was only the academic experts who expressed this notion. It was not found amongst non-academic experts or “popular” experts in Norway. In Lithua-

31 NOTE: The beliefs about the function of language are found in the least number of articles in all three countries (LT: 37.1%, NO: 45.5%, SR: 29.1%), so a broader research is needed to determine the generalisability of the results.
nia and Serbia, the distribution per expert-type is vice-versa; the pragmatic notion is found only amongst “alternative” academic experts (LT: 8.1%, SR: 6.3%), none amongst the (mainstream) academic and non-academic experts.

7. Differences between types of experts:

7.1. There is more similarity – both in terms of separate beliefs and notions of language – amongst the “alternative” Lithuanian and Serbian academic experts and the researcher-academic experts in Norway (the dominance of the “pragmatic” notions of language, the lack of the notion of representation).

7.2. The beliefs and notions of language of the Lithuanian and Serbian “mainstream” academics are similar to the non-academic experts in the same countries (“monoglot” and “ethnolinguistic” notions).

7.3. The Norwegian “popular” experts and the Lithuanian and Serbian mainstream academic experts are similar in terms of representation (ethnic), but not in the case of the other two aspects (all three main beliefs of expertise are expressed in Norway, while in Lithuania and Serbia, external is dominant).

8. The role of academic experts in the public sphere: Lithuania and Serbia clearly fall into the same groups in terms of the dominant ideologies of experts. There is a “mainstream” academic linguistic environment that promotes a view of language described in Bauman and Briggs (2003) book – real language is seen as the one that is “ethnically pure” and “correct” and is thus used to measure one’s loyalty to a nation-state and personal social status. In Norway the linguists not only express different notions of language, but actively stand against the above described ideas, dominant in Lithuania and Serbia. Their role is sometimes constructed as a “myth buster”, the one that speaks against supposedly widespread misconceptions about language. The possible explanations will be presented below:

8.1. The difference in the representation (largely absent amongst Norwegian experts, dominantly ethnic in Lithuania and Serbia) can due to the fact that Lithuania and Serbia are countries that are in the process of “nation-re-building”, and cultural elites are engaged in re-engineering the culture and traditions they feel were damaged by the five decades of state socialism – language is one of them (the perceived fear of Russification and the Serbo-Croatian language policy amongst others).

8.2. The dominance of the monoglot and ethnolinguistic notions amongst Lithuanian and Serbian academic experts – that would be considered “myths” amongst most Norwegian academic experts can be explained in many ways. It is possible that academic experts in Lithuania and Serbia preserve some of the role of the intellectual from the totalitarian system. In the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia respectively, scientists and researchers were expected –
as were most workers – to contribute to the building of a communist future, and they often needed to (regardless of what they were actually doing) to present their work as compatible with the requirements of the centralist totalitarian state. The articles in the news can be interpreted as an attempt to, through an appropriate ideological tone – raise public awareness of the importance of their profession. The Norwegian academic experts see their role in public life in the tradition of the Enlightenment to battle prejudices and “folk” understandings of language, while the Lithuanian and Serbian ones see themselves as “social engineers”, an idea that gained momentum in the early Soviet Union and the creation of the New Soviet Man.

8.3. The material conditions could also play a role here: as the economic doctrine in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia was state-capitalism, most workplaces were allocated by centralized work planning committees. Thus, the main way to get a position would be to present one’s profession as important for the sustainment of the system. Both the Lithuanian and Serbian experts seem to be trying to raise “moral panics” that justify the need for their profession – language control, purification etc. All this could be further explored in future research as well.

8.4. The stimulus for the debates, topicality. Representation is activated by talks of influence of foreign languages in all countries. English is seen as a threat everywhere, but in Lithuania and Serbia, minority languages are also seen as a potential danger to the majority language. Expertise is activated by discussions of decreasing literacy, influence of English and deteriorating public language in Lithuania, usually initiated by LP institutions or language experts that were at some point engaged in its work. In Norway and Serbia, the stimulus is also language change (was noticed by language speakers and then complained to about to the linguist) or the influence of English. These similarities and differences could be explained through the degree of institutionalisation: Lithuanian state-sponsored LP institutions are often contacted by journalists to report on their work and the ‘condition’ of the Lithuanian language. The dominance of the monoglot ideology in journalistic practices can be seen just from the titles and the framing of language issues. The frames of the debate are quite similar – all the linguistic new phenomena are media-worthy issues, because they could indicate something ‘bad’ is happening in language. Even when the linguists have a non-mono-

32 To put all the economic models of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia under the label “state-capitalism” is a crude oversimplification, as especially Yugoslavia changed its economic model a few times between 1945–1990 moving towards “market socialism”, but as far as language experts are concerned, their main job market were the positions opened by the government – teaching, lecturing, editing, language corrective work etc.
glot view, they have to start from the monoglot supposition, “Not afraid of language deterioration” (Exp-NO-6), and under-titles such as “Language will never deteriorate” (Exp-NO-23). These examples illustrate that the expert’s role is to start from what is commonly assumed about language, and then break the myth. In the cases of Lithuania and Serbia, this is found in only a few articles, for ex. “Lithuanian language is not in a crisis” (Exp-LT-5), “Serbian language is not endangered” (Exp-SR-32). Ideologies of language embedded in journalistic practices are not the main study object in this dissertation but could be explored in future research.

Also, in all three countries, the innovations in language – youth language, new varieties, slang, SMS, emojis, etc. – provoke experts to express beliefs about expertise.

3.2. THE ONLINE COMMENTS, OR “VOX POPULI”

“Postmodern knowledge is not simply a tool of the authorities; it refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable. Its principle is not the expert’s homology, but the inventor’s paralogy.” (Lyotard 1984: xxv)

If what Lyotard suggest is true, the postmodern “paralogy” should emerge as a protest against the established way of thinking. In my research, the language users are provided a voice in the internet, and that should give them the opportunity to challenge old narratives or the ideologies of experts. After the analysis, in the discussion chapter, I will evaluate how true this is.

This sub-chapter will present the qualitative and quantitative results of the comment analysis. Just like with the experts, the goal of the qualitative analysis was to determine the ways in which the beliefs about representation, expertise and function of language manifest themselves in the discourse. The goal of the quantitative analysis is to determine the dominance of the notions and beliefs.

Qualitative data analysis was done by taking a small amount of comments from all threads, looking for different beliefs about representation, expertise and function of language. Data saturation principle was applied: when no new categories of beliefs about language would emerge from the data, the analysis would be stopped. The qualitative analysis focuses on the description of the context of these comments, focusing especially on the social, political context. When necessary, other discursive structures are described too, including intertextuality, interdiscursivity, metaphors, metonymies and cultural models of language.

The quantitatative data was done on a random sample with the goal to establish the domiant vs. alternative beliefs and notions of language. Sample: I constructed three (from each country) random-stratified samples of comparable sizes. The random
sample was not drawn from the total population of comments; instead, the comments belonging to one source (a forum thread, a comment section) were defined as a stratum, and a number of comments of proportionate sizes was drawn from each stratum (so all sources would be represented in the sample). To make the size of the sample comparable, 10% of the comments were taken randomly from each stratum in the Lithuanian population, and 24% for the Norwegian and Serbian population. 

This resulted in 583 Lithuanian, 559 Norwegian and 571 Serbian comments. Then, comments that had nothing to do with language (about other topics like party politics, prices or elections) have been removed from the sample. That left the Lithuanian commentator sample of 355, the Norwegian of 308 and the Serbian of 326 comments. The complete overview of all the beliefs and notions identified in the sample in numbers and percent can be found in appendix 4.

Some of these comments did not exhibit only one belief about language (connected to either representation, expertise or function), some two and some three. The relative values (percentage of a certain belief about language within its category: representation, expertise and function) is presented in appendix 5.

In next three subsections present the results of the qualitative analysis (Lithuanian in 3.2.1., Norwegian in 3.2.2., Serbian in 3.2.3.) with a quantitative commentary. The fourth subsection presents the quantitative results in greater detail, along with a comparison of the findings in the three countries (3.2.4.).

3.2.1. LITHUANIA

As mentioned before, the criterion for the choice was that articles are connected to Lithuanian language (articles discussing, for example, only foreign exotic languages were not taken into the data). Three political subjects are dominant in these discussions: the issue of “raising illiteracy”, influences of English on Lithuanian and the minority languages in Lithuania, especially Polish. These topics come with macro-level discourses are, as I will show, mirrored in the comments to a certain degree.

First, the discourse on “dangers to Lithuanian language” is mostly maintained by professional linguists and teachers. Linguists have a tradition of cooperation with journalists on language issues, during which this subject is taken up. On special days, such as Mother Tongue Day, or International day of Language, National exam day, leading linguists, academics and heads of language planning institutions, are interviewed about “language issues”. This is an opportunity for linguists to set the agenda on what they consider to be an issue. This agenda of the linguists has a clear order – language change is approached as potentially dangerous, language is seen as deteriorating due to too influence of foreign languages and “careless” speakers (Vaicekauskienė 2016). On a rarer occasion, dialects are discussed as part of the Lithuanian national heritage that needs protection and preservation. The other topic,
minority language status, is often framed as a political conflict – the Polish minorities’ representatives at the parliament are asking for higher linguistic rights to use Polish language in public and official institutions in regions where Polish speakers comprise the majority of population. This subject has been around since Lithuania proclaimed independence from the Soviet Union – the question of Polish and the Polish language was presented as a ‘problem’, because the constitution defined the state language as Lithuanian, as well as because of conflict between Lithuania and Poland in 1918.  

This conflict framing that suggests that “minority languages are a potential problem” suggests that the normal state of things is when one language is dominant in one nation-state.

However, a great deal of commentators introduces new subjects, that are common to any public debate in Lithuania: emigration, the Soviet Union times and Globalisation. Emigration is one of the hottest and most long-lasting topics in Lithuanian media, due to the many Lithuanians that emigrated to Scandinavia, UK and Ireland in the past decades. Emigration is seen as one of the factors damaging not just the demographics, but also one of the most valued national treasures – language (see (19) above or the whole article Exp-LT-31 for a Lithuanian linguist’s comment on immigration and language). The Soviet Union is a frequent topic in political debates in Lithuania, both as a negative phenomenon (very often ‘Soviet mentality’ is seen as a problem), but also as a positive (the Soviet system is seen as something that had certain advantages over the liberal capitalist system or through the lenses of nostalgia). Language was an important part of the Soviet ideology, as the Soviet authorities sought to establish Russian as the language of administration and international communication. On the other side, some commentators think that Lithuanian language was better protected and more correct in the Soviet times (one former head of the SCLL shares the same opinion publically, see Exp-LT-15). Finally, cultural globalisation is seen as a danger for Lithuanian language, that reduces its status in Lithuania and its stability (it is even mentioned as a threat in the guidelines of the SCLL). Economic globalisation is often discussed positively in the context of Lithuania’s membership in the European Union, but negatively by some conspiracy theorists, as a process that encourages emigration and limits national sovereignty. On the language level, the topic of globalisation is based on the idea of English being a global aggressor and a ‘devourer’ of local and national languages (Polzenhagen & Dirven 2008).

The above described topics invoke different beliefs about language, that will be the subject of the three sub-sections below.

33 There are not many English-language studies on the subject, for a further reading see the bilingual Lithuanian-English edition “Lietuva ir Lenkija XX amžiaus geopolitinėje vaizduotėje” (Pukšto & Milerytė 2012), or a recent master’s thesis by Simonas Teškevičius “Models of Polishness among Lithuanian Polish minority” from 2016.
3.2.1.1. Representation

As discussed in 1.4.2.1, when one ethnic group having one language is seen as the normal state of things that is considered the **ethnic** representation. The dominant belief concerning **representation** is **ethnic** (51% of the entire sample).

(58) Lietuvių kalba yra tautos ir valstybės pagrindas, kad ir ką visoki iškrypėliai besakyti. [The Lithuanian language is the basis of the nations and the state, no matter what various perverts might say]

**Ethnic representation** is often activated by discussions about the language and the **state**, where the **state language** is not seen as limited to the **state apparatus**, but it encompasses the totality of the state and everything within it (see 2.1.4). This is especially visible in the discussions on the status of Polish as a minority language.

(59) Nu cia dabar... Kas per lengvatos ir dvikalbiai uzrasai. Tai gal Airijos” Anglijos ir Norvegijos paprasom kad jie rasytu zurasus ir lietuviskai tiems lietuviams kurie nesupranta anglu/norvegu kalbos? kas cia per issidirbinejimas jei gyveni Lietuvoj tai buk malonus ir ismok lietuvi kalba jei nenori ar neopatinka vaziukin savo sali ir gyvenk. Kokie cia dar reikalavimai keisti Konstitucija ir esama sistema? Lietuv per maza salis kad galetu leisti daryti savo kalba. [What’s this... What kind of exemptions and bilingual inscriptions. So, are Irish, English and Norwegian asked to write inscriptions in Lithuanian for those who do not understand English/Norwegian language? What kind of hoax is this if you live in Lithuania be so kind and learn Lithuanian if you don’t want to and [you don’t] like it go to your country and live there? What kind of requirements to change the constitution and the current system? Lithuania is too small a country to allow itself to spoil its language.] (COM-LT-15)

The comment above is about a news of the possible introduction of bilingual (Lithuanian and Polish) signs for municipalities. Even though it is only public signs, language is considered to be an integral part of the state and its public space, not just the ethnic group that speaks it (but based on the dominant **ethnic** group’s language nonetheless).

The same discursive presupposition about the ‘natural state’ of language can be identified in the discourse by looking at the words that describe linguistic phenomena. Some words, forms or letters are “more Lithuanian” than others, as exemplified below.

(60) (...) mandras tai pats esi neišpasakytai - kokia čia kalba parašei žodį “radio”? Lietuviška šio žodžio forma tai per prasta? [(...) do you consider yourself so incredibly cool – what language did you write the word “radio” in? The Lithuanian form\(^{34}\) of the word is not good enough for you?] (COM-LT-15)

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\(^{34}\) Lithuanian standard form for radio is radijas.
The presupposition is that ‘everything concerning language in Lithuania should be only Lithuanian’ encompasses even peripheral linguistic phenomena such as punctuation or the spelling of a foreign word, labelled “not Lithuanian enough” in the example above. These utterances pre-suppose that the ‘normal’ state of things is when words, spellings, punctuation and all other linguistic phenomena are ‘Lithuanian’.

**Ethnic** representation is invoked by topics such as *globalisation, Lithuanian sovereignty, emigration* and (to a certain degree) *Soviet nostalgia*. As I will show, the common ideological basis of the discourse is the ideal of the homogenous nation-state: the ideal state in which one ethnic group dominates in one state, which uses one language. All perceived disturbances of this condition are seen as a problem. For example, its consequence globalism is seen as language death.

The other topic I have called *Lithuanian sovereignty*. The demands for non-Lithuanian languages to be more visible or officially recognized (mostly Polish) is perceived as an *attack on the Lithuanian language and, consequently, the sovereignty of Lithuania* by many commentators. The commentator below is reacting to an article by linguist, who stated the Lithuanian government should allow the use of Polish letters in personal documents.

In many other comments, local Polish population are even seen as ‘bad Lithuanians’, who became Polish by denying their Lithuanian roots. This re-establishes the idea of one-nation-one-language as the original and ideal state of things.
nia has many illiterate serfs, who always find reasons to suck up to someone, not to be themselves, that’s why – half of Lithuania 200-100 y. ago became more like Tutejszy and converted to “bilinguals” becoming “plain language”-talking pseudo-Poles.]

This idea that someone who was “originally Lithuanian” became a Pole or a “Tutejszy” by adopting a different language reflects a primordial view of nationality. The language of these ‘convertees’ is seen as “plain”, and their ethnicity as “pseudo”, which suggests that their “original” language was Lithuanian and ethnicity Lithuanian. Also – though I cannot claim for sure – the ethnonym Tutejszy in this comment could have been intentionally chosen, as the language of this group is sometimes perceived as a mixture of Baltic and Slavic languages of the area. Therefore, this choice could point to the idea that only ‘pure’ language are ‘real’ languages, while others are perceived as ‘mixtures’.

As an answer to the dangers of globalisation, Westernization and “too much minority rights”, the Soviet Union is seen as a “golden age” by many commentators; a period where the one-nation-one-ideal existed, and Lithuanian language was protected from foreign influences.

(65) Sovietai pasirodo puoseleja ta lietuviu kalba. Patys lietuviai net savo kalba susinai-kina [It seems that the Soviets took care of Lithuanian language. Lithuanians themselves are destroying even their own language] (COM-LT-18)

Ex. 66 below is a typical example of Soviet nostalgia – the past is presented as better than the present and values connected to the Soviet Union, such as orderliness (and hard work in ex. 67) are stressed:

(66) O kas bus rytoj? Prisimenu, kai mano vaikui buvo penki metukai, išmokiau skie-menimis skaityti. Einame po miestą, bando perskaityti iškabas, tačiau nepavyksta, nepažįstamų raidžių pilna: Q; W; X. Staiga vaiko akys nušvinta “parodo pirštu į geltoną iškabą ir labai gražiai perskaito: cA-mE-liA. Man tik širdį suspaudė prisimi-nių tarybinius laikus kai būdavo viskas didelėmis aiškiai lietuviškai parašyta o mažytėmis raidėmis - rusiškai. Aš paglošciau jam galvą ir pasakiau: šaunuo-lis. Ką tai reiškia “”cA-mE-liA””-? Atsakau - nieko nereiškia ! [And what awaits tomorrow? I remember, my child was five years old, just learned to read in syllables. We walk through the city, he tries to read signs, but it’s not working, it’s full of unknown letters: Q; W; X. Suddenly the child’s eyes lit up” (s)he points to a yellow sign with his finger and beautifully reads: cA-mE-liA. My heart clenched I remembered the Soviet times when everything was clearly written in Lithuanian in big letters and in smaller ones – in Russian. I pet his head and told him: well done. What does it mean “cA-mE-liA”? I answered - nothing !] (COM-LT-11)

35 Tutejszy (lt. Tuteišiai) are an ethnic group in many parts of the Baltic countries as well as Belarus and Poland.
“Camelia”, used in the example above is a name of a drugstore chain in Lithuania, which the commentator considers to be non-Lithuanian. In this example, due to the strong pathos expressed by the author, it could be so that the nostalgia is an idealization of one’s own past.

Topics of Soviet nostalgia can also take a different tone, akin to conspiracy theories. “Western values”, are contrasted to and “Soviet values”, such as “hard work”, are good. The commentator in the comment bellow is reacting to an article about decreasing literacy amongst schoolchildren, explaining it through a “value shift”:

(67) nuo 1998 m vykdoma reforma, kri vis nesibaigia, einame lik vakaru sistemos, kur zmonies jau dabar buki, nes kuriami balti negrai, t.y vergai. Lietuva link to eina dydliais zingsniais, nes turbut toks nurodymas is Bruselio. Sovietine sistema vertė mokytis, o dabartine kalbėti apie teises (…) [The reforms started in 1998 and is still unfinished, it leads us to the Western system, where people are already blunt, because they are creating white negros, i.e. slaves. Lithuania is taking huge steps in that direction, because this is probably Brussel’s orders. The soviet system forced [us] to learn, and the current one just talks about rights (…)] (COM-LT-10)

On the other hand, I have found very few comments that would talk about the Russification tendencies during Soviet times as an attack on the one-nation-one-language ideal. This could be explained in two ways: either the commentators belong to the generation to whom English language is more foreign than Russian in the public space; or, as the commentators they have limited space and semiotic resources in the comment section, do not wish to state the “obvious fact” – that there was a project of Russification (known to all Lithuanians), but try to grab attention by pointing out the paradox that Lithuanian language was more protected under the Soviets than in the era of globalisation.

The third topic that provokes the ethnic notion of representation is emigration. The comment below is a criticism of a sociolinguist’s article where they state that the Lithuanian language norm is too strict, and the language policy is too repressive (Exp-LT-32). The commentator does not accept this as legitimate opinion for a Lithuanian linguist. Normally they are expected to act as “protectors” of language and its correctness and purity (cf. Tamaševičius 2016). Therefore, the commentator explains her view with a conspiracy theory in which the goal of this particular linguist to destroy the one-language-one-nation ideal by promoting emigration, globalization and ‘bad Lithuanian’:

(68) [kalbininkas] yra iš tos pačios grupės veikėjų, kurie šamoningai stengiasi išmontuoti Lietuvą: vieni diegia Lietuvos istorijos supratimą pagal Lenkijos šovinistų koncepcijas, kiti darbuojasi lyčių keitimo ir (ne)suvokimo klausimais, kiti propaguoja “globalios Lietuvos” ir emigracijos “galimybes”, o šita lituanistė natūraliai įsilieja į šį būrį propaguodama lietuvių kalbos nemokėjimą, degradavimą... Nenormalu, kad ji iki šiol nepašalinta iš darbų susijusių su lietuvių kalba... [the linguist] is from the same group of agents, that are consciously trying to dismantle Lithuania: some are
installing an understanding of Lithuanian history according to Polish chauvinist ideas, others work with sex change and (mis)understanding [of sex], others promote “a global Lithuania” and “opportunities” of emigration, while this linguist naturally falls into this group by promoting incorrect Lithuanian and degradation language... It’s not normal that she still hasn’t been fired from works connected to Lithuanian language... [COM-LT -16]

An alternative understanding of representation is geographical, found in only three (1.6%) instances. It comes most often as a criticism of the standard language's dominance and suggests to actively use them (communicative function). This is different from the usual discourse of academic experts in which dialects are seen either as a “treasure”, without any real use value (cf. ex. 5, also Vaicekauskienė & Keturkienė 2016), or openly discouraged (cf. ex. 7).

(69) Blogiausia yra tai, kad netgi tarmės (oficialiai visų mylimos ir saugomos, o realiai paliekamos išnykčia) taip pat laikomos didžiosiomis klaidomis (!), kad palaikomi nesąmoningi stereotipai (esą tarmiškai kalbantis - kaimietis, kvailas, neišsilavinęs ir pan.). Apkakalba, jeigu norime turėti tarmes, leiskime ir jas realiai vartoti. Čia labai stipria perlenkiama lazda. tik viena kalba yra geriausia, o visa kita, kas tik kažkiek neatitinka normos, yra laikoma kalbos bjaurastimi. Liūdna tiesa...

(70) Palikit lietuvių kalbą ramybėje. Jei žmonėms jos nereikia jokiais tyrimais ir veiksmais jos neišsaugosite ir savo nereikalingų lietuvščikių darbo vietas teks pakeisti į normą -lius darbus fermose ar kur ir ką ten dar mokėsit dirbti. Geras pavyzdys yra Airija - kad ir kiek visokio plauko apsimetėliai bando dėti pastangų atgaivinti mirusią keltų kalbą jos niekam nebereikia. Airija tik dėl to ir tapo civilizuota bei klestintčia valstybė kad puikiai (nors istoriškai labai komplikuotai) integravosi į savo buvusių okupantų eko-
nomine żoną. Kam būtų reikalinga Airija jei ten visi kalbėtų tik keltiškai? [Leave Lithuanian language alone. If people don’t need it, you will not be able save it with your research and actions, you will have to change your useless Lithuanian philologist work to a normal work at a farm or wherever you will be capable of working. A good example is Ireland – no matter how much all kinds of impostors make efforts to revive the dead Celtic language, no one needs it. That’s how Ireland became a civilized and developing state, because it perfectly (though historically very complicated) integrated in to the economic zone of their previous occupants. Who would need Ireland if everyone there would speak just Celtic?] (COM-LT-22)

3.2.1.2. Expertise

The external expertise is usually expressed through the attitudes that a ‘good speaker’ is able to follow expert-defined rules of writing and speaking. It is the dominant belief connected to expertise (77.2% of all). In a few comments the idea that speaking and writing need to follow strict rules is expressed overtly:

(71) Kiekvienas save gerbiantis pilietis, juo labiau planuojantis studijuoti aukštojoj mokykloj, pirmiausia turi mokėti taisyklingai lietuviškai ir rašyt, ir kalbėt, nebent studijuos Prancūzijoj, Anglijoj, Japonijoj ar kt. [Every self-respecting citizen, not to mention those planning to study at a higher education institution, has first to learn to write and speak correct Lithuanian, unless he/she goes to study in France, England, Japan or other places.] (COM-LT-26)

But, as discussed before, a dominant attitude usually does not need to be expressed openly. Another way of expressing ideas connected to external expertise is by pointing out ‘bad language’, ‘language decline’ amongst mother-tongue users (including other commentators). Corrective practices copied from the schooling system are used by commentators to point of the other commentators’ lack of expertise. Although these comments are mostly interpersonal insults, language is understood as a system of rules that one has to acquire through learning, rather than a cognitive system. The comment below points out a commonly used word “dabaigs” [to finish], considered incorrect by linguistic authorities, because of presumably Slavic nature of the prefix da- (norm-setters allow only variants of Baltic-origin pa- or už-), as well as the use of “incorrect” orthography, because the original comment was written without any diacritical signs.

(72) kas per lietuviškas žodis “dabaigs”? Dar norėčiau paklausti patrioto, kodėl ne lietuviškas raidynas? [What kind of Lithuanian word is this “dabaigs”? I would also like to ask the patriot, why are you not using Lithuanian letters?] (COM-LT-1)

The most frequently pointed out mistakes are the ones in orthography. Unlike linguists, commentators, as lay language users, generally assume orthography to be
an essential part of language which is also found in other research of metalinguistic discourses (see 1.4.2.2.). In ex. 72, apart from external expertise, we also see that “correct” orthography is defined as “Lithuanian” (ethnic representation).

Also, comments written in SMS-style language and similar non-standard spelling forms tend to activate notions of external expertise, as non-school-like spelling is interpreted as a sign of low language competence. The commentator below sees SMS-spelling (commenting on the typical features such as the use of zh, sh and ch for ź, š and č) as a ‘speech impediment’.

(73) Perskaitau komentarus, o dar diskutuojač tokia tema, ir plaukai piestu stojas - nei “š”, nei “ž” nei nosinių ten, kur jos turi būti. Patys išugdėm “sveplių” kartą. Ar jums nėgėda, “svepliai”, šitaip niekinti savo bočių kalbą? Iš kur ištraukėt tokius žodžius: “priesh”, “ash”, “pripazhinti”, “the”, “ira” ir t.t.? Abejoju, kad Tamsta esat lietuvis [I read the comments, and even in such a discussion, I get goose bumps - neither “š” nor “ž”, nor ogoneks there, where they should be. We have cultivated a generation of “lispers”. Are you not ashamed, “lispers”, to spit upon the language of your ancestors? And there did you pull out words such as “priesh”, “ash”, “pripazhinti”, “the”, “ira” and so on? I doubt that you, sir, are a Lithuanian.] (COM-LT-10)

The last two sentences in ex. 73 that invoke “the ancestors’ language” are examples of ethnic representation. Regard for external rules of language is seen as both linguistic expertise and national identity. As mentioned, this combination of beliefs will be referred to as the monoglot notion of language. It was noticed in 9% of all the comments.

In the same topic, internal expertise is expressed through a direct disobedience of normative rules prescribed in schools:

(74) Einai velniop tie visi kalbininkai ir knygines ziuokes! Klaidu jiems, mat per daug! O kad kalba yra tokia klaikiai sunki, kad ne kiekvienam aplamai ikandama - niekam nedasunta?? Kas yra kalba? Tai priemone informacijai perduoti zodziu arba rastu. Ir jinai visu pirma, turi buti PATOGI, lengva ir suprantama. Jej kalba yra grizdiska, apipinta bele kiek nesuprantamu sunkiausiu taisykliu - tai velniop tokia kalba! Ja reikia tobulinti, keisti, lengvinti, o nereikalauti, kad visi ja butu isszubrine nuo a iki z! Kalba tarnauja zmonems, o ne zmones kalbai! :@ [To hell with those linguists and bookworms! Too many errors they say. And nobody can get that the language is so difficult, that no one in general can grasp it?? What is language? It is a tool to transfer information in speech or writing. And it first of all has to be COMFORT-
ABLE, easy and understandable. If the language is cumbersome, stuffed with so many incomprehensible hardest rules – to hell with such language! It needs to be improved, changed, facilitated, and not to insist that everyone should swallow it from a to z. Language serves the people, not vice versa! :@] (COM-LT-10)

The commentator inverts the common way of thinking about grammar and orthographic rules, by using the phrase “language serves the people, not vice versa” (found in almost the exact same form in a couple more comments). Also, he or she uses simplified orthography (no ogonek, caron or other diacritical signs), misspells some words (jej instead of jei) and using ‘incorrect’ lexis, such as aplamai (in general), which teachers and norm-setters would correct to apskritai. The commentator also uses the “angry face” at the end of the comment (:@).

Ex. 75 below represents how internal expertise is expressed through semantic resources – creative spelling (use of the same above-mentioned digital orthography, intentional misspellings), stylistics and intertextuality. He opens with a quote – a normative rule that the form “rašosi” is incorrect (norm-setters offer “rašoma” [written]), using normative orthography, then starts commenting using his own orthography.

(75) “Sąvokos “rašosi” nėra” Gal kalbajobai lituanistai galetu apsiriboti kalba, o ne už Hindu filosofija, ir aishkinimu koks yra gyvenimas. TOTALUS BUKUMAS IR AT-SILIKIMAS. 17 amžius. O jús norite kad lietuvių kalba išliktu Savaime RASHOSI. And you want the Lithuanian language to survive Of course RASHOSI is correct, if the act separated from the subject. The word “rashomas” mean a focus on both the subject and object, and with “rashosi” only the object. The word is written [rashomas] in different ways but is always written [rashosi] as it should be. Wrods can are written [rashomas] and misspelled, ber are written [rashosi] without errors. because the word feature rather than the writer (...)]. (COM-LT-8, emphasis by me, caps in original)

The commentator presents arguments against the norm setters to claim that both forms of “written” – rašomas and rašosi (the norm setters accept only the latter) are

37 The commentator uses the reflexive form of the verb “to write” (lt. rašosi), which is considered incorrect, instead of the “correct” passive participle of the same verb (lt. rašoma). There is no way of correctly translating these words, as both mean “is written as”, “should be written” or “to be written as”. I have translated them differently to English, just to point out that he is using two different forms – these are semiotic tools in the hands of the commentator, as they (especially the incorrect one) attract attention.
correct in different contexts. But despite the content, the commentator chooses to use digital orthography, intentionally misspells words such as “word” and “but” (emphasized in the example) to show that even that does not disrupt communication. Linguists are referred to as “kalbajobai” (“language-fuckers” or “language-idiots”). The word “kalbajobai” is not originally created by the commentator; it was made popular in a TV sketch-show that parodies norm-setters and language purifiers that see “incorrect” and “unlithuanian” language everywhere. This reference to a TV show character creates an interdiscursive (or ‘abstract’ form of an intertextual) link: content from another text is not copied directly, but the connection to another text is created by invoking a certain “person, document or statement” (2003: 88-89). One of the many characters of the show are two male actors dressed as older female linguists. They are called “kalbajobai”; they invent new Lithuanian words to replace the English ones, they forbid use of certain words they do not like (usually creating ridiculous neologisms), correct one another’s language endlessly etc. They are one of the most popular parodies of Lithuanian linguists and represent a parody of prescriptivist and purist attitudes. The content, the intertextual link and the use of creative orthography can be interpreted as an expression of the idea that one does not need ‘language rules’ or ‘linguists’ (which are associated with external expertise) to communicate, but rather a language one himself creates (internal expertise).

We can also see that this is a clear answer to the ideology of ‘correct language’ presented in ex. 74 and 75; the commentator does everything he can to annoy those who make it their job to correct others language. It can be said that these two discourses are in dialogue. Ex. 74-75 borrow from the voice of the teacher or an old, educated person, who is explaining the importance of correct language to the younger generation, and ex. 75 uses the voice of a rebellious youngster, denying the authority of the teacher-like voice of the other commentators (exemplified in ex. 73). The dialogue between the commentators can be interpreted as ‘classroom discourse’. The roles are clearly divided: on the one hand there are the ‘good’ students, pointing out abnormalities in other people’s language and a teacher who are stressing the importance of correct language (external expertise). On the other hand, there is the voice of the ‘bad students’ whose free use of forms and letters can be interpreted as the expression of the idea that language is the property of those who create it (internal expertise).

Another theme that invokes the notions of external and internal expertise is nostalgia. Nostalgia is natural for all human beings. The past cannot be changed, it is certain and therefore comprehensible and comforting, while the future is unclear, potentially dangerous. The same is with language – future might bring changes or even death to language, which is why the past seems stable and comforting. This is expressed in many comments that their own childhood better than their children’s.

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38 The word also sounds like “dalbajobas”, a derogative slang term of Russian origin, used similarly to “idiot” in English.
childhood. The commentator below sees both language and the school system of this own youth as better than his child’s:

(76) Mano vaikas pirmokas. Rasyt mokykloj nereik. kryziukai-nuliukai. Mas savo laiku viska raseme. Ranka. ir uzduotis, ir atsakymus. Zinoma, susirasinejimas telefonais nepadejo – pripratom be lietuvisku raidziu. Todel turbt neverta stebetis kai baige univerka nemoka laisko parasyti taisyklingai. ATSIPRASAU IS ANKSTO - ZINU- TE IS TELEFONO. [My kid is in the first class. They do not write at school. Tic tac toe. In our times, we wrote things. With our hand. Both question and answers. Of course, communication through mobile phones changed it – we got used to writing without Lithuanian letters. That is why it is probably not surprising when [they] cannot write an email correctly after finished university. SORRY IN ADVANCE - MESSAGE FROM TELEPHONE.] (COM-LT-10)

The commentator himself is not upholding the norms of ‘correct language’ that he idealizes in the comment but excuses himself for it in the end.

Furthermore, nostalgia that activated ethnic representation, also activates external expertise, by presenting the youth of the author (usually in the Soviet Union) as the time where language rules were respected, people were more literate etc.

(77) Kaip nebūtų graudu, taciau raštingiausią dabartinę kartą sudaro tie, kurie baigė vidurinės tarybiniais laikais. [No matter how sad it is, the most literate generation are those who finished high school in the Soviet times.] (COM-LT-15)

(78) Ankčiau Dobrovolskio ar Kuzavinienės-Kadžytės vadovėliai buvo puikūs, išmokdavo puikiai visi rašyti, net sovietų sistema nesugebėjo sustabdyti raštingumo. O dabar patys nusiseiliname. (...) ko daugiau norėti – chaosas, sumišęs su bizniu... [Before, textbooks by Dobrovolskis or Kuzavinienė-Kadžytė were excellent, everyone learned how to write perfectly, not even the Soviet system managed to stop literacy. And we have disqualified ourselves. (...) What more do you want – chaos, mixed up with business...] (COM-LT-31)

There is another aspect of the nostalgia that surfaces in the comments suggests political connotations: a contrast is created in the discourse between the “profit-oriented capitalist system” and the “education-oriented socialist system”. The mention of “business” in ex. 78 could point to the dissatisfaction privatization of publishing houses that issue school textbooks, and the mentioning of the textbook from Soviet times could point to the idea that there was more quality control when the government was strictly regulating the textbook production (ex. 78 and 79).

(79) leidyklu biznis: daug prie beraščių kalbos prisidėjo leidyklu nežmoniškas pelno siekimas. [textbook business: the inhumane profit-seeking of the publishers greatly contributed to [the rise of] the illiterate language.] (COM-LT-10)

A number of comments gives this subtle hint, so it cannot say for sure that this is “Soviet nostalgia” at work, but – since the idea that the Lithuanian language-
teaching methods in Soviet times was expressed in expert discourse (Exp-LT-15), it could be that the commentators criticising the publishing houses are – or used to be – Lithuanian language teachers, that experienced the change first hand. Either way, their criticism of “raising illiteracy” shows external expertise, because language is seen as something to be put into people’s heads, rather than come from them.

3.2.1.3. Function

The aspect of function rarely occurs alone, it is usually accompanied by the aspect of representation or expertise. It is also the least frequent in the sample (18%). The most dominant function was the cultural-identificational (71.4%), then the communicative (25%), and lastly instrumentalist (4.7%).

The identificational function, combined with external expertise gives an understanding of standard language as a ‘face’, in the sociological meaning of the word. Language shows one’s social status.

(80) Daugelis nė nesusimąsto apie tai, kad padoriai išmokta lietuvių kalba gyvenime juos reprezentuos kur kas geriau, nei idijotškos asmenukės snukiakygėje ar demonstruojama “išmintis” komentaruose. Jei, pavyzdžiui, koks nors “išminčius” žodį “pažįstamas” rašo su “y”, ko apskritai gali būti vertas toks “išminčius”? [Many do not even think about the fact that decently learned Lithuanian language will represent them in a way much better than the idiotic selfies on Facebook or demonstrating “wisdom” in comments. If, for example, some “clever-head” writes the word “pažįstamas” with an “y”, what is it worth having such kind of a “clever-head”?] (COM-LT-22)

First, a clearly hierarchical positioning of imagined language varieties (correct language: high value VS ‘mistakes’ and Facebook-language: low value) expresses the belief that your language shows your “level”, or the (hierarchical) social identification function. Second, a spelling error of the word “acquaintance” (pažystamas instead of pažįstamas) is used as to discredit expertise in Lithuanian language. This combination of the two beliefs (normativist notion of language) is found in 4 (1.1%) comments.

The identificational function, combined with ethnic representation, produces an understanding of the main function of language as a tool of expressing national identity:

(81) (...) kalba yra svarbiausias dalykas mūsų išlikimui ir identitetui. Tauta gali būti pasvergta, ištremta – bet jei išsaugo savo kalbą atgimsta kaip valstybė. Atsipeikėkite pats, jei nesuprantate kalbos svarbos. [Language is the most important thing to our survival and identity. A nation can be enslaved, exiled – but if it preserves its language, it will revive as a nation state. Come to your senses yourself, if you do not understand the importance of language] (COM-LT-13)

39 [Acquaintance]
Allowing foreign elements into the language can be seen as “disrespecting the national language”, even if such an element is just the way names and place-names are written. This notion will be called ethno-linguistic (7.4% of the sample). The commentators in ex. 81 and 82 see that language must be “used and respected”, and the basis for that respect is ethnic. Language has, thus, not just the function of communication, but also a marker of how patriotic one is.

(82) Latvijoje yra griežtai nustatyta rašyba vardų ir pavardžių, ko Lietuvoje dar nėra vie- ni rašo angliskai su lietviška galūnę,kitom kalbom vėl prilipdydami galūnę arba neprilipdydami iš vis.Tai mieli lietuvių kalbos profesoriai,žinokit,kad tokių nesamo- nių mūsų braliukai latviai neturi ir gerbia savo gimtąją kalbą kaip niekas kitas.Ne- kalbant jau apie visokios vietovardžių vertinius,neatitinkančius etninės prigimties. [In Latvia, writing of names and last names is strictly regimented, something Lithuan- nia does not have yet some people write in English with Lithuanian endings or in other languages again adding endings or not adding them at all. So dear Lithuanian language professors [ref made to academia], know that our brothers Latvians do not have such nonsense and respect their mother tongue as no other. Not to mention all kinds of place name loan-translations, [that] do not fit [their Lithuanian] ethnic origin.] (COM-LT-11)

Some comment contained beliefs about all three aspects of language: ethnic repre- sentation, external expertise and two functions national identification and hierarch- ical social identification. This will be called the national-elitist notion of language (found in 2.5% of the sample).

(83) Esperanto neprigijo ir neprigis, nors sumanymas buvo gražus. Galvojau ir sugalvo- jau- kodėl? Todėl kad, pasikartosiu, kalba yra (tautos) dvasios produktas, o Esperan- to yra dirbtina kalba ir neturi tautos. Yra ir atvirkščias ryšys: mokymiesi svetimos kalbos imame suprasti tos tautos dvasią, mąstymo būdą, prioritetus, kilmė ir pan. dalykus. Lygiai taip pat iš kalbos galime spręsti apie žmogaus “lygį” (pvz. “liudo- jedka Eločka”). Paprastas kalbas turi primitivyos gentys, ar norėtume eiti ta linkme? [Esperanto never caught on and never will, even though the idea was nice. I specu- lated why and the idea came up. Because, I say, language is a product of the (na- tion’s) spirit, whereas Esperanto is an artificial language and does not have a nation. There also exists the opposite connection: by learning a foreign language, we start to understand that nations spirit, way of thinking, priorities, origin and similar. The same way, we can determine a person’s “cultivation” from language (f. ex liudo- jedka Eločka). Primitive tribes have simple languages, do we want to follow that direction?] (COM-LT-12)

First, the function of language is “to determine a person’s level from language” (hierarchical social identification) function and external expertise) is illustrated with an example – liudojedka Eločka. This is a character from a classical novel “12 chairs” (by Ilf and Petrov), popular in the Soviet and post-Soviet countries.
The character is stylized through language – she only speaks a handful of words. Adding the *ethnic* element to that, this example shows how all three aspects of language combined give what Moschonas calls “*Relativism’s transformation*” (2004: 174), referring to the common simplification of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis: the idea that your language directly reflects who you are.

This cluster of beliefs will be called the *national-elitist* notion of language, because of the national and “high” imperative put in the understanding of both the essence and the function of language. It was found in 2.5% of the sample (9 comments).

On the other hand, another cluster of beliefs was found in 4 comments – as an opposition to the monoglot notion described above – *internal expertise* and *communicative* function (*pragmatic* notion of language). Unlike in the discourse described above, language change is seen as natural, the symbolic value of language is rejected:

(84) visiskai pritariu nuomonei, kad kalba yra tik komunikavimo priemone. ji visa laika keitesi, keiciasi, ir keisis, kad ir kaip visokio plauko kalbininkai to nenoretu. Ir pati kalba nera vertyle. Visiskai tam pritariu. Tai tik dar viena proga visokio plauko klerkams ir knyginems ziuurkytms prisidengus kalbininkija pamelzti is musu kiseneliu atliekamu litu! [I totally support the opinion that language is ONLY a means of communication. it has always changed, it changes and will change, no matter how much all kinds of linguists don’t want [it to change]. Language itself is not a value. I totally agree with that. It’s just another opportunity, disguised as linguistics, for the bureaucrats and bookworms to milk more money from our pockets!] (COM-LT-10)

Also, the belief that “one nation should have one language” is rejected.

(85) Siulyciau autoriui nuvaziuoti i Svedija ar olandija, kur beveik kiekvienas laisvai kalba angliškai. Vietines kalbos nuo to visai nenyksta, o zmonems gyventi lengva. Velgi, jei kazkas mokosi dvi kalbas nuo vaikystes, jis abiem snekes visai laisvai. nemanau, kad nuo to lietuviu kalba nukentes. [I would suggest to the author to go to Sweden or Holland, where literally everyone speaks fluent English. The local languages are not dying because of that and it makes peoples’ lives easier. Again, if someone learns two languages from the childhood, he will speak them fluently. I do not think that Lithuanian will suffer because of that.] (COM-LT-3)

3.2.2. NORWAY

The main topics of the discussion forums are Norwegian dialects, spelling issues, language change (especially phonological changes) and the status of Nynorsk.

For Norwegians, dialects are a common subject both on TV and daily life. While initially gathering data, I have found many ideology-free discussions about dialects: threads with links to dialect-study material, discussions about the ‘most difficult phrases in your dialect’ and similar. I have included only those threads that problematize
on the subject of dialect, thus provoking an ideological debate. Dialect comes up as a subject in most other debates that I have analysed, too (in 15 out of 22 threads, dialect was either the main topic or came up as a sub-topic).

Language change is a subject that comes up now and then in Norway, as one very visible language change is currently taking place. The palatal fricative /ç/ (in writing marked as ‘kj’ or ‘k’, when followed by frontal vowels ‘i’ and ‘y’) being replaced with the palato-alveolar fricative /ʃ/ (in writing marked as ‘skj / sj’ as well as ‘sk’ when followed by frontal vowels ‘i’ and ‘y’) in many parts of Norway, especially amongst younger generations (Torp 1999). This causes uproar amongst parents, some of who insist that linguists do something to prevent the change, while linguists mostly take the stance that this change is only natural and nothing can be done about it (cf. Exp-No-32). Another, more recent change is the spread of the “Frederikstad L” sound in Oslo amongst young people. Frederikstad is a place south-East of Oslo, famous for having the only low-status dialect in Norway; the apical /ɭ/, typical of the dialect in this city is being used to an increasing degree in Oslo instead of the laminal /l/, traditionally considered to be a part of the Oslo dialect (Svendsen 2012). Seven threads are about these topics.

Nynorsk is a big subject in Norway, as schoolchildren learn both forms of written language, one as primary and the other as secondary. While pupils that have Bokmål as a primary language rarely learn Nynorsk well, the pupils that have Nynorsk as the primary language (12.2% in 2016) learn both written forms and develop a “bidialectal literacy” (Vangsnes, Söderlund & Blekesaune 2017). Nynorsk is considered unnecessary by many as a secondary language, as very few Bokmål users master it during school. Discussions for-and-against secondary Nynorsk quickly turn into ideological debates. 7 threads of the sample are about the status of Nynorsk.

Finally, pointing out language “errors” in speech and writing is a frequent topic. Unlike Lithuania and Serbia, Norwegian commentators do not only discuss Norwegian language, but also excessively point out errors people make in foreign languages and make fun of Norwegianized pronunciations of foreign-language proper nouns.

### 3.2.2.1. Representation

**Representation** was found in only 53 of the 306 comments in the sample (17.2%). The majority of those 53 are ethnic (36 comments) and geographical (15 comments). They are activated through discussions about the influence of English, about Norwegian dialects and nynorsk. All provoke the commentators to express beliefs about representation, as they discuss what is “Norwegian” and what is not.

When English is the subject, dialects and the two written forms of Norwegian are erased from the picture and Norwegian language is presented as ‘one’, fitting into the one-nation-one-language ideal. Too much English is seen as a threat to Norwegian identity.
At norske ord får ny betydning eller stavemåte, kan jeg fint godta er språkutvikling. Men når vanlige norske ord blir erstattet med engelske, kalle jeg det utvanning. [I can easily accept that Norwegian words get a new meaning or spellings as development of language. But when ordinary Norwegian words are replaced with English ones, that I call dilution.] (COM-NO-13)

The word “dilution” points to the cognitive metaphor language is a substance, something that can be concentrated or diluted by influence of other substances / languages.

Another common way of expressing ethnic representation is by presenting language metonymically as a force that unites a nation. For example, the commentator below experienced a public speaker that used a great amount of English words in his vocabulary and expresses worry for the national character of the language. The uses the metonymy language is a glue, also noticed in Berthele (2008):

Det norske språk er sjølve limet i kulturen vår, og det jeg opplevde i dag ga meg en vekker om at nå holder anglofiseringen på å gå for langt. Dette er noe som burde bekymre oss alle. [The Norwegian language is the very glue of our culture, and what I experienced today alarmed me that Anglicisation is going too far. This is something that should worry all of us.] (COM-NO-13)

One portion of the comments express the pro-dialect ideology, the idea that each person should speak his own dialects without mixing or using standardised speech (Røyneland 2009). Geographical representation is expressed through an old belief that those who are not using their own dialect are trying to appear ‘lordlier’:

Å lytte til folk som er rotfest i dialekta si og som ikkje prøver å knote, dét er vakkert, det. Rein musikk. [To listen to people who are rooted in their dialect and do not try to speak unnaturally, it is beautiful. Pure music.] (COM-NO-4)

Det er ilt å høyra bygdefolk når dei har vore ute ei stund, kor dei gjer seg til kar! Kor dei pyntar på språket sitt og vil verka fine og dana. Kor mykje meir hugnadsamt er det ikkje å høyra ein som snakkar dialekten sin trygt og truverdig. [It is awful to listen to village people after they have been out for a while, how they make themselves into lords! How they decorate their language and want to appear fine and cultivated. How much lovelier is it not to listen to one that speaks his dialect confidently and authentically.] (COM-NO-10)

This type of talk comes from the times when the elite of the country was Danish, and to turn your language into a more city-like speech was considered being servile to the authority. The typical name for this kind of behaviour is knot, and is connected to denaturalisation, meaning that one is hiding or denying one’s origins (Sol- lid 2014). When both standard language ideology and pro-dialect ideology appear in the discourse, it is the latter one that ‘wins’. As an example, in an exchange, one commentator made fun of those who do not write in standard language, but when he
got an angry answer (ex. 90), the commentator apologized, employing the notion of knot (ex. 91), concluding that more people should write in dialect.

(90) vell no har eg nå utdannelse og er i fast jobb, og om du virkelig meine at dei som snakke/skrive dialekt kje har god not utdannelse eller er idiota så tar du kraftigt feil. [well, I finished my education and am now employed, and if you really think that those that talk/write in dialect do not have good education or are idiots, you are extremely wrong.] (COM-NO-13)

(91) Harselerte litt. Sorry. (...) jeg synes det er flott at du skriver dialekt. Flere burde gjøre det. Vi er dessverre blitt en nasjon av knotere. [i was mocking [you] a bit. Sorry. (...) I think it’s nice that you write in dialect. More should do so. We have unfortunately become a nation of knoters.] (COM-NO-13)

In Norway, ‘dialects’ work as means of legitimization of new linguistic phenomena, meaning that if some now linguistic form or variety can be described as “dialectal”, it is no longer seen as dangerous, but positive, which was the case of Oslo multiethnolects, that were labelled as ‘urban dialects’ (cf. Ims 2014). Similarly, in a discussion about a supposedly incorrect past tense form of the verb to search (har letet instead of har lett), one commentator legitimizes the ‘incorrect form’ by saying that it belongs a dialect.

(92) Men mange sier faktisk “har letet”. Er det feil å bruke dialeksen sin bare fordi en eller annen autoritetsgjøk mener at skriftspråket vårt skal følge naziregler i en ordbok? [But many actually say “har letet”. Is it wrong to use dialect, just because some authoritative jerk thinks that our written language should follow Nazi rules from a dictionary?] (COM-NO-15)

Discussions about dialects and written forms of Norwegian often turn into battles between different notions of representation. One understanding is that Norwegian is ‘the real language’, and dialects are part of it, or whether dialects are ‘real language’, and Norwegian is a constructed / secondary / written language.

In some comments, some dialects are seen as ‘better’ than others, and the analysis reveal the criterion for this evaluation is ethnic. Some supporters of Nynorsk show this clearly in their comments. The standardized of Nynorsk, Ivar Aasen, chose the dialects that he perceived as “most pure”, meaning least influenced by Danish. Some modern-day supporters of Nynorsk have the same ideology, such as the two comments below, written by the same commentator:

(93) Dialekt vert for mykje ugras, dialektbukarane bør halda seg til nynorsk – i alle høve i annonsering og nyhendesendingar i NRK. [There is too much wild grass in dialects, dialect users should stick to Nynorsk – in any case in advertisements and news on NRK.] (COM-NO-10)

(94) Nynorsk er eit logisk framhald av mellomnorsk som utvikla seg i ein periode då dansk kom inn som skriftmål. (...) Nynorsk er først og fremst ei vidareutvikling av mellomnorsken slik han overlevde i dei dialektane som var minst påverka av dansk. [Nynorsk is a logical prolongation of the Middle Norwegian that developed in the
period when Danish was the written language. (…) Nynorsk is first of all a development of Middle Norwegian that survived in the dialects least influenced by Danish.] (COM-NO-10)

It should be mentioned that in my data, examples such as the two above were plenty, but they mostly come from a handful (about 6–7) of very active, engaged forum users who write in Nynorsk. This is probably because Nynorsk users in general are more active in language debates, as they feel as a linguistic minority vis-à-vis the majority bokmål users, who do not have to defend their already status.

3.2.2.2. Expertise

The absolutely dominant notion of expertise is external (84.77% or 206 out of 241 comments that exhibit the notion of expertise). This is partially because two of the discussions on this topic that attracted much attention. These are the two discussions taken from the news portal (aftenposten.no and vg.no), where it is obligatory to use a real name and last name (most of the commentators were posting through their FB account). But even without those two discussions, the comments on vgd.no also display a high present of external expertise, 72.58% (45 out of 62 comments).

The first topic to invoke beliefs about expertise is language change. “Errors” in spelling and speech are seen as lack of linguistic expertise, which, over a longer period of time lead to deterioration. The first culprit for this is the apparently too “tolerant” school system. Many complain (ex. 95) that the lack of corrective practices in Norwegian schools will bring about language deterioration:

(95) Og barn skal ikke rettes på i skolen når de skriver feil. Når det blir slik i noen generasjoner, er det kanskje ikke rart at lærere skriver meldinger fulle av feil til fortvilte foreldre som oppdager at læreren ikke kan norsk. [And one cannot even correct children in school when they write incorrectly. When it is like that over a few generations, it is perhaps not strange that teachers write messages full of errors to desperate parents that find out that the teacher doesn’t know Norwegian.] (COM-NO-15)

The second problematic phenomenon is language use by language-experts. Although it is generally known that Norwegian does not have any physically codified spoken norm, ‘incorrect speech’ exists as a cognitive fact, as ‘incorrectness’ is seen as a danger to the Norwegian language.

(96) Når folk med språkbruk som yrke ikke engang giddar å snakke korrekt, så kan vi vel ikke nære særlig optimisme om norsk språks framtid. [When those with language as a profession don’t even bother to speak correctly, then we really cannot keep the optimism about the future of Norwegian language.] (COM-NO-35)

40 Like in most non-expert discussions, writing, spelling and speaking are not seen as separate entities, but one whole system of “Norwegian language rules”.
This belief is inverted (to internal expertise) by those that see the language change as a natural consequence of generational shift:

(97) Ifg. min gamle norsklærer så er mekanismen veldig enkel: En generasjons babyspråk er neste generasjons rettskriving. [According to my old Norwegian teacher, the mechanism is very simple: One generations baby language is the next generations correct spelling.] (COM-NO-15)

(98) Dersom mange nok bruker former som betegnes som barnespråk, så vil det jo etter hvert være barnespråket som de facto blir hovedformen. Vil det ikke da være riktigst å akseptere denne formen? [If many use forms that are marked as child language, then child language will gradually become the de facto main form. Would it not then be best to accept this form?] (COM-NO-15)

Internal expertise was found in only 13.2% of those comments exhibiting expertise.

Another practice that reveals beliefs about expertise are corrective practices. Correcting others usually refers to a hidden ideological authority that determines how language “should be like”, rather than how it really is. One such corrective practice specific for the Norwegian online forums (not found in Lithuanian or Serbian forums) is the correction of mispronunciations of foreign words. While I was looking at other forums for potential threads on language related topics, I stumbled upon many threads are devoted exclusively to this topic. Foreign place names and names of realia such as food should, according to virtually all participants in the forum, be pronounced in the original language, while the Norwegianized pronunciation is ridiculed.

(99) I dag irriterte jeg meg over noen stedsnavn samt ord som ble uttalt på feil måte. Ibiza = Ibitsa Tenerife = Teneriff (er vel en klassikerne) Chorizo = Sjorittso Paella = Paela [Today, I was annoyed at place-names and words that are pronounced wrongly. Ibiza = Ibitsa Tenerife = Teneriff (this is surely a classic) Chorizo = Sjoritts Paella = Paela] (COM-NO-1)

(100) Lasanj er det verste jeg kan høre. Da flykter jeg ut av rommet. [Lasanj is the worst I have heard. In that case, I run away from the room.] (COM-NO-1)

The commentators simultaneously delegitimize the actual linguistic product (in the cases of ex. 99-100, the Norwegianized pronunciation), and legitimize an imaginary ‘correct’ variety, based on the ‘(pronunciation) rules of the original language’. In this case, an external expertise comes from the accumulated knowledge of foreign language. This is somewhat in contrast with the complaints about “foreign lan-
guage influence” or “language deterioration” and it can be interpreted as *value signalling* — through these complaints, the commentators show off their linguistic sophistication and knowledge of foreign languages.

On the other hand, commentators also correct “mistakes” in Norwegian. A very common topic is a vocal shift currently in progress in Norway, the change from /ç/ (marked *kj* in writing) to /ʃ/ (marked *sj* or *skj* in writing), mentioned in the introduction to 3.2.3.

(101) La oss nå slutte med å pirke på feil på språk som ikke er vårt morsmål... Det er ting som nordmenn sliter med på sitt eget språk også. Skjøtt er klassikeren. [Let’s stop pointing at mistakes in a language that is not ours... There are things Norwegians have difficulties with in their own language. Skjøtt is the classic.] (COM-NO-1)

The word “skjøtt” an example of the phonetical change described above. Instead of the correct spelling “kjøtt” (meat), “skjøtt” is used to point out that the “incorrectness” of the latter pronunciation.

The “kj-debate” is so vast, many consider it to be a speech impairment. They express the belief that professional authorities such as speech therapists should correct language:

(102) Trenden med at barn og unge ikke klarer å uttale kj-lyden er omtalt av mange. At man bytter ut kj- med sj- er ikke noe nytt. Det nye er at man ikke sender ungene til logoped for å lære og snakke rent. Er det fordi det er for dyrt? Fordi foreldrene gir beng? Eller er det ideologisk så ukorekt å si at noe er galt, og noe riktig at vi godtar alt? [The trend of children and young ones cannot manage to pronounce the kj-sound has been talk about. That one changes the kj-sound with the sj-sound. What is new is that we don’t sent our children to a speech therapist so that they would talk purely. Is it because it is too expensive? Because the parents don’t care? Or is it ideologically incorrect to say that something is wrong, and it is correct that we accept everything?] (COM-NO-9)

Just like the “mild school” in ex. 95, political correctness is seen as another cause of incorrect language, as suggested in the last sentence of ex. 102. This is also present in the discourse of non-academic experts in Norway, for example, in one article about students’ language mistakes (see Exp-NO-24), a small comic was put above the article, on which a man is drawn sitting next to a computer, typing “skjøtt / skjino / skjylling” (instead of the correct spelling “kjøtt / kino / kylling”), intended as an example of “illiteracy”. However, some academic experts see this as natural language change (cf. Exp-NO-23, Exp-NO-32), expressing belief in the autonomy of language, that language is a self-regulating object, detached from possible influence of its own speakers. One part of the commentators employs the same arguments (5%), borrowed from historical linguistics, framing language “change” as “development”.

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(103) Må igjen peika på at det ikkje dreier seg om ein talefeil, men om ei fonetisk vidadeutvikling. At denne utviklinga ikkje vert sett på med blide augo av mange, er ei anna sak. Fransk og engelsk fungerer godt med denne “talefeilen”. Vil tru det nok var dei som irriterde seg i Noreg på 1200-talet då folk byrja seja kjenna i staden for kenna. [I have to point out again that it’s not a speech impairment, but a phonetic development. It’s another story that this development is seen in a negative light by many. French and English function just fine with this “impairment”. I would think there were those in Norway in the 13th century who’d be irritated when people began to say “kjenna” instead of “kenna”.] (COM-NO-9)

The commentator above goes back an era into a time when /ç/ used to be /k/ in the middle ages, to illustrate change as unavoidable. This view of language as a changing entity is sometimes expressed by comparing language to a mass that reshapes itself through time:

(104) De glemmer at språket er som en deig, en kronisk bevegelig masse som langsomt endrer form. Dette er for eksempel hovedgrunnen til at gammelnorsken er uleselig for nordmenn flest. [They forget that language is like dough, a chronically movable mass that slowly changes form. This is, for example, the main reason Old Norwegian is unreadable for most Norwegians.] (COM-NO-13)

3.2.3.3. Function

**Function** was found in only 19.8% (61 comments) of the sample. Out of those 19.8%, the *communicative* one was the most frequent (59%). It appears in many different topics, and in combination with many other notions of expertise and representation.

Dialects are often used as an argument that a modern nation state cannot function without a single language. Some refer to the *communicative* function of language, claiming that one should be able to understand many dialects in order for all Norwegians to communicate well amongst each other.

(105) Dersom det faktisk er slik at mange nordmenn har problemer med å forstå norske dialekter, synes jeg det bør være et godt argument for at det bør slippes til mer dialek i norsk fjernsyn (og radio). Det er trist og lite heldig at man ikke skal kunne kommunisere på sin egen norske dialekt med en hvilken som helst annen nordmann. [If many Norwegians have problem understanding dialects, I think it should be an argument to put more dialects into Norwegian TV (and radio) (…) I would say it would be embarrassing not to understand a Norwegian person because of that person’s dialect.] (COM-NO-4)

But the *communicative function* it can be also used as an argument against the use of dialects, especially when combined with the *external* expertise. The com-
mentator below complains about ‘bad language’ of TV anchors. This notion will be called prescriptivist and was found in 1.9% of the whole sample (6 instances).

(106) Da er det vel ikke så urimelig å mene at de som har språket som formidlingsverktøy til en hel nasjon, pleier det og "underviser" det. [(...) it is not irrational to think that those, who have language as a means of mediation for the whole country, should take care and [of it] “teach” it.] (COM-NO-4)

The other function is called instrumentalist (19.7%), where language is seen as a tool of achieving non-communicative goals. This belief about the function on language surfaces especially in debates about nynorsk and foreign languages. Nynorsk is seen as “useless”, when contrasted to “useful” big world languages. This implies the potential economic gains one gets from learning “big” languages.

(107) Man burde forby nynorsk i media og bokutgivelser. Hva i svarte helvete skal poenget være med at vi lærer det våset på skolen. Må da være mye bedre å lære seg tysk, fransk, spansk osv. [One should forbid Nynorsk in media and books. What is the bloody point of learning that nonsense in school. Would be better to learn German, French, Spanish etc.] (COM-NO-1)

(108) Jeg har ALDRI hatt bruk for nynorsk. Det har ikke gitt meg noe fordeler i livet. Å lære nynorsk har vært bortkastet tid som jeg kunne ha brukt til å lære mer av noe annet. [I have NEVER had use for Nynorsk. It has not given me any advantages in life. To learn Nynorsk has been time, thrown away at something I could have used to learn something else.] (COM-NO-20, caps in original)

Lastly, the identificational function was found in 21.3% comments of the sample. It is much like in Lithuania, combined with external expertise it produces a normativist notion of language where one’s ‘level’ is determined through language (in 6 out of 61 of the comments expressing function, or 8.2%), the same as in the Lithuanian data.

(109) Det er slik i Samfunnet at det er satt krav til lese og skriveferdigheter, fordi det forteller noe om hvilket nivå man er på. Jeg vil forvente at min advokat er skrive og talefør, men en burgerflipper hos McDonalds ikke trenger å være helt der opp. [There are demands for writing and reading skills set by Society, because it tells us something about which level one is at. I expect my lawyer to be able to speak and write, but a burger-flipper at McDonalds does not have to be that far up.] (COM-NO-13)

and with ethnic representation, it produces an ethnolinguistic notion of language, where one’s patriotism is visible through language use (found in 6 comments in the sample, or 1%). It appears often as an answer to the instrumentalist function, stressing that language is not a tool but culture, more precisely, national (cultural) identification. In the cynical tone, the commentator in the example below criticizes those who see language as only a tool, invoking “cultural” values of language that he/she attaches to Nynorsk, dialects, literature etc.
Du klarar deg nok godt utan å lære nynorsk. Du har kan hende aldri opna ei bok av forfattarar som Ivar Aasen, Halldis Moren Vesaas, Tarjei Vesaas, Kjartan Fløgstad eller andre som skriv på nynorsk. Du synes kan hende at språkhistorie, språkkultur og dialektar er heilt uinteressante emne. Vestlendingar og andre dialekttullingar bør sjølvsvagt lære seg standard austnorsk ("bokmålsk") om du skal forstå kva dei seier. Nei, norsk kultur og språk kva er det for noko. Bra det kjem mange utlendingar til landet så vi får ein slutt på dette norske tullet. You'll manage well without learning Nynorsk. You have probably never opened a book of a writer like Ivar Aasen, Halldis Moren Vesaas, Tarjei Vesaas, Kjartan Fløgstad or others that wrote in Nynorsk. You maybe think that language history, language culture and dialects are not an interesting subject. The Westerners and the other dialect-fools should of course learn standard East Norwegian ("bokmålish") if you want to understand what they say. Norwegian culture and language, what on earth is that? Good that many foreigners are coming so that we can put an end to this Norwegian foolishness] (COM-NO-19)

3.2.3. SERBIA

The main topics in the comments were: language change and “growing illiteracy”, the language policies in neighbouring Bosnia, Croatia and Montenegro, the Serbo-Croatian language and, gender-sensitive language.

The last topic is somewhat unique to the Serbian data, as a long-running language ideological debate has been going on whether it is needed to change the correct system in which all names for professions are in the male grammatical gender. Some leading feminists, public figures as well as academics showed support for this idea, while many considered it “unnatural”. Moreover, norm-setters clearly defined the use of the male gender as the correct way of referring to professions (Filipović 2011).

3.2.3.1. Representation

Representation was found in 65.6% of the comments in the sample (214 instances). Within those, ethnic representation was dominant, found in 83.6%, and the second most followed by a belief marked as anti-ethnic (15.4%), which comes as a criticism of the ethnic representation, pointing out that the relation between an ethnic group and language is never one-to-one. The higher percentage of anti-ethnic beliefs in comparison with Lithuania and Norway can be explained by the history of statehood and the Serbo-Croatian language, that was defined as a “multi-national language”.

One topic activates debates about representation is the topics of Serbian, Croatian and Serbo-Croatian languages. This was found mostly in right-wing oriented “Večernje Novosti” and “Politika”, which attracted many comments from not only
Serbia, but also Bosnia, Croatia and Montenegro. This is clear from their self-identification, but also from their writing (use of Bosnian/Croatian/Montenegrin standard). Of course, there is a possibility that someone is misrepresenting or using writing to pretend to be from another place than they actually are, but as I am researching how the virtual sphere looks like, these comments leave a believable impression of being from places other than Serbia.

Language policy in the neighbouring countries is a frequent topic of Serbian newspapers. They are often framed as “political conflict” – the way language is planned in Bosnian, Croatian and Montenegrin politics (see 2.3.) is presented as in conflict with Serbian national interests. One such example is the situation described in 3.1.3., where the right-wing “Večernje Novosti” reported from a linguistic conference in Croatia about *Croatian Cyrillic cultural heritage*, as “theft” of the Cyrillic script from us! (Exp-SR-12). Another example is the news that Bosnian authorities started promoting the name *Bosnian* language to be used in schools (Exp-SR-75). The same newspaper presents the use of the term *Bosnian* instead of *Bosniak* as an attack on the Serbian language in Bosnia.41

The motivation to express ethnic beliefs about representation in a comment comes from what is perceived as an “unnatural state”: instead of one nation having one language, four different nations speak an almost identical language. One part of the commentators “fix” this state by claiming that each nation’s language is unique, regardless of the similarities. The other part claims that only Serbian language exists, while the other three languages are made-up. They also claim that even the Bosnian, Croatian and Montenegrin nations are made-up and that all of these nations derived from the original, Serbian, nation.

I will begin from the description of the latter ideology, that Serbs were the original nation. Here, it is probably that the ideology of ‘Greater Serbia’, or at least some of its parts, is at work (see 3.1.3. for a fuller explanation), but it is rarely expressed openly, because the ideology is associated with the wars of the 1990s and is generally considered illegitimate discourse for public debates. However, certain aspects of this ideology are expressed openly, such as that Croatian language is not really a language:

(111) Hrvati se skoro 100 god trude da promene što više reci kako bi se njihov *tkz.* jezik razlikovao od srpskog,u čemu ispaju smešni. [Croatians have been trying for over a 100 years to change as many words as possible, so that their so-called language would differ from Serbian, which makes them look ridiculous.] (COM-SR-13)

The argument that Croats used to be Serbs who changed their religion from Orthodoxy to Catholicism also surfaces and that Croats are not a “real nation”:

41 For more information about the ‘Bosnian-Bosniak controversy’ see 2.3.2. for the Bosnian part, 2.3.5 for the Serbian opinion and 3.1.3. for the experts’ discussions about these terms in Serbian media.
(112) Srpski jezik i tacka. Kakav Hrvatski? Pa Hrvatska je izmisljena nacija, a kamoli jezik! [Serbian language and that’s final. What is Croatian? Croats are a made-up nation, not to mention the language!] (COM-SR-19)

(113) Ma šta se bunite pa to je njihov maternji jezik samo su promenili veru i ime [What are you complaining about, it’s their mother tongue they just changed their faith and name.] (COM-SR-7)

This talk clearly borrows from far-right ideologists that have dominated the public scene of the 1990s during the wars with Croatia and Bosnia. Other commentators recognise that this talk is connected to far-right politics. The commentator below (ex. 115) is pointing out commenter “aleksej’š” (ex. 114) political affiliation, by calling him a supporter of Šešelj, the leader of the far-right party (quoted in 3.1.3).

(114) Aaleksej samo jos jedan od dokaza da su to pokatoliceni srbi. [Aaleksej just another proof that they are Catholicized Serbs] (COM-SR-7)

(115) @aleksej hahhahha, šešeljevac [@aleksej hahhahha, šešelj-supporter] (COM-SR-7)

As a reaction to this ideology, many Croatian commentators join the debate, who explain that Croatian and Serbian cannot be considered one language just because of their mutual intelligibility, nor because of their similar dialectal basis. The commentator in ex. 116 describes the describes what makes Croatian and Serbian unique and distinct from each other, thus re-establishing the one-nation-one-language ideology (without the primordial twist, understanding languages as collections of dialects). In ex. 117 the commentator gives a legal definition of Croatian and a definition, to point to the acceptance of Croatian as a separate language.

Jedan, Hrvatski nije samo Štokavština, on je međuodnos Kajkavskog, Čakavskog i Štokavskog.
Srpski je s druge strane međuodnos Štokavštine i Torlakih. U tome je razlika. Tko se malo sjeća matematike i presjeca skupova, kuži o čemu govorim. Razumijevanje govornika dvaju sličnih jezika nije niti prvi niti jedini kriterij razdavanja tih jezika.
(... I kažete Novogovor, ozmišljamo razlike, a mi se samo vraćamo svom izvornom jeziku.
Hrvatski jezik postaje 24. jezik EU. [Croatian language is, like Serbian, stylised on the basis of the Stokavian [dialect]. Because of unification. And that is where all similarity stops.
Because, Croatian is not only Stokavian, it is an interrelationship of Kaykavian, Chakavian and Stokavian [dialects].
Serbian is, on the other hand, an interrelation of Stokavian and Torlakian dialects. That is the difference. Those who remember mathematics and the intersection of sets, gets what I am saying.
The mutual intelligibility between speakers of two similar languages is neither the first, neither the only criterium for the separation of those languages. (...) You say Newspeak, that we make up difference, but we are just returning to our original language. Croatian language is becoming the 24th EU language.] (COM-SR-8)

Hrvatski jezik je službeni jezik u Eu, dakle priznat kao takav...ovo su neke vaše sheme na koje mi ne padamo... [Croatian is an official EU language, so it is accepted as such...these are some kind of tricks of yours, that won’t work on us...] (COM-SR-36)

Some commentators from Serbia express the same idea:

E izvini ali ja ako hocu svoju zemlju u buducnosti slobodnu i nezavisnu i svoj jezik koji se zove SRPSKI (...) to ne znaci da mrzim Bosnjake, Hrvate, Crnogorce i sve druge nacije, uvek cu postovati njihovo ako oni postuju moje. [Well sorry but if I want my country free and independent in the future and I want my language to be called SERBIAN (...) that does not mean I hate Bosniaks, Croatians or Montenegrins and all other nations, I will always respect theirs if they respect mine]. (COM-SR-21)

In other words, the ‘Greater Serbian’ proponents are ‘fixing’ what is perceived as ‘many-nations-one-language reality’ by claiming that there is only one original nation, and other commentators fix it by claiming that each nation has its own unique language. In each case, the notion of representation is ethnic, in the first version primordially ethnic.

An alternative notion of representation comes as a reaction to the dominant ethnic one, which will be called anti-ethnic. The commentator below sees languages based on ethnonyms as products dangerous for inter-ethnic relations:

Svi smo mi ovdje ćaknuti. Srpski, hrvatski, bosanski i crnogorski su po međunarodnim standardima jedan jezik, samo smo mi toliko primitivni i arogantni pa mu dajemo razne nazive, e da bismo se i u tome razlikovali od ”onih tamo, drugih i drugačijih”. Radi budućnosti naše djece valjalo bi da tom jeziku, koji je bogatstvo svih nas na ovim prostorima, damo jedan naziv, i tu bi lingvisti trebali da se malo oznoje i dogovore, a ne da ovakvim idiotskim izjavama truju medunacionalne odnose. [Everyone here are a bit coo-coo. Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and Montenegrin are one language according to international standards, just we are so primitive and arrogant that we give it different names and to be different from “those over there, other and different”. For the future of our children, it would be good to give that language, which is a treasure of all of us in this region, one name, and the linguists could break a sweat and reach a deal, instead of poisoning international relations with these idiotic statements.] (COM-SR-20)

Other commentators even suggest a name for the common language that would not be based on an ethnonym, but on a new name or a compromise.
Nazovite sve ove jezike [UŽNOSLOVENSKI i rešćete zauvek problem. [Name all these languages SOUTHSLAVIC and you will solve the problem forever.] (COM-SR-20)

A lot of comments are ironic, and therefore difficult to interpret. Many of them belong to the discourse of Yugo-nostalgia, a phenomenon similar to Soviet-nostalgia. Yugo-nostalgia exists in many forms: it can be a cultural nostalgia for the old rock-and-roll scene, a more reflective political nostalgia, or even a nostalgia that is based on the wish to return to the old system of “socialist market economy”; but irrespective of the type of Yugo-nostalgia, a single Serbo-Croatian language is seen as a positive thing (cf. Lindstrom 2005, Volčič 2007). Some other commentators suggest the same notion – that there is no such thing as a pure Croatian or pure Serbian language, that languages and nationalities do not necessarily match.

Dear countrymen, I am Croatian by father, Srem-born by mother, by birth I am a Belgrade-Serb, and Yugo-nostalgic by choice. I think that the polemics that you are leading are unnecessary, the essence of my suggestion is for Croatians to throw out all Serbian words from their dictionaries and Serbs [should throw out] Croatian. In that way, we will preserve the bloody-earned cultural heritage and honour, in the best possible way, the “brave” nationalists that polarized them.] (COM-SR-36)

The commentator ridicules, through the ironic comment “throwing out Croatian / Serbian words”, the practice of purification of the lexicon as meaningless nationalism through the phrase. As discussed in 2.3., this phenomenon is more widespread amongst Croatian than Serbian linguists, but the point is that the commentator inverts the imperative for an “ethnically” pure language, thus is refers to anti-ethnic representation.

Another subject that comes up from time to time in many of the studied comment sections is the issue of female professions and the grammatical endings used to alter the male to a female profession. This has a pre-history. In the interwar period, as most women did not have the right to work, these endings marked that the woman is married to a man of that profession (for example Ministar means ’minister’ and Ministarka would, in those times, mean ‘the wife of a minister’). In Socialist Yugoslavia, universal right to work was introduced and the male grammatical gender was used as neutral to all professions, regardless of the sex of the worker. The modern-day feminist activists see this ‘neutral male gender’ as discriminatory, and some active women

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42 Srem: a region in North Serbia, bordering with Croatia.
have changed their profession names, adding the female endings. But many disagree with this practice. In the example below, the female psihološkinja – used instead of the male psiholog – is perceived as a vulgarization of language:

(122) Takođe i nakaradno nametanje ženskog roda za zanimanja apsolutno ne smatram pozitivnim pomakom - psihološkinja i ostale nebuloze (naročito forsirane na b92) zvuče više nego smešno (...) Bolje da se naši filolozi bave traženjem pravilnih reči koje bi menjale engleske reči u tehnologiji koje se svakodnevno pojavljuju nego da se većaju decenijama oko pravila pisanja ulica, apostrofa i reči i nasilnim uvodjenjem ženskog roda u neka zanimanja... [I also don’t consider the grotesque imposition of female gender for professions to be a positive move – psihološkinja and similar tomfoolery (especially forced at b92\(^{43}\)) sound more than ridiculous. They’d do better to find correct words to replace English words in technology, that appear every day than to engage in decade-long discussion about rules of street names, apostrophes and ... and the brutal imposition of the female genus in some professions...] (COM–SR–4)

As we can see, the general negative stance towards change in language is reflected in both the commentator contrasts the “unnatural genderization” to the “real nature” of language, that shou as it should be, more “Serbian” (ethnic representation) and less oriented towards gender-tolerance issues. This can be interpreted as a contrast between traditionalist and progressivist values. Unsurprisingly, it is the ethnic representation that is connected to a traditionalist worldview.

3.2.3.2. Expertise

The stimulus for the discussion of expertise are newspaper articles on the topic of language correctness, language decline and raising illiteracy. Language correctness topics are sometimes simple: articles have the form of “Did you know...?” type of questions, where grammar and spelling rules are presented through tests, quizzes, interviews with language experts etc.\(^{44}\) This is traditional media practice in Serbia, the media has long been considered the most important medium for the spread of correct language, on certain occasions (mother tongue day, anniversaries of famous linguists’ births or deaths etc.), linguists are asked to comment on common mistakes, lesser known grammatical and orthographical rules.

This provokes many sub-debates about ‘rules of language’, so feisty that many commentators start correcting each other. The example below shows how this discursive practice borrows from the discourse of the classroom. The commentator “rebro” [rib]

\(^{43}\) B92: Name of a radio and television station in Serbia, often associated with libaral ideologies see 1.4.4.

\(^{44}\) Such articles have been found in Norway, but the comment sections are usually closed. I have not found this type of articles in the media in Lithuania.
uses the typical phrase of a school teacher “sit, one!” In Serbian schools, examination is usually oral, a student stands up from his seat and answers the teacher’s questions (this practice is diminishing but is still alive). When the teacher says “sit”, that signals that the examination is over, and then announces the grade for all the classroom – from one (worst) to five (best). The commentators below correct each other, ending their sentences with “sit, one!”, which can be interpreted as a battle of who will assume the role of the teacher (the commentators in ex. 124 even uses “teacher” as his nickname). This interdiscursive technique is, in the words of Bazerman “Using recognisable phrasing, terminology, associated with specific people or groups” (2003:88):

(123) Ꞁrebro ka Ꞁslobo: Piše se ”srpskom jeziku” i ”da bi se popravio ovaj negativni trend”. Sedi jedan!. [Ꞁrebro to Ꞁslobo: It is written “serbian language” and “in order to correct this negative trend. Sit one!.”] (COM–SR–34)

(124) ꞀUcitelj ka Ꞁrebro: Na kraju recenice može da stoji ili znak uzvika ili tacka, nikako oboje. Sedi jedan. [ꞀTeacher to Ꞁrebro: At the end of the sentence there should be either an exclamation point or a full stop, but never both. Sit one.] (COM–SR–34)

Two other commentators notice this battle for authority and join with their own corrections, one gives the grade “two”:

(125) ꞀDule ka Ꞁrebro: Iza sedi se stavljna zapeta. Sedi, jedan. :))) [ꞀDule to Ꞁrebro: Behind «sit» one writes a comma. Sit, one. :)))] (COM–SR–34)


This interdiscursive link is very indicative of the ideology at play. The classroom is a place with clearly divided roles, where the one who knows the language is the language teacher, and the ones who don’t know enough are the pupils. Language teacher is generally understood as that person whose job is to differentiate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ language and teach it to the schoolchildren. This discreditation of the language of other commentators by assuming the authoritative role of the teacher can be seen as a manifestation of external expertise: language is a set of rules that one either has or has not learned.

Another clearly identifiable discourse is the discourse of nostalgia. Language in the old times is presented as closer to the ideal standard language, while the language of today is presented as language in decay. To exemplify language in decay, the commentator in ex. 127 below uses language of Roma people and of the town of Leskovac. Roma people live in large areas of Serbia and are exposed to both structural and interpersonal racism (Janevíc, Sripad, Bradley & Dimitrievska 2011), and their language is often seen as ‘bad Serbian’. The town of Leskovac belongs to the Southern group of dialects, that is the most ridiculed, parodied dialect because of the huge difference between the it and standard Serbian (cf. Petrović 2015); for example, Standard Serbian has seven cases, and the dialect in Leskovac only two:
(127) Nekada smo se smejali Romima zbog njihove kolektivne neobrazovanosti i što nema ni jednog koji ume da govori, važilo slično i za Leskovčane i okolinu, ko bi rekao da ćemo doživeti da naša deca padnu na isti nivo. [We used to laugh at Roma people, because of their collective lack of education and because there none of them is able to speak, the same goes for people from Leskovac and that area, who would have thought our kids would fall to that level.] (COM-SR-28)

The language of the current generation is seen as less correct (more like the language of dialects and Roma people) and the language of the old generation is seen as more correct. The negative attitude towards language change – as well as the depiction of bad language speakers as ‘uneducated’ – to the fact that language is understood as a system of rules beyond speakers (external expertise).

Other commentators combine this nostalgia with ethnic representation (6.13% of all comments), stressing the importance of correct speech for the national identity:

(128) Ono cega se secam je, da sam oko sebe slusala dobar govor, da sam citala obaveznu lektiru (i mnogo vise od toga), da se u kuci citala “Politika” (…) Pozivam vas da pogledate naslove u danasnoj “Politici”. Sigurna sam da cete naci jednu gresku, ako ne pravopisnu, a ono pomocni glagol na kraju recenice. (…) To nisu obicine greske, to su greske koje narusavaju strukturu i logiku srpskog jezika (ocigledan uticaj engleskog). Cak i u knjigama pojedinih poznatih izdavača ima gresaka. Da li, danas, neko uopste zaposljava lektore? (…) I ne zaboravite, jedina otadzbina koju covek ima, ma gde bio, je u njegovom maternjem jeziku. [What I remember is that I was surrounded by good speech, I read the obligatory literature (and much more than that), that “Politika” was always read in our home, I invite you to look at the titles in today’s “Politika”. I am sure you will find at least one mistake, if not an orthographical, then for sure a particle verb at the end of the sentence. (…) These are not ordinary mistakes, these are mistakes that distort the structure and the inner logic of the Serbian language (an obvious influence from English). You find mistakes even in books of certain publishers. Does anyone even employ language-advisors nowadays? (…) And do not forget, there is only one homeland that one has, wherever he/she may be, and that homeland is in his mother tongue.] (COM-SR-28)

The opposite notion of language change, internal expertise (11.22%), comes as a criticism of the discourse expressed above. Language change is seen as natural and language is seen as a product of people:

(129) “vladanje normom bez izuzetka”, “jedan jezik kao sredstvo opšteg sporazumevanja”.. krajnje ograničeno i pogrešno shvatanje jezika. Jezik se prilagodava ljudima, ne obrnuto. [“mastering the norm without exceptions”, “one language as a means of general communication”. quite a limited and wrong understanding of language. Language adopts to people, not vice versa.] (COM-SR-31)

Strangely enough, a similar phrasing is used in both the discourse of Lithuanian and some Serbian commentators (compare with ex. 74). “Language should serve
people, not vice versa” seems to be a potent phrasing that expresses the irritation of some living in standard language cultures.

Another way in which internal expertise manifests itself, is through a positive attitude towards youth language (a kind of an anti-nostalgic discourse):

(130) Bolje bi bilo da jezicki strucnjaci pokusaju da cuju kako obicni ljudi govore i da to sto cuju pokusaju da pretvore u nesto sto je u duhu postojeceg (vrlo zastarelog) jezika, nego da ukazuju na greske. Ne znam kako je moguce da su svi zabiravili Vuka Karadžica i to kako je on postavio temelje danasnjeg modernog pisanog jezika. Slusajte mlade i ucite od njih. [It would be better if language experts would try to hear how common people speak and to turn what they hear into something in the spirit of the current (very outdated) language, then point to mistakes. I don’t know how it is possible that everyone forgot Vuk Karadžic and how he set the grounds of the modern written language of today. Listen to the young ones and learn from them] (COM-SR-18)

Usually, praising youth language would be considered absolutely illegitimate discourse in Serbia; therefore, this commentator legitimizes it by referring to Vuk Karadžić, the head standardizer of Serbian language. The “basis of modern Serbian” that the author mentions, refers to the principle that children at thought in Serbian schools: that Serbian standard language was based on the language of the ‘common people’, not on the language of the elite.45

In very, very rare cases, the ethnic representation is combined with the internal expertise, like in the comment below, where language purity is seen as positive, but youth language and language change are seen as positive.

(131) Problem sa srpskim jezikom je sto se ne modernizuje, nema novih reci I onda koristimo strane. Slang ne ulazi posle mnogo godina u zvanicni jezik, narodna jezikom tj. onaj koji prica veliki broj ljudi, razlikuje se od zvanicnog, (...) Bolje je da tu decu malo poslusate I nesto od njih naucite. [The problem with Serbian language is that it is not modernised, there are no new words, and then we use foreign ones. Slang does not go into the official language, [and] the people’s language, that is the language that is spoken by most people, is different than the official. (...) It would be better to hear the children and learn something from them.] (COM-SR-17)

Examples combining these two notions of language were found only four times in the entire sample. I provide this as an example of discourse that would definitely be considered illegitimate in the public sphere.

45 There were competing language standards in the period of the 19th century, and the battle between them seemed at times like a “class battle”. The one standard was based on the elite literary traditions, and the other – codified mostly by Vuk Karadžić – based on dialects, documented in folk stories and legends. The latter one won the battle. See Auty (1968) for more information in English.
The function of national identification is activated by topics such as the influence of English on Serbian (just like in Lithuania and Norway) and the use of the Latin instead of the Cyrillic. Latin script is generally perceived to be in the dominant position compared to the Cyrillic script, by both linguists and linguistic authorities (see 2.3.5.), yet the Cyrillic script is considered to be essentially Serbian. This raises concerns and fears of losing an important part of the language – the script. The use of Latin script and the use of English words are labelled as a product of low national self-esteem and shame of one’s Serbian identity. The first comment below is signed with a nickname “Serbian without shame”, which points to the idea that (pure) Serbian should be used, and not the one media language, that the commentator sees as overflowing with foreign words.

(132) Srpski bez stida: Poplavljen besmislenim tudjicama cisto da bi se zvucilo belosvetski a ne seljacki... hvala narocito RTS, B92, Blic itd. [Serbian without shame: Overflown with meaningless foreign words, just so that it would sound cosmopolitan and not rural... thanks especially RTS, B92, Blic etc.] (COM-SR-10)

The next example elevated the Cyrillic script to a symbol of Serbian national identity:

(133) Кад одете напоље и видите да сви чувају свој идентитет и не стиде се себе као ми – можда ћете почети да користите ћирилицу! Дотле, одричите се себе! А народ који се одриче себе и не заслужује да постоји! Како то да у немачкој све тастатуре морају да имају “умлауте”? Како то да сви мобилни телефони морају да буду прилагођени немачком језику? А код нас? Ми смо криви и нико други! [When you go abroad and see that everyone preserves their identity and are not ashamed of themselves like we are - maybe you will start using Cyrillic! Until then, renounce yourselves! A people who denounces itself does not deserve to exist. How come German keyboards have to have “umlauts”? How come all mobile phones have to be adapted to the German language? And here? It’s our own fault and nobody else’s!] (COM-SR-35)

The ethnic representation is recognisable in the ethnonyms “Serbian” and “German” and the idea that all linguistic features have to be equivalent to one language and nation. The criticism of those who are ashamed to use their nation’s language pre-supposes that the normal state (illustrated through the German example) is that one takes prides in one’s national and linguistic identity. The function of language that is idealized here the function to identify one’s nationality.

The function of hierarchical social identification is connected to the external expertise. The idea expressed is that language reveals one’s “level”, like in the comment below: the commentator warns that a person who “just communicates” and does not improve his or her mother tongue will come off as uneducated. In this view, language is conceptualized as a measurement tool of a person’s social status:

144
(134) Maternji jezik ostaje uvek jezik koji najbolje govorite, tu niko nije izuzetak. Ako ni njega ne umete da govorite i ako vam je rečnik dovoljan tek toliko da umete samo da komunicirate onda čete zauvek delovati neobrazovano. [Your mother tongue will always remain the one language you speak the best, no one is an exception here. If you cannot even speak that language and if your vocabulary suffices only for communication, then you will forever appear uneducated.] (COM-SR-28)

On the other hand, belief that the primary function of language is communication, surfaces in the debates as a “reaction” to the above described belief that language is a symbol of one’s nationality or social status, as “a reminder” of the original function of language. The example below is from a discussion on supposedly decreasing literacy amongst schoolchildren, where the commentator had enough of the expressed worries over language deterioration and therefore they stress the communication as a primary function of language:

(135) šta iz srpskog ima da se uči? jel komuniciraju medjusobno?? jel znaju da razgovaraju? da nešto napišu, pročitaju?? (...) neka uče engleski, nemački. to je obrazovanje. [what is there to be learned in Serbian [class]? do they communicate with each other?? can they talk? can they write or read something? (...) let them learn English, German. that’s education.] (COM-SR-12)

Another notion of function is idealized – the instrumentalist. Language (in general) is seen as an instrument of achieving (not just communicative) goals. For example, the commentator below presents Serbian as the mother tongue – one that already serves its purpose – and the foreign language as those that need to be learned, presumably to achieve a higher degree of social mobility.

(136) Ucite strane jezike. Minimum 2. A Srpski znate i više nego sto ce vam ikada trebati u zivotu. [Learn foreign languages. Minimum 2. And Serbian you know more than you will ever need in life.] (COM-SR-34)

Although the commentator does not overtly say that language is a tool of economic gain, it could be simply that he suggest communication with foreigners is important. But, when interpreted in the context the discussion, it is clear that it is instrumentalist. The discussion was under a news about the need to care for “one’s own mother tongue”. As the commentator in ex. 136 wrote the adjective Serbian with a capital letter (the correct spelling in Serbian would be in lowercase), he attracts many “correctors” who shoot back expressing external expertise. One such commentator calls him out for not being proficient in Serbian, using the phrase “sit down, one!” mentioned in 3.2.4.2.

(137) Ti ne znaš srpski jezik. Sedi jedan! [You don’t speak the Serbian language. Sit down, [your grade is] one!”] (COM-SR-34)

Then the original commentator answers back that he does not care about Serbian, but that his foreign language skills are high, which provides him with economic gains.
He especially stresses that he has a higher salary than Klajn, who is the leading normative linguist in Serbia:

(138) Pa to sam i ja rekao. Ali zato Engleski, Nemacku I Spanski sedi 5. Imam vecu platu od Klajna [That is what I said. But then English, German and Spanish sit [down, my grade is] 5. I have a higher salary than Klajn.] (COM-SR-34)

And continues to attract commentators who express an opposite belief in the function of language, in the lower case, cultural identification.

(139) Bravo, mora da si srećan. Plata je sve u životu. Maternji jezik je nešto što je deo tradicije, opšte kulture, stava prema nečemu čemu pripadaš svidelo ti se ili ne. Svakako nisi repa bez korena, a ako smatraš da jesi - pa, ok, za plitkoumne i plata dosta. [Bravo, you must be happy. Salary is everything in life. The mother tongue is something that is a part of tradition, general culture, an attitude towards something you belong to, whether you like it or not. You are not a turnip without a root, and if you think that you are - well, ok, for the feeble-minded, salary is enough.] (COM-SR-34)

These discussions about the functions of language could reflect a tension between the ‘idealist’ and ‘pragmatic’ values in the society. On the one hand, the high competence national language is seen as one’s ‘public face’ and an important component of national identity. On the other, language is seen as a tool of communication or as an opportunity for success in the international market, where the ‘national language’ is not worth investing in, because one knows it by virtue of birth.

Not much can be said about the dominance of one or another notion of function, as it was identified in only 42 comments of the 326 comments in the sample (12.88%). The identificational function was found in 15 instances of those, the communicative in 17 and the instrumentalist in 9.

3.2.4. QUANTITATIVE AND COMPARATIVE RESULTS

This section will present the quantitative results and the comparison of the three countries.

1. The beliefs and notions in the commentator discourse are of the same types as in the expert discourse (see 3.1.4., point 1. for a description of the notions). No new statistically significant beliefs or notions were found in the commentator discourse.

2. Representation in the commentator discourse shows a degree of similarity to the (overall) expert discourse (c.f. 3.1.4., point 3). Representation is much more expressed in the comments in Lithuania (51%) and Serbia (65.5%) than in Norway (17.2%), and the absolutely largest part of those contains ethnic representation.

2.1. Also similar to the experts’ discourse are the topics that activate discussions on representation (c.f. 3.1.4., point 9) – the influence of foreign (in
Lithuania and Serbia also neighbouring and minority) languages. The low percentage of comments containing representation in Norway is probably the results of the fact that only English is seen as a threat, while in Lithuania and Serbia minority and neighbouring languages are seen as threats.  

2.2. In Norway, 4.9% of the comments in the sample contained geographical representation, and 10.1% anti-ethnic in Serbia. These can be interpreted as the result of the conditions described in the introduction to this thesis – the ‘pro-dialect’ ideology in Norway and the recent disintegration of the Serbo-Croatian standard language (because of which commentators express the idea that language is not connected to an ethnos). But they do not have dominant status in the virtual sphere, contrary to what I postulated in the introduction.  

3. Expertise: More comments expressing expertise were found in Norway (78.2%) than in Lithuania (37.2%) and Serbia (29.8%). Nevertheless, amongst those, the dominant belief was external expertise in all the countries. The similarity could be explained by standard language culture (Milroy 2001), which causes non-linguists to express concerns over language change they notice in their children and demand language to be regulated (as noticed in most other research, c.f. Cameron 2005). The greater number of comments containing beliefs about expertise in the Norwegian data is due to the general topic of the discussion. As noted in point 2. above, some Lithuanian and Serbian comment sections were devoted to the negative influence of minority and neighbouring languages. Nothing similar was not found in the Norwegian discourse, but instead more threads on illiteracy and language change were found. In short, notions of representation are discussed more in Lithuania and Serbian and expertise in Norway, at least in the period studied (2008-2016).  

4. Function: The beliefs about the function of language were the least prominent in the sample (LT: 17.4%, NO: 19.8%, SR: 12.9%). Within those low percentages, there is one significant difference, the function of communication is dominant in Norway (59%) and cultural identification (both national and hierarchical social) in Lithuania (71.4%), but the overall numbers are quite low, so more research would be needed to confirm the generalisability of this finding. If generalizable, this would mean that the Lithuanian and Norwegian commentators reflect similar beliefs about function as the experts in the same countries, except Serbia, where the communicative function is expressed more by ‘vox populi’ and less by experts.  

5. Complex notions of language: As the comment is a very short textual genre, commentators rarely find place to express more than one belief about language, so not many complex notions were found. The most prevalent ones in Lithuania were the monoglot (6.9%) and the ethnolinguistic (7.4%) ones, in Serbia monoglot (5.5%). In Norway no notion was found in more than 3% of the sample.
4. DISCUSSION, CRITIQUE, RECOMMENDATIONS

In this chapter I will discuss the results of the analysis (4.1. and 4.2.), critique the methodology (4.3.).

4.1. TYPES OF BELIEFS ABOUT LANGUAGE

I have not used the term ideologies of language as an analytical category, as it usually refers to macro-level metadiscursive regimes, but rather sought to analyse individual beliefs and notions (more frequent sets of beliefs) of language. In this subchapter, I will put those beliefs and notions into their ideological context.

In diagram 1 shows the categorization of these beliefs, and the notions constructed by combinations of those beliefs. I have presented all the beliefs that have occurred a significant number of times in at least one county and at least one type of discourse. The beliefs are categorized into three categories called (1) monolingual (red), (2) cognitive (yellow) and (3) historical (purple).

The first group points to beliefs that are elements of an ideology broadly referred in sociolinguistic literature as monolingual or the same ideology that I described in the introduction: the ideal state is when one nation has one (main) homogenous language, and as a consequence of that, the way one uses language can be used as a tool to measure one’s loyalty to the nation and one’s status in society. Dialects are valued as varieties, but only as an ethnocultural symbol, not as a tool of communication. On the other side, there are the notions that usually exclude the ones mentioned in the first group or are even expressed as a criticism of the corresponding notion from the other group. The most obvious such belief is anti-ethnic, which directly expresses and idea that languages are not representations of ethnic groups and their ‘culture’ or ‘spirit’ (but with no concrete idea of what it represents). All the other beliefs in this group are based around the idea that language is a product of the cognitive processes – automatic acquisition of first language, thinking, communication, linguistic creation of identity etc. Therefore, they are labelled cognitive. The third “group” is a single belief in the essence of language is an abstract system, that is its own master and unfolds and develops despite active human engagement in language. It is also significant that when this belief appears in the discourse it very often excludes other ideological beliefs (both representation and function).

I should make it clear that these groups do not represent a set of beliefs that necessarily go hand in hand all the time. The nature of ideology is discursive, and as the research has shown, both experts and non-experts can express a different, sometimes even diametrically opposite beliefs in different discursive contexts. One cannot claim that, if one finds one or two beliefs in one group, all the other ones are necessary
there, just “hidden” or not directly expressed. Priming and many other factors play a role in what belief gets expressed, leaving open the possibility of the same commentator employing radically different notions of language in different communicative contexts. But, as I was researching the virtual sphere, I can claim that these are the three main ideological orientations towards language that are constructed in the online discourse through systematic interaction of beliefs and their statistical significance in all three countries (at least in the period 2008-2016), just that their frequencies and discursive areas are different in each of the three countries.

The classification is based on two criteria: first, how the ideological oppositions are created in the discourse, which belief excludes the other, or is constructed as an “answer” or “the opposition to” another belief. Second, how some mutually-non-exclusive beliefs tend to form sets of beliefs that I called notions, that reveal the compatibility of beliefs within a broader discursive enterprise.

The only belief that can be placed in both the “monolingual” and “cognitive” category is geographical representation. A rural or urban variety can be seen as a partial representation of a national language, often with the subordinate status to the standard language, but also as a communicative tool and a representation of one’s many social identities. The only notion of language that seems to combine two beliefs from ideologically different groups is the one I label “prescriptivist”. Language is presented as a means of communication, but at the same time, correct standard language is presented as the best and most effective form of language for communication.
These three types of ideologies can be applied to the LP efforts as well. As we saw in chapter 2, the language planning mechanisms are quite different in the three countries (and regions), but the ideological backgrounds are quite similar in Lithuania and Serbia and somewhat different in Norway. Lithuanian and Serbian LP ideologies are clearly based on ideas belonging to the monolingual group, with the only difference being that the Lithuanian ones exhibit more purist practices in the codification of the lexicon. Norwegian LP is based partially on the monolingual ideal that the majority language should not ever be used less than a foreign language in any sphere of life, which is already true in most spheres of life in Norway, except the academia and international business. The ideology have been labelled as *functionalism* (the idea that LP should work towards making communication more effective and fostering mutual understanding) which has much in common with the *pragmatist* notion of language (language is seen as a communicative system produced by users). Lastly, there is the *Usus-ideology*, noticed in the corpus planning, that starts from the idea that language norms have to be formed according to the real-life use, which could be said to be based on the belief in *internal expertise*. So, in Norway, some parts of the policy are based on monolingual, others on cognitive understandings of language.

4.2. “THE BIG PICTURE”: LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES ON THE MACRO-SOCIAL LEVEL

This section will put the results of the research in a larger perspective, firstly regional (4.2.1) and then border (4.2.2.).

4.2.1. LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES IN THE BALTIC, SCANDINAVIAN AND EX-YUGOSLAV SOCIETIES, A PRELIMINARY SKETCH

In this section, I will try to present what language ideologies circulate in the three countries that have been the focus of this study, as well as to discuss the generalizability of the models on the regions which they belong to and beyond.

The results from the Lithuanian metalinguistic data in this research confirms the findings of Vaicekauskienė and Keturkienė (2016): the Lithuanian language teachers that they interviewed about language, just like the teachers’ voices in online discourse (a part of the non-academic experts in my data), exhibit the same *monolingual* beliefs and notions of language, which points to the prevalence of prescriptivist ideologies about language. Most non-experts embrace the same monolingual beliefs, which can be explained in several ways. The younger generation gets the discourse from their Lithuanian language teachers, while the older generation, that was schooled during the Soviet times and thus not exposed to a overtly nationalist discourse, probably gets
the monolingual beliefs from the nationalist political and public discourses on language that became dominant in the 1990s. Next, most of the Lithuanian academic and non-academic experts share the same beliefs of language, thus confirming what Tamaševičius (2011, 2016) and Subačius and Raila (2012) wrote about – language is discussed through metaphors connected to ethnicity and nationhood, as well as by conceptualising it as an abstract ideal, that all “good citizens” should strive for. The group of the Lithuanian society that exhibit cognitivist beliefs about language are sociolinguists, as seen from my data, and also journalists (c.f. Vaicekauskienė 2012). It should be no surprise that journalists, when asked in interviews about their ideas of good language, reflect ideas connected to the **communicative function** of language (in contrast to ethnolinguistic notions of language), stressing classical rhetoric, liveliness of language and precision of expression as traits of good language (Vaicekauskienė 2012: 98). As Vaicekauskienė’s research was conducted face-to-face and the subject of the interview was the spoken language / language of live broadcast, which is why the communicative function came out first. In my data – although it was not the primary object of research – the voice of the Lithuanian journalists exhibits the same monolingual beliefs about language as the majority of the experts they interview, so this could be explained by the fact that these are specific types of journalists working with language-related issues, or that these journalists are forced to take the position of the dominant ideology as a starting point. Hence, the result’s of Vaicekauskienė (2012) and my modest observation are difficult to compare, but it could be explored in further research.

Whether the language-ideological situation in Lithuania is generalizable to all the Baltic countries is somewhat unclear. From the studies of Vaisbergs (1999, 2010) and Strelēvica-Ošiņa (2016), one can see that both language purists and prescriptivists are active in the public sphere (but they are mostly self-proclaimed linguists, and not state institution / university representatives, like in Lithuania), as well as that purism and prescriptivism have been a long part of Latvian lexicographical tradition, even though this is slowly changing. In Estonia, one study suggests that young Estonians (aged 10–12) reflect discourses on the “dangers” bit foreign languages towards Estonian, which they see as having soon to face a grim future (Ehala & Niglas 2006). This could be a reflection of the broad societal discourses on the “dangers” facing Estonian language (mentioned to be present in Estonia in Verschik 2005), possibly – like many sociolinguistic studies have pointed out – transmitted to student by the teachers. Future research would need to confirm this.

The Norwegian results confirm the same that Josephson (1999) and Wingstedt (1998) found in Sweden – that the beliefs about language between professional linguists and non-linguists differ greatly in the aspect of **representation**. Josephson (1999) and Wingstedt (1998) only measured the attitude towards words of foreign origin and the purity of the vocabulary, whereto the professional linguists exhibited less purist attitudes / were more acceptive attitudes towards loanwords, and the lay users more purist attitudes. A negative attitude towards foreign elements can be interpreted as a reflection of a deeper belief in the **ethnic** nature of language. In my
data, the analysis of the discourse showed exactly this – negative attitudes towards foreign elements express the belief that all the elements of language X should be as X as possible, where the X is usually a name of the ethnic group that speaks that language (ethnic representation). It can be assumed that, if the research on metalinguistic online discourse would be repeated in Sweden, the results would be the same as in Norway: the non-experts tend to express a belief that language represents an ethnic group, while the experts express either the opposite belief, that language does not represent an ethnic group or omit (possibly intentionally) to express any belief about representation at all. It would be interesting to see whether the gap between the experts and non-experts would be narrower in Denmark, where attitudes towards the use of English in work context amongst lay users is the highest (51% of the informants evaluated the use of English at work positively), and purist attitudes towards the vocabulary are the lowest (Sandøy 2009a). Beliefs about expertise are often visible in the positive/negative attitudes towards non-standard speech in media, which is the highest in Norway and amongst Finland-Swedes, where about 80% of non-experts expressed positive attitudes; in the other Scandinavian countries and the Faroe Islands these attitudes are more-or-less balanced, between 50% and 60%; and least positive are found on Iceland, 31% (Sandøy 2009a). My data, on the other hand, shows that non-experts overwhelmingly disapprove of ‘incorrect’ language, especially in schools and in written form. This could be because my data was taken from forums and comment sections where the main topic were mistakes in written language, while in the MIN project, the question was asked only about spoken language (Sandøy 2009a: 77). From the given overview, the logical conclusion would be that prescriptivism is dominant when it comes to the written form of language, but not when it comes to the spoken language.

The Norwegian LP is mostly formed on the supra-country level that does not have a direct ideological similarity with the metalinguistic discourses of the experts and non-experts, unless we treat the functionalist “plain language” project as the desire to improve the communicative functions of language, as mentioned in 4.1. The traditional goal of increasing mutual intelligibility amongst Nordic countries can be said to be based on two beliefs that come from opposite ideological camps: on the one hand, it reflects a desire to make language functional for communication and understanding, but on the other, it is based on an “imagined community” of Nordic peoples, that is much more idealistic than real (see 2.2.), as the modern societies have great numbers of minority language groups and the Nordic societies are, in general, more oriented towards English language and anglophone culture than towards the language and culture of their Nordic neighbours. Further research could look into whether functions of language are understood in similar or different ways between experts and non-experts in the other Scandinavian countries.

My research on Serbian metalinguistic discourses largely confirms the findings of Greenberg (2004, 2008) and Jovanović (2018a) regarding the ideologies of language experts. The absolutely dominant language ideology in the media is the “Neo-Vuko-
vite” one (Greenberg 2004) and exhibits the same discursive-ideological traits as the far-right protectors of the Cyrillic (Jovanović 2018a). The only distinguishing feature of this discourse is the belief that language represents a primordially ethnic group, all other monolingual beliefs and notions of language appear in the discourse in the same way they do amongst in Lithuania and amongst Norwegian non-experts. The Serbian LP institutions exhibit a “milder” version of the monolingual ideology, employing ethnic representation. Apart from these nuances, the beliefs about language fall in the same ideological category (monolingual) amongst the Serbian LP institutions, experts and non-experts. So far, the only group that express a different ideology is a group of linguists and cultural workers (mostly writers), who express anti-ethnic beliefs and other cognitivist beliefs and notions of language. The comprehensive research on the metalanguage in Croatian academia by Kordić (2011) and some observations of Kapović (2011) show that the ideologies of dominant language experts in Croatia are largely in the same monolingual category as Serbian ones, minus the primordial ethnic representation. They appear to be present in language-advisory books, as well as in the institutional discourses (Kapović, Starčević & Sarić 2016, Starčević 2016). It is possible that this is generalizable to Bosnia and Montenegro, as the Croatian model was followed by linguists when re-standardizing the language (in Montenegro, linguists from Croatia were employed in the work on the new orthographic norm and the new grammar) and by politicians when establishing the status of the language, following a generally one-nation-one-language ideal (cf. Nakazawa 2015, Jovanović 2018b). The cognitive beliefs and notions are expressed by politically liberally oriented linguists and writers. The reason the voice of writers can be heard speaking against monolingual beliefs and notions and expressing cognitive ones is probably because these authors are popular in the whole ex-Yugoslav cultural space (many initiatives for these linguists to meet were organised by the writer Vladimir Arsenijević, who is read in both Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia and Montenegro, cf. Bugarski 2018) and therefore take a clear stance against monolingual beliefs that they see as linguistic and cultural isolationism.

The knowledge about ideologies of language gathered from my research and the previous research can provide a (although still quite unclear) picture of the distribution of ideological beliefs amongst the society as a whole (including the state system) in Lithuania, Norway and Serbia. It is presented in diagram 2.

In a short summary, I would not claim that these models are applicable to the regions, but it is highly possible that the Scandinavian and Ex-Yugoslav models are generalizable, firstly because the people who live in these regions speak mutually understandable languages, there is a common cultural space, because there is intensive economic Nordic cooperation, and there used to be (though partially coerced) political and economic cooperation within Yugoslavia. The similarities in the LP models confirm this. In the Baltics, due to lack of mutual intelligibility and a low level of interaction on the political arena, LP models are divergent both in goals, instruments and power. But the general (monolingual) ideological climate does not seem to differ that greatly, so this is something that could be explored in further research.
Diagram 2. A tentative sketch of language ideological orientations of different societal groups in Lithuania, Norway and Serbia.
In this section, I will present the similarities and differences of my results with similar research on metalinguistic discourses in the contexts beyond these regions.

The observations regarding the understanding of language as a *homogenous entity* that essentially something that divides “us” from “them” seems to be universal of public metalinguistic discourse, as it is confirmed in studies on Greek (Moschonas 2004, 2009), Swiss (Berthele 2008), US (Tardy 2009), British (Milroy 2005) public discourses (*ethnic representation*). My research shows that Norwegian academic experts reject and fight against such an understanding of language, while the Lithuanian and Serbian ones accept and promote it. It should not be assumed that Lithuanian or Serbian academia is ideologically *monolingual*, but rather the question in the future should be asked who, why and under which conditions is allowed (or willing) to participate the public sphere to voice their opinion (it is the media that has the power to decide who is the ‘expert’, cf. Johnson & Milani 2010). In Lithuania the large answer is partially in the large state-sponsored LP system based on a *monolingual* ideology, but also in journalistic practices that seem to be very repetitive – an interview with a linguist is taken for the International Mother Tongue Day, The European Day of Languages, etc. In Serbia the answer seems to lie in political ideologies of the media outlets, or their linguistic traditions, or the close ties of their journalists and editors to the academia. Future research could explore the journalistic practices that produce and sustain the dominant language ideologies in the public sphere.

The quantitative research on metaphors about language in Germany seems points to the dominance of metaphors of the *monolingual* kind in news media. The very frequent metaphor *language is a substance* (also noticed in my data, cf. ex. 86) presents language as something that should be *pure*, *unmixed*, which usually entails an *ethnic* criterion for such purity and unmixedness (German-ness), thus it confirms my results that show an absolute dominance of *ethnic representation* amongst non-linguists. The same can be said for the metaphor *language is an container*, that defines the “‘inside’ (identity) and ‘outside’ (alterity) of a language” (Spitzmüller 2007: 273).

However, the metaphor *language is an organism* in my data usually pointed to *autonomous expertise* – language was seen at its own master, developing as it wishes, all language change and even death was seen as natural and beyond the control of the users. However, in Spitzmüller’s (2007) research on German language in metalinguistic media texts between 1991-2001, *language is an organism* expressed something close to what I labelled *external expertise*, because “while the organism metaphors imply that language is a self-evolving system, it is a system, nonetheless, that needs special ‘care’ (...) in order to be protected from external threats such as ‘illness’ (...), ‘violence’ (...), ‘mutation’ (...) or even ‘death’ ” (Spitzmüller 2007: 274). This could mean that the same metaphor forms a different model in a different culture – in Norway a model of language as an immortal being that changes form over time, while in
Germany as a mortal human-like or plant-like organism that grows, gets sick and needs constant care. I have not counted the metaphors in my data, but future research could be extended to a comparison of metaphors and the cultural models they form, which could also be of general interest to cognitive metaphor theory.

In another quantitative research on Spanish internet commentators, Reyes (2013) discovered two argumentation schemes connected to the aspect of expertise. One was called “deterioration of language”, based on the idea that an orthographical reform necessarily means a ‘bad’ language change – the essence of the language is disturbed by a reform (23% of his data), thus this argumentation scheme is based on the same criterion as my belief in external expertise. Another argumentation scheme is much alike internal expertise in my research, which Reyes calls “language users’ propriety rights” (12.8%). In Reyes’ research, this argumentation scheme is based on a rejection of a language reform as an attempt to impose a norm on to a speaker, that has the right to use the language according to his own way. It could also be said that if one rejects a language reform for an earlier one, one is not really expressing a belief that language is an inherent / internal given to a human, but rather uses and argument to keep the (written) language he or she grew up with. In Reyes’ research, there approximately two times more of those who claim that language should not change because of external rules, than those who are willing to claim propriety rights against an authority. In all three countries in my data, this relationship was much larger than 2:1, but it is questionable whether these researchers are comparable in this respect, because Reyes’ research was reactions to a language reform on an online forum. Nevertheless, Reyes’ research clearly shows a tendency of the ‘vox populi’ to understand language as a system of rules beyond users, and even beyond traditional authorities.

When it comes to function, there is a clear opposition between the “cognitive” and the cultural-identificational functions (called cultural because it implies that a speaker’s language is judged from “the view of the society at large”) of language. These are in opposition to each other in most research that looked into the function of language. Geeraerts (2003) claimed that the two main ideologies of standardization are based around the function of language – as an instrument of communication and expression of identity. The application of Geeraerts’ models to contemporary discourses shows also different identities that are expressed: local, national, global (Geeraerts 2003, Berthele 2008). In my data, I have not found any expressed beliefs that the function of language is to express one’s personal or cosmopolitan (transnational), only national, local (geographical) or social (horizontal or hierarchical). This could mean that it is beyond the limits of legitimate discourse to present language as tool of expressing personal identity, only national or social (status). On the other hand, this could be because all the data I took is from nation-wide media, and therefore it is expected to discuss those functions of language that could have some meaning in a broader nation-wide perspective.

In my ‘vox populi’ data there is a dominance of the function of national identification in Lithuania, but in Norway the communicative function is dominant, in
Serbia, there is a similar percent of the two mentioned functions and the instrumental one. One explanation for this could be that language is the main distinguishing feature of Lithuanian national identity, but it is not so in Norway and Serbia. It should be noted the number of identified beliefs about the function of language in my sample is quite low, thus a separate research on the ideologization of the functions of language would be necessary to confirm the generalizability of the results.

Finally, I will discuss my results in the broader sociolinguistic context. The seminal sociolinguistic studies have claimed that there are powerful ideologies governing how we think about language. Amongst those are beliefs that rules, and correctness are inherent attributes of language (Milroy 2001, Cameron 2005), a hierarchical view of language varieties, with the standardized one at the top (Niedzielski & Preston 2009), the belief that language comes from the spirit of the nation and belief that languages are homogenous, separable entities (Billig 1995, Bauman & Briggs 2003). All of these belong on the monolingual side of ideology. In the discussion so far, I have tried to quantitatively evaluate if this is true, as well as to take comparative perspective to determine the universality of these claims. The discussion so far offers a more nuanced view of these ideologies as well as an alternative view of language present in the public. The monolingual beliefs and notions of language are not dominant amongst a large number of language experts in the Norwegian public sphere, and similar voices are emerging even in countries undergoing a nation-re-building process, where it was, until recently, almost a public offence to question holy marriage of ‘language’ and ‘nation’. The ‘lay users’ – internet commentators – are indeed more influenced by monolingual beliefs than the cognitivist ones, but it is not so that the monolingual beliefs have a ‘hegemonic’ status amongst them, as often claimed in critical research. A clear alternative exists, and in some cases, a cognitivist belief even dominates, for example the function of communication in non-experts discourses in Norway and Serbia, the low overall expression of beliefs connected to representation in Norway could mean that linguistic nationalism is not as strong as one might think.

On the other hand, one should not exclude the possibility that linguistic nationalism is ‘dormant’, because of the very stable economic situation in Norway and nothing – even mass immigration – provokes the stability of the state and the society at large. The reason for a more prominent ethnic representation in Lithuanian and Serbian data, and representation altogether, could be the general feeling of political instability, caused by low GDP and large emigration, factors that are not present in today’s Norway. Future sociolinguistic research could also explore the relationship between language ideologies and macroeconomic factors.

It has repeatedly been shown in research that the media is dominated by beliefs on the “monolingual” side of ideology, coming from politicians, public figures and similar opinion leaders. But journalists, the creators of media content, mostly do not reproduce the macro-level discourses on language, but instead express much more nuanced ideas about what (good) language is, at least in a non-public setting.
(Vaicekauskienė 2012). The research by Loreta Vaicekauskienė provides an interesting perspective on journalists' view of language and raises the question of why the media raises issues based on monolingual beliefs, when most journalists are thought a much more cognitivist approach to language. This could be explored in further research.

Lastly, I will briefly touch upon the late-modernity / post-modernity debate. I have tendentiously opened sub-chapters 3.1. and 3.2. with quotes by Luckmann / Berger and Lyotard. The core thesis of “postmodernists” is that experts no longer have authority, that there are no overreaching narratives. In the cases of Lithuania and Serbia, this is not true, as the most powerful ideological brokers – the state and the experts share a monolingual ideology. In the case of Norway, it is the “lay people” that are entrapped by the “one-nation-one-language grand narrative”, demanding that language experts would be more “modernist”, while the experts seem to be distancing themselves from the modernist narratives. In short, the “grand narratives” seem to be very much alive in the discourses in all three countries, and only the certain academic experts express a kind of a protest against them. But for now, the ideologies of the experts are not reproduced by the masses, only by the state in Scandinavia, to a certain degree.

4.3. METHODOLOGY CRITIQUE

The main idea behind the choice of data was to limit the time period (2008-2016) and represent the period as realistically as possible. Having a large amount of data can make the researcher miss out significant nuances. In this case, in the ‘expert’ data, all types of articles were included, ranging from ‘breaking news’ to opinion pieces and entertainment news articles. It is clear that some genres are more important and reach a larger audience and could have been focused more on, while the other ones excluded. The comment section data was based on only anonymous comments, as well as my personal evaluation (along with consultations with locals in Lithuania, Norway and Serbia) on which of is the ‘central’ part of virtual sphere for anonymous commenting. In the case of Lithuania, I chose only Delfi due to its huge popularity and the sheer amount of comments that no other website is even close to achieving. However, the Delfi comments have often shown examples of extreme racism and similar illegal behaviours. The reputation it has is pretty low, and many other news portals have started campaigns against such anonymous commenting practices, allowing only registered users to comment.

On the other side, the period of 2008-2016 can be seen as a period of the transition between the ‘anonymous’ and the ‘personalized’ Internet, so the data selected does represent one important sight of public discussion that is still active. In Lithuania, Delfi started deleting comments in 2015 after a week or two after the publication of the news, thus anonymous commenting might soon become a thing of the past. In Norway, the situation is more complicated. I have included two areas of the virtual sphere: the com-
ments under news and forum threads. The analysis has shown that there is no essential difference in the general ideological orientation between these two sights (mostly beliefs and notions in the “monolingual” group), except that the forums allow a greater variety of beliefs to be expressed in more subtle ways. On the other hand, the Vgd.no forum shows that certain topics are “occupied” by very active users, so another possibility would be to include many other forums but reduce the number of threads taken from vgd.no, regardless of how few the comments on the topic of language are present. That could have contributed to a sample with more diverse voices. With Serbia, I chose the anonymous comments because they are great in number. But there are two active forums with language-related threads that are more-or-less active, but the number and the frequency of comments does not compare to the anonymous ones under the news. But the inclusion of the forums could have contributed to a more diverse picture of voices, and many more nuanced view of language, coming from anonymous-but-registered forum users. Alternatively, for the typological purposes, including the increasingly growing blogosphere and comments there, could yield different results, as the blog/vlog as a platform provides much more freedom in terms of space, time and mediums for expression of ideological views on language and thus possibly much more sophisticated beliefs about language. Yet, the question remains how specific the audiences in the blogosphere are. YouTube is nowadays popular for vlogs, and attracts a huge number of comments, and it also sparks interests amongst journalists. Lastly, I could have relied on social media, which would reflect the tendency in the transformation of the virtual sphere from being a ‘public, free-for all’ towards a ‘networked’ sphere, in which information and data are available only to members of online networks. However, taking the information from personal profiles involves many ethical concerns and is generally not suitable for a large-scale comparative research. As a solution, I could have taken the comments from the Facebook pages of these news portals instead of the comments from the news portals website. This should probably be done in the future, as it is interesting to compare the comments on the portal’s news page, and the comments of those that “share” the news on their Facebook was (although it will involve more ethical considerations). A similar approach could be applied to Twitter and other social media. For the period of 2008-2016, this approach would not work, as social media had not reached their popularity in 2008 in all three countries; many of the media outlets did not yet have their Facebook profiles on social media.

The theoretical model used in the analysis comes with certain limitations. Focusing only on three categories could have “blinded” the researcher to some nuances in the beliefs and attitudes towards language. During the analysis, it became obvious that I was ignoring the very obvious ideologies of gender, race and also some clear religious connotations expressed in the discourse. Also, critics could say that some of the categories in the analysis, are not as clear-cut as presented (the communicative and instrumentalist functions of language, for instance, can be seen as quite similar, and it was difficult to differentiate between them in the analysis). An alternative
methodology could have been to limit the research object to a single phenomenon, for example, the metaphor or the cognitive model of language. The strength of this analysis would be a much clearer unit (a cognitive model) that could then be explored in different contexts.

To respond to that, that the present methodology was preferred because I expected to find too many culturally-bound models, which would provide a more detailed and precise description of the language ideology in one country, but lead to incomparable results, if such models turn out to be very specific. Also, the constructed model, based on previous research (albeit only on examples of “Western” societies), can be potentially used and developed and its applicability tested in other contexts.

The strength of the model is that it shows how different attitudes towards languages or linguistic forms can essentially reveal the same ideological traits (for example towards ‘mispronunciations’ of foreign and domestic words reveal external expertise). The potential pitfall includes the closedness of categories, that resulted in many (especially very short) comments being marked as clearly ideologically laden, but no concrete belief belonging to the three categories could be assigned.

The unit of the analysis of the metalinguistic discourse was the comment and a news article, respectively. Each belief and notion was identified within that unit. This complicates the results in a few ways. First, the articles containing voices of many experts often contain diverging different beliefs and notions. The given results reflect the number of “exposures” to different ideological view, but not how one or another expert’s ideology is constructed. An alternative approach would be to take the main actors and public figures as the unit of exploration and explore their beliefs. This would show that many experts in the data change their beliefs (sometimes quite radically) over time or depending on the topic discussed, which definitely influences the public perception of the expert and their language ideology. With the anonymous comment as the unit of analysis, this danger does not exist, but the alternative approach could be adopted in the forums and comment sections requiring a social media account: to explore the ideologies of the most dominant actors and how they influence others.

Lastly, the period considered in the dissertation (2008-2016) should be discussed. When I started this project and determined which years will be taken for the analysis, I expected there to be more discussions on representation in Norway, as a until-then-not-seen document had been presented by the Ministry of Culture 2008, describing a detailed future of the Norwegian language status vis-à-vis English (Norwegian language policy had, until then, almost exclusively focused on corpus, see 2.2.2.). In Lithuania and Serbia, where not much has changed in the language policy since the early 2000s (with the exception of one language awareness campaign in Serbia), when the main language policy model and principles were established, representation was much more discussed than in Norway. Future research could explore larger periods of time (perhaps using fewer comments from each time period) to try and notice the potential changes in the ideologies.
5. CONCLUSIONS

In this dissertation, I have presented different types of ideologies of language in three European countries: Lithuania, Norway and Serbia, as well as in the three regions they belong to: the Baltic, the Scandinavian and the Ex-Yugoslav.

The picture of the language ideological situation presented here differs slightly from what is usually presented in sociolinguistic literature and language-ideological research. The Baltic countries have for a long time been examined only from the perspective of their policies and practices towards minority languages and language contacts, rarely on their (no less interesting) majority language policy. The recent research in Lithuania has pointed to the possibility that Lithuania has the most powerful (both de jure and de facto) state-financed LP system in Europe when it comes to the management of the majority language. Scandinavia is shown as in contrasts between the two countries with early standard languages, Denmark and Sweden, and the country with two late standards, Norway. Norway is also presented as one of the most unique language ideological cases in Europe where nothing seems to match the normal European language culture, as there is no “one standard”, dialects are widely used orally, even in such places as school and TV. In the Ex-Yugoslav region, language ideologies have for a long time been observed based on the practices of re-standardization that followed the break-up of Yugoslavia. A contrast is often stressed between the “purist” practices in Croatia, and more liberal, “anti-purist” ones in Serbia. This gives the impression that language ideologies are ‘liberal’ in Serbia, as no excessive re-standardization or purification efforts were ever attempted (and they were also attempted in Bosnia and Montenegro). Only quite recent studies have pointed to strong nationalist ideologies within Serbia, and to the idea that the main ideological tension in the region is between the nationalist / isolationist ideologists on one side, who insist on the one-nation-one-language ideal, and the transnational, anti-nationalist and anti-war ideology, represented by those that support the idea that one joint language is needed for the whole region.

My comparative research offers a somewhat modified picture of the language ideologies in these countries. The aim of this dissertation was to identify the dominant and non-dominant ideologies in Lithuania, Norway and Serbia and present them in the regional and global context. This was done through a review of LP documents and studies on LP and identifying and beliefs and sets of beliefs (notions) about language in the metalinguistic discourses in these countries. I expanded the usual territory of language ideological research – the mainstream media – to include ideologies within the state system and the growing virtual sphere, that provides a voice to a more general public. This approach offers a more nuanced view of language ideologies, as it clearly shows that different ideologies dominate in different areas of the public domain.
First, three main ideologies of language were identified. The first ideology of language reflects the modernist idea: that language is (or if not, should be) a single, homogenous entity that ideally matches ethnic or national borders (monolingual). The second ideology reflects ideologies constructed through an understanding of language as a cognitive tool that allows for communication, as well as identity construction, social mobility etc. (cognitivist). The third is based the idea that language is an abstract system (or a “being”) beyond the speakers, that develops and changes according to rules that can never be fully known to (nor controlled by) humans (historical). Table 4. shows the dominant ideologies in each country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Vox Populi</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LT</strong></td>
<td>Monolingual (enforced)</td>
<td>Mostly monolingual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NO</strong></td>
<td>Somewhat monolingual, mostly cognitivist/functionalist (implemented through recommendations)</td>
<td>Mostly cognitivist and historical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SR</strong></td>
<td>Unofficially monolingual (no active LP)</td>
<td>Mostly monolingual</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Dominant ideologies

Then, using these types of ideologies, we can look back at the picture of these countries and the regions against the background of current research.

The results from the Lithuanian data not only confirm the thesis that Lithuanian LP is extremely powerful, but also shows that the metalanguage of the experts and non-experts express the same monolingual ideals that are set in the LP. The comparison with the other Baltic countries reveals that Lithuania should be treated as a special case in the region, as neither Latvia nor Estonia have been practicing such a large-scale control of the corpus of their languages (only the status, and even that in a much narrower field). When it comes to Norway, what could come as a surprise is that the non-experts do not differ greatly in their ideologies from their Lithuanian and Serbian counterparts. This probably confirms what has been long noticed by linguists, that the beliefs about language rarely reflect the actual linguistic practices. On the other hand, the state LPs and the voices of the experts exhibit a larger ideological variation in the metalanguage and the LP practices. No ideology can be said to be dominant in whole of the country, and these three ideologies live side by side in different parts of the society. Lastly, the results of the Serbian data reveal that there is very little “anti-purist” or “liberal” about ideologies of language. The metalanguage of both experts and non-experts exhibits and a monolingual ideology behind which lure the nationalist narratives and ideals that have been prominent in the wars of the
1990s, based on a primordialist understanding of the nation and its language. But unlike in Lithuania, the State has not systematically invested any resources in an active LP. These discourses, in other words, do not have state support (at least not yet).

It could be said that these three countries fall into three ideological categories. First, Lithuania could be seen as a country of the post-Soviet area, in which the monolingual ideals are not only dominant, but also enforced by the state. Second, Norway can be seen as a Nordic country, in which the ‘lay people’, as well as non-academic language experts (see diagram 2, pp. 154), express monolingual ideologies, while the academic experts distance themselves from such ‘folk’ understandings and instead express a cognitive and historical ideology of language, while the state LP exhibits some elements of both the monolingual and cognitivist ideology. Third, as an ex-Yugoslav country, Serbia exhibits the same overwhelming dominance of monolingual ideology as in the other countries, as suggested by previous research (possibly because of the ongoing “nation-re-building” process or because of the consequences of the wars of the 1990s), but all the countries in the Balkans rely on language academies and research institutions to take responsibility for language issues. How similar the situation is in the Baltic, Scandinavian and Ex-Yugoslav are to Lithuania, Norway and Serbia remains to be verified in future research.

Answering the question on whether the ‘virtual sphere’ poses a challenge to the monolingual “grand narratives” of language, the answer is (at least in the period of 2008–2016): most likely no. Although voices that provoke and challenge linguistic nationalism and standard language ideology in creative ways can be seen on the internet, the vast majority of the commentators are doing quite the opposite: they perceive the monolingual ideologies as in decline and demand from the state and the experts to sustain them. Although, I cannot claim that the ideologies presented in this research reflect the entirety of language ideologies in the Lithuanian, Norwegian and Serbian virtual sphere, because I chose the period 2008–2016 (for example, the “bilingualism debate” in Norway and the language campaign in Serbia could have affected the results). On the other hand, the results provide a comprehensive picture of the discourse on language in the virtual sphere for the exact period of 2008–2016. This period can be labelled as the period in which the virtual sphere changed from being anonymous to being highly personalized, with social media such as Facebook, Twitter and similar becoming increasingly important tools of online debate. The virtual sphere will no doubt continue to develop and grow in many ways and perhaps in the future it could be seen as a force for ideological change. On the flip side, the growing commercialization and politicisation of the virtual sphere, raises doubts about whether this is possible. The recent “Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal” reveals a dark side of social media and a pessimistic view of its possibilities as a tool of democratic participation.

There is no way of knowing how the Internet will develop, and what ways of online participation will be made possible, and which ones will disappear in the future. Longitudinal studies and comparisons of different online metalinguistic discourses
could provide insight into how and why ideologies of language will change (or remain the same) over time.

Finally, coming back to the theoretical questions raised in the introduction: do the metadiscursive regimes described by Bauman and Briggs (2003) have hegemonic status, or are they challenged in the era of the internet? My research suggests that the modernist ideology of language does not have the status of a *hegemony* neither in the virtual sphere, nor in the state-sponsored LP. Lithuania could be considered as an example of a country where this ideology is closest to having a hegemonic status, but even there, an alternative voices emerge amongst experts and non-experts. So, the status of the monolingual ideology can be described as *dominant* rather than hegemonic. The situation is similar in the Serbian discourse, but the most powerful arbitrator – the state – does not support this ideology financially. In Norway, both the state LP and the discourse of experts show that the modernist ideology of language is losing ground and legitimacy amongst the most powerful ideological brokers.

The modernist metadiscursive regimes should be observed in particular political and socioeconomic contexts in order to determine their status in the future. One key factor that sustains the modernist view of language are the intensive nation-re-building efforts that come as a response to the perceived loss of national identity during a few decades of state socialism. This could be extended to the research of the role of politicians, institutions, as well as their economic or political interests.
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BA-%D1%98%D0%B5-%D0%B7%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%
B0%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD-%D0%BE%D0%B4-%D0%BE%D1%81%D0
%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BD%D0%B5-%D1%88%D0%BA%D0%BE%
D0%BB%D0%B5-%D0%B4%DO%BE-%D1%84%D0%B0%DA%D1%83]%n
D0%BB%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%B0

politika.rs/scc/clanak/292288/%D0%93%D0%BE%D0%BE%D1%80%
%D0%B9%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%80

III. COMMENT SECTIONS AND FORUM THREADS:

Lithuania

daily/lithuania/asmetona-lietuviu-kalba-gyvuos-ilgai.d?id=16044759

lit/news/daily/lithuania/asmetona-iteisinti-dvikalbyste-nusikaltimas.d?id=
18972724

kalbos-mokymasis-lietuviu-kalbai-nepakenks.d?id=22265622


lit/news/daily/education/griezdamismuiku-mokysis-irlietuviu-kalbos.d?id=
25055389


COM-SR-23. Politika.rs, 25.11.2015. Треба ли нам глагол требати. http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/344047/%D0%9A%D1%83%D0%BB%D1%82%D1%83%D1%80%D0%B0/%D0%A2%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B1%D0%B0-%D0%BB%D0%B8-%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BC-%D0%B3%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%BB-%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B1%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B8


COM-SR-31. Politika.rs, 09.02.2016. Језик на удару медијске површини. http://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/348811/%D0%A1%D1%83%D0%BB%D1%82%D1%83%D1%80%D0%B0/%D0%88%D0%B5%D0%B7%D0%B8%D0%BA-%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D1%83%D0%B4%D0%B0%D1%80%D1%83-%D0%BC%D0%B
6.2. SECONDARY SOURCES


oga književnog jezika, 52(4), 139-148.


basada Švicarske konfederacije.

Krämer, P. (2017). Delegitimising Creoles and Multiethnolects: Stereotypes And (Mis-) Conceptions of Language in Online Debates. *Caribbean Studies, 45*(1/2), 107-142.


International journal of the sociology of language 154, 65-82.


Wodak, R. & Matouschek, B. (1993). ‘We are dealing with people whose origins one can clearly tell just by looking’: Critical discourse analysis and the study of neo-racism in contemporary Austria. *Discourse & Society, 4*(2), 225-248.


### 7. APPENDICES

#### APPENDIX 1. EXPERT ARTICLES: COMPARISON OF BELIEFS ABOUT LANGUAGE IN THE ARTICLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>Belief</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nr. of occurrences</td>
<td>% of articles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>59.7%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>65.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Geographical</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social group</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-ethnic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Articles containing a belief about representation</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>75.8%</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
<td>75.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expertise</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Articles containing a belief about expertise</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>67.7%</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td>ID-cultural</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ID-horizontal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communicative</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Instrumentalist</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Articles containing a belief about function</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Complex notions of</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>language</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnolinguistic</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Normativist</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prescriptivist</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pragmatic</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Variationist</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Atomic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total articles</td>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


## Appendix 2: Expert Articles: Occurrences of Notions and Beliefs about Language, per Country / Expert Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complex notions</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National-elitist</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monoglot</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ethnolingustic</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>Normativist</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Prescriptivist</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pragmatic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variationist</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atomic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Representation</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social group</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expertise</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Internal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ID-cultural</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID-horizontal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicative</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumentalist</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| # roles identified in articles: | 43 | 12 | 10 | 38 | 12 | 8 |
| # total articles:               | 62 | 44 | 79 |
### Appendix 3. Expert Articles: Percentage (of the Total Number of Articles) of Notions and Beliefs About Language, per Country / Expert Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Complex notions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National–elitist</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monoglot</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnolinguistic</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normativist</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prescriptivist</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pragmatic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variationist</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atomic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Representation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social group</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles containing a belief about representation</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expertise</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles containing a belief about expertise</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Function</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID-cultural</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID-horizontal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicative</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumentalist</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles containing a belief about function</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% roles in the total number of articles</td>
<td>69.4%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Acd. = academic expert; Soc-acd. = sociolinguist (academic) expert; Pop-acd. = popular academic expert; Non-acd. = non-academic expert
### Appendix 4. ‘Vox populi’ comments: Number and percentage of notions and beliefs about language in the comments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notion / belief</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National-elitist</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monoglot</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnolinguistic</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normativist</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prescriptivist</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pragmatic</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variationist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>185</strong></td>
<td><strong>53</strong></td>
<td><strong>214</strong></td>
<td><strong>51%</strong></td>
<td><strong>17.2%</strong></td>
<td><strong>65.6%</strong></td>
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</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Representation</th>
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<th>Norway</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>54.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social group</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>0.3%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-ethnic</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>185</strong></td>
<td><strong>53</strong></td>
<td><strong>214</strong></td>
<td><strong>51%</strong></td>
<td><strong>17.2%</strong></td>
<td><strong>65.6%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expertise</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>66.9%</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>7.1%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>136</strong></td>
<td><strong>241</strong></td>
<td><strong>97</strong></td>
<td><strong>37.5%</strong></td>
<td><strong>78.2%</strong></td>
<td><strong>29.8%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
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<th>Norway</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identificational (cultural and horizontal)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>4.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communicative</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumentalist</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>63</strong></td>
<td><strong>61</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
<td><strong>17.4%</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.8%</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.9%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# articles in the sample: 363 308 326
**Appendix 5. Relative values for each belief about language (% of the total beliefs within each of the three categories – representation, expertise and function) in both expert and commentator discourse.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belief</th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Commentators</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Representation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>78.7%</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical</td>
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<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social group</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-ethnic</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expertise</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td>61.9%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Function</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identificational</td>
<td>56.5%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicative</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instrumentalist</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Vuk VUKOTIĆ

LANGUAGE SERVES THE PEOPLE,
NOT THE OTHER WAY AROUND!

Ideologies of language in Lithuania, Norway, Serbia
and the Baltic, Scandinavian and Ex-Yugoslav regions.
A typological perspective on metalinguistic media discourses
and language policies

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION
HUMANITIES, PHILOLOGY (04 H)

Išleido Lietuvių kalbos institutas, P. Vileišio g. 5, LT-10308 Vilnius
Spausdino UAB „BMK Leidykla“, J. Jasinskio g. 16, LT-03163 Vilnius

Nemokamai.